One size fits all?

Thus if you accept the premise of the efficiency of a single type fighter force, then there really is only one logical aircraft type for the RAAF in the longer term – the F-35 JSF.

The JSF promises to be the ultimate jack-of-all-trades fighter – stealthy, internal weapons carriage, huge internal fuel volume, manoeuvrability on par with the F-16, AESA radar, EO sensors. Not only that, but it should be affordable – the huge buy numbers planned by the US and partner nations means it will achieve economies of scale in production probably not seen since the Vietnam war.

Certainly the exact JSF buