Issue 259: A New Era

Any debate on the RAAF’s future air combat capabilities would not be complete without revisiting the past to find how we got to this point, and how these events have influenced the decisions which will affect the RAAF’s future force.

Classic Hornet

The F/A-18A/B Hornet, arguably the first combat aircraft designed from the ground up to be a true multirole fighter, was selected to replace the RAAF’s Mirage III fighters in 1981, ahead of the single-engined and then single role General Dy-namics F-16A and Dassault Mirage 2000, and entered service in 1985.

But before being shortlisted, the F/A-18, F-16 and Mirage 2000 were considered as part of a larger mix which included the F-15 Eagle, the F-14A Tomcat, and even the Panavia Tornado. The Tornado was dropped early on as it was predominantly a strike aircraft with little or no air-to-air capability, while conversely and despite offering some commonality with the then new F-111C, the hugely expensive F-14 had no air-to-surface or strike capability.

Anecdotally, there was strong support for the F-15 within RAAF circles due in no small part to its ‘no compromise’ approach to the air-to-air role, and thus its promise of airspace domination for years or even decades to come. But the F-15’s initial ‘not a pound for air-to-ground’ approach was also part of its undoing for the RAAF, as it would not have adequately fulfilled the Mi-rage replacement’s multirole requirement. There were also political concerns at the time as to how some nearby regional pow-ers, already sensitive over the small F-111C fleet’s near-strategic strike capability, may have reacted to an Australian F-15 buy.

But despite the requirement of a multi-role capability to replace the Mirage, some insiders believe the RAAF leadership of the time was fixated on the F-111 being The bomber, and the F/A-18 being The fighter, and thus didn’t truly appreciate or utilise the multirole capability of the Hor-net in its early days.

However, tightening budgets and the end of the cold war in the early 1990s meant western air combat requirements were quickly changing, with many believing the days of the single role fighter were num-bered. This was borne out by the Iraq and Balkans conflicts of the 1990s which saw allied air forces quickly gain air superiority over adversaries and then be able to switch their F-16s and F/A-18s over to strike and even close air support missions.

F-111

Meanwhile, when many were beginning to foresee the end of the single role fighter, in the 1980s the RAAF’s F-111Cs were becoming more difficult to support, leading to the Avionics Update Program (or AUP). Let in 1990 to Rockwell (which was later absorbed into Boeing), the complex AUP saw the F-111Cs fitted in the mid-late 1990s with new digital avionics in place of unreliable and increasingly difficult to sup-port analog systems.

Despite AUP, one option briefly pro-posed in 1991 was for the F-111 instead to be replaced by a similar number of F/A-18D Hornets or perhaps F-15EStrike Eagles plus a few extra tankers. The F/A-18D in particular had obvious com-monality benefits with the RAAF’s existing F/A-18A/B fleet, and was being built in ‘Night Attack’ form for the US Navy and Marine Corps with many systems com-mon or similar to those later fitted to the RAAF’s Hornets under the Hornet Upgrade Program (HUG).

The F-111 fleet’s longer term future was really secured by the Keating government’s 1992 decision to acquire 15 former USAF F-111Gs. Although some in the RAAF privately felt it was a rash decision, for which there was no active requirement, the intention was to extend the F-111’s service life by spreading flying hours over a larger aircraft fleet.

The future of the F-111 seemed fur-ther assured with the 1999 acquisition of 11 F-111A and F-111G airframes, 130 TF30 engines, a few dozen wing sets, and a number of ALR-621 RWR kits from AMARC to ensure an adequate supply of spares for the RAAF’s fleet. The intention at that time was to keep the aircraft in service until 2015 to 2020.

But despite offering enhanced capabili-ties and improved availability rates in the AVIATIONpast decade, with the F-111 now slated for retirement at the end of 2010 it is questionable whether Australia has seen an adequate return on its investment in AUP. The RAAF also did not build upon the AUP’s capabilities by giving the F-111 improved communications including datalinks, enhanced integrated electronic warfare equipment, and the capability to employ GPS guided bombs. But with the RAAF and DSTO (Defence Science & Technology Organisation) concerned about the F-111 suffering from structural fatigue issues, that argument is academic.

Conversely, had the F-111 been replaced in the mid 1990s with a more modern mul-tirole capability equipped with datalinks and improved sensors, this in turn would have enhanced the capability of the Classic F/A-18A/B fleet and would have negated the need for a bridging capability from 2010.

Hug

As with the F-111 and AUP, the RAAF’s Hornets have been comprehen-sively upgraded under HUG (Air 5376). But there were other options on the table in the late 1990s for the replacement of the classic Hornets instead of performing the comprehensive HUG upgrade.

One option proposed by Boeing at the time was for the RAAF’s Hornets to be replaced by F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. Boeing had reportedly counselled against upgrading the ‘classics’ as the aircraft had originally been designed to be retired once its projected fatigue life of about 6000 hours was reached. But fighter aircraft are expensive things to buy and bed down and defence budgets are finite, and so the RAAF instead chose to spend around $3 billion on the HUG program, arguably the most comprehensive fighter upgrade performed anywhere in the past decade.

Despite being a success, HUG has not been without considerable pain for the RAAF, with aircraft availability suffer-ing in recent years as jets underwent their modifications. But with the centre-bar-rel replacement program now limited to just 11 airframes and only the electronic warfare system upgrade under Phase 2. 3 to be completed, availability of what is now the most capable classic Hornet fleet in the world should improve in the coming months and years.

Still, ongoing concerns over other structural and fatigue issues in the aircraft’s wings and undercarriage will certainly continue to be closely monitored.

AIR 6000

With the AUP and HUG programs getting underway or approved, in 1999 the ADF established the Air 6000 project office with the goal of defining the require-ments for the eventual replacement of both the F-111 and the F/A-18. The project drew together elements from Air Force’s Capability Systems, the DMO and the DSTO, and initially sought to replace the Hornet from 2012-2015 and the F-111 in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe.

But Air 6000 also sought to avoid what it called the ‘replacement mentality’ that had characterised previous aircraft retirements and acquisitions, and instead looked at “long term airpower needs and wants” and how to turn “those needs into a meaningful requirement that industry can respond to”. The project team determined early on that it would be difficult to replace the F-111’s strike and range capabilities so, as well as traditional manned aircraft, the studies also looked at unmanned aircraft and long range missile systems. The 2000 Defence White Paper helped form the basis of the project guidance.

But on June 26 2002, the Howard government announced that Australia would participate in the multinational Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and that the JSF would be selected to fulfil Air 6000’s requirements from 2006, should its development and costs proceed smoothly and the aircraft continue to meet Aus-tralia’s requirements. For many observers, commentators and those in industry, this announcement was completely unexpected, and effectively meant other potential solu-tions would no longer be considered.

NACC

With the Air 6000 solution now effec-tively settled, the project was allocated seri-ous forward funding to the tune of between $12 and $15 billion for the acquisition of between 75 and 100 F-35As and associated training and infrastructure, and was split into three acquisition phases.

Phases 2A and 2B (which have subse-quently been combined) will see the first two ‘tranches’ of aircraft acquired for service entry in the 2012 to 2018 timeframe, while Phase 2C is ostensibly keeping an open mind on whether an additional tranche of F-35s will be bought, or an undefined “complementary system” obtained.

In the meantime, the Commonwealth committed an initial US$150 million to the JSF’s development program and topped that up with a further US$100 million in 2006, giving it true partner status along with eight other countries and deeper insight and input into the aircraft’s development. To this end, partner nations have been involved in the definition of the aircraft’s capabilities and development path, and RAAF and DSTO personnel have been and will be given unprecedented access throughout this process.

Jointstrike Fighter

However, the F-35’s development path has not been entirely smooth to date, with weight issues forcing a partial redesign of the aircraft in 2004, delaying the flight test program by a couple of years. The first F-35 development aircraft, AA-1, was built to the old design and is therefore not truly representative of production aircraft, while the first F-35B, BF-1, and BF-2 (which is due to commence flight tests at the time of writing) and follow-on test aircraft are built to the later design.

Ongoing delays in integrating the F-35’s systems onto the 737 airliner based CATBird testbed have also meant much of the systems testing is yet to commence, while a low pressure turbine blade failure on a test engine in late 2007 meant a partial redesign to the P&W F135 engine core (see from p64) became necessary, a contributing factor in the delay in starting hover trials of BF-1.

In the US, the F-35’s political survival AVIATIONis not guaranteed, with various US and foreign government audit and oversight groups continually expressing their concern at the cost of the program, in particular in the context of huge expenditures on the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and how these affect the US defence budget into the future. Consequently, funding for items such as test aircraft and for the alternate F136 engine has been withheld and then reinstated several times, resulting in uncertainty.

Today the F-35 program is approach-ing a key point in its history, with a new US presidential administration deter-mined to reel in government spending, of which defence is a major part in the com-ing years, and where many other capabili-ties are fighting for its attention in the FY2010 budget.

So far there has been little wrong with the aircraft itself, although with only single figure percentages of the flight test and systems integration testing programs complete, it is still very early days in the JSF’s development.

The F-35 was designed to meet a series of requirements for the US and allied nations through to 2040 and beyond, and being designed as a true multirole combat aircraft from the ground up, the USAF will mainly employ it in the battlefield and maritime strike, close air support, and occasional deep strike roles, with the F-22 Raptor taking care of the air domi-nance mission. But for those US services and partner nations who can ill-afford to acquire and operate a top tier fighter, the F-35 will need to be equally adept at the air-to-air mission.

It is here where the F-35 has attracted the bulk of its criticism from various com-mentators, observers and interest groups, many of whom claim that the F-35 will not be able to compete in the air-to-air arena with fourth generation Russian fighters or operate safely in the face of long range Russian SAM systems currently being fielded, let alone any other fifth genera-tion fighters that might be on the drawing board. (But it is relevant here to note the views in the article introducing the Wil-liams Foundation (p70) that defence forces must have a number of critical capacities in order to generate an effective air combat capability – merely owning a fighter like a Sukhoi Su-30 does not equate to an effec-tive air combat capability. ) Criticism over the F-35’s radar signature away from the forward quadrant, it’s lack of speed and kinematic performance, and its comparatively small weapons load outs has been constant, as has condemnation of the aircraft’s aggressive development schedule which will see the first US Marine Corps squadrons fielded some 18 months before the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) program has been completed.

The F-35’s many supporters counter with their belief that the aircraft’s stealth and advanced sensors and communications will always give it the ability to look and shoot first without the need to engage in close quarters combat, and that much of the risk in the program will have been retired by the USMC’s 2012 service entry timeframe through the large test fleet, laboratory bench testing and the CATBird testbed.

Questions over the initial cost of the aircraft and its cost of ownership have also been constants. As with all military aircraft programs, the further along the develop-ment path a country buys an aircraft, gen-erally the cheaper it will be, as much of the non-recurring development and production establishment costs will have been retired and the support program will have been established. But many of the partners, in-cluding all of the US services, the UK, and Australia, will require deliveries quite early in the production run, meaning higher up- front acquisition costs and having to sign up to an immature support system.

There has been much speculation over exactly how much an F-35A will cost, but with many different ways to measure the costs it is difficult to compare apples with apples. Still it is fair to assume that in the early low-rate production run, from which Australia has tentatively been al-lotted at least 27 F-35s, they will cost well over US$100m (A$153m) each. Later production aircraft should see that cost drop to under US$80m (A$123m). But as these prices do not include the cost of establishing new basing facilities, training systems, maintenance systems, ground support equipment and the myriad of an-cillary costs associated with buying a new combat aircraft, it is clear Australia will not see much change from the $15 billion it has allocated.

Lockheed Martin has proposed a consor-tium buy between partner nations which would set a fixed price for each aircraft regardless of where it falls in the produc-tion run, but such a proposal still has to AVIATIONrun the gamut of US defence and political approval processes, and it appears to be an ‘all or nothing’ deal that all partner nations must sign up to.

Concern has also been expressed over how the F-35 will be supported in service. With US laws on the export of military technology ever-tightening, there will likely be systems within the aircraft that will not be able to be repaired or serviced on foreign soil, raising questions of operational sover-eignty over a not unsubstantial investment in combat aircraft.

But the biggest threat to the JSF pro-gram is likely to come from the current global economic crisis, which shows no sign of waning, both in the US and in partner nations. Will the Obama admin-istration defer or even cancel the program and instead go for more F-22s and other capabilities which are already in or closer to production, and will partner nations defer their F-35 buys in favour of shorter term economic stimulus measures? This will no doubt all be taken into account before the Australian government re-affirms its commitment to the JSF through the White Paper, Defence Capability Plan and part two of its air combat review later this year.

The Super Hornet is about so much more than just having sufficient airframes in Amberley’s ‘carports’ in the next decade.

BACC

With the prospects of a fully opera-tional F-35 continuing to be delayed, and the F-111 showing signs of wear and tear which indicated it might not realise its planned 2015-2020 withdrawal, under direction from former Defence Minister Brendan Nelson the RAAF began formu-lating a contingency plan for a bridging capability to ‘de-risk’ the air combat force in the middle of next decade.

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet had ostensibly always been the “fall-back op-tion” should the JSF program experience difficulties, and the RAAF had kept a continuous watching brief on that aircraft and its development path, no doubt aided by a constant drip feed of information from Boeing’s astute and patient sales team.

Rumours that the government was start-ing to consider a bridging capability began to emerge in mid to late 2006. Boeing had reportedly been asked by Minister Nelson to brief him on the Super Hornet and to develop options for a decade-long bridg-ing capability to cover the gap between the F-111 and the F-35. Details were firmed up in late 2006 and a contract signed in February 2007 for 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornets to enter service from 2010 under the new Air 5349 Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC) Project, while the concurrent decision was taken to retire the F-111s in late 2010.

In many ways, the Super Hornet is a means to an end, and from the Air Force’s point of view the aircraft is about so much more than just having sufficient airframes in Amberley’s ‘carports’ in the next decade. The aircraft’s advanced AESA radar, sen-sors, avionics and low observable features will allow the RAAF’s workforce to better transition to the ‘fifth generation’ F-35 when it finally arrives, rather than make the huge leap straight from the 1960s era F-111 and 1980s F/A-18 classics.

To this end, the Super Hornet workforce will operate under higher security ratings; the new headquarters buildings and hang-ars for the operating 1 and 6 Squadrons will have greater security and compart-mentalisation in preparation for the F-35; life support, logistics and even base rescue personnel will learn how to deal with new equipment, technologies and materials; while the pilots and back seat air combat officers will experience new levels of situ-ational awareness through the aircraft’s sensors, displays, helmets and datalinks.

Criticism of the Super Hornet buy has again centred around that aircraft’s perceived inferiority in the air-to-air arena when compared to aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-30MK which is proliferating in our region. And to a certain extent, that argument has some merit. Fighter pilots will tell you that speed and altitude are life, and that the ability to engage and disen-gage at will usually determines the outcome of an air battle.

But supporters of the aircraft argue the F/A-18F’s combination of AESA radar and other advanced sensors and weap-ons, superior networking and situational awareness, and training will see the aircraft remain tactically relevant until the early 2020s, at which time a decision will have been taken on whether to replace or to upgrade and retain it. They also point out that, by its very presence, the Super Hornet will also enhance the capability of the RAAF’s classic Hornet fleet through its ability to share its sensor data via Link-16 when operating together, thus making it a force multiplier.

In 2008 the core of 1SQN, after divest-ing itself of its remaining F-111s and some of its maintenance and administration per-sonnel, began relocating to NAS Lemoore in California to train on and prepare for the Super Hornet. The RAAF’s first jet is scheduled to be rolled out on July 8 and, after a period of testing by US Navy and Boeing pilots, will be based at Lemoore from early next year prior to the first wave of aircraft arriving at Amberley next May – almost 25 years to the day after the first classic Hornets arrived at Williamtown.

The F-22 Debate

That Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor is the pre-eminent fighter aircraft of our time is a given. But is it right for Australia? There’s no doubt that the F-22 is ex-pensive to acquire, and costly to operate. Recently published figures put its current multi-year procurement unit cost at about US$150m (A$230m) each, not including initial fleet establishment costs such as bas- brid ing infrastructure, ground support equip-ment, training and other necessities. And a recent report by the US Project On Gov-ernment Oversight (POGO) has revealed that the F-22 has a mission capable rate of just 60 per cent in USAF service, in part due to issues relating to the maintenance of its low observable coatings and shape.

Current funding levels will see the USAF acquire just 187 F-22s, while other funding to the tune of a reported US$8. 3bn (A$12. 7bn) for planned Block 30 and Block 40 enhancements will only be sufficient to cover part of the fleet. But in the lead up to the Obama administration’s FY2010 budget due in April, political ele-ments along with new USAF Chief Gen-eral Norton Schwarz have been talking up the prospect of extending the line to 243 aircraft – although this still falls some way short of the USAF’s actual but seemingly unachievable requirement for 381 F-22s. Such a move by the Obama administration would also have the added benefit of realis-ing short term economic stimulus benefits in an economy in decline.

But many other commentators and crit-ics of the F-22 from within and outside of the US military have instead been pushing for advanced developments and upgrades of the current fleet of ‘legacy’ fighters such as the F-15, F-16 and Super Hornet, as these aircraft are cheaper to build and maintain, can be enhanced with AESA radars and other advanced systems, and ostensibly can be built in sufficient numbers to overwhelm any likely opposing force.

But, no matter how many stealth treat-ments and coatings applied, these aircraft would still retain their relatively large radar cross sections. More than 30 years after the first true stealth fighter, the F-117, entered service and two years after it was retired, did we really think the mighty USAF would still have fewer than 200 stealth aircraft in service? Either way, it’s generally accepted amongst most commentators that the USAF needs to start replacing ageing fighters soon.

Meanwhile, very early in the Air 6000 process in Australia the DSTO undertook studies of the F-22 as a potential candidate for the RAAF, and established that while “the F-22 is a very nice fighter aircraft…it is not what we want and we have the stud-ies to prove that. ” Subsequent comments by successive RAAF chiefs support DSTO’s findings. They say the F-22 is very much a single role aircraft without the multirole capabilities planned for the F-35.

Still, others point out that both the GPS guided JDAM and SDB (small diameter bomb) have been cleared for release on the F-22, and that further strike and network-ing enhancements are programmed in the Block 30/40 upgrades. Some point out that the F-35’s somewhat blurred block upgrade path appears to be moving weapons and capabilities downstream as the develop-ment process slips. Indeed, the F-22 has dropped hundreds of JDAMs and SDBs to date, while the F-35 is yet to drop even a single weapon.

The F-22’s key advantages are its superior speed, supercruise and altitude, which translates into greater kinematic ‘throw weights’ for its weapons and allows it to get to the fight faster and to engage and disengage at will; it has all aspect very low observability, or stealth, which cannot easily be countered by current to medium future threats; it can become a de facto AEW&C platform once its weapons are expended; has significant room for growth; and it has been designed to work with lower tier strike/close air support aircraft and pack-ages.

Nonetheless, the F-22 still faces an un-certain political future and thus uncertain long term support and upgrade paths; many of its systems operate processors designed and built in the early 1990s which would need to be replaced in future upgrades; there are currently no stand-off missiles or maritime strike weapons programmed into its block upgrade programs; it doesn’t provide much of an increase in range over its predecessors; it requires lower tier strike and close air support aircraft to oper-ate with it once air dominance has been achieved; and it is prohibitively expensive to acquire and establish even a small force.

And then there is the one irrefutable remaining point against the F-22 – by law the F-22 can’t be exported. General Schwartz confirmed this recently when he said that some of the F-22’s technolo-gies are too sensitive to export, although he added that “it was a possibility” that an ally who wanted the aircraft could pay for it to be suitably modified to eliminate any export control concerns the US might have. But this would come at a high price tag – DMO insiders say A$1 billion – and would also create an orphan variant leading to supportability issues.

‘Real politik’ plays a role here too. The most likely F-22 export customer is Japan, which has long expressed an interest in the jet – but some in the US resist an F-22 sale to Japan for fear of upsetting China and the delicate strategic balance in North Asia.

Regional context

The Australian airpower debate also needs to be seen in a strategic context of who and what the threat is.

Certainly there are more and more capa-ble fighters in the wider Asia Pacific region. In particular emerging powers China and India continue to build their air arms through the integration of modern systems mainly of Russian origin. And China has also revealed its indigenous Chengdu J-10 (F-10) to the world and has shown it to be, in airshow configuration at least, to be a capable performer (see Jan-Feb ’09 AA).

Closer to home, Indonesia has taken delivery of a further four Su-30MKs, although the combat effectiveness of these and the previously accepted two Su-30s and two Su-27s remains questionable. Malaysia has received its initial batch of eight Su-30MKMs to complement its small fleets of F/A-18Ds and MiG-29s in service, and the first of 20 AESA-equipped F-15SGs for Singapore has commenced flight test prior to its handover to the RSAF and workup in the US over the next few years.

That is a proliferation of advanced fight-ers the RAAF hasn’t faced in some decades. But armed with likely a much deeper insight into the various regional geopoliti-cal and military posturing by friends and potential foes alike, the ADF consistently asserts that it is headed down the right path – acquiring the Super Hornet to complement the upgraded classic Hornets, supported by the forthcoming Wedgetail AEW&C and KC-30A tanker force mul-tipliers, before the fifth generation F-35 arrives later next decade.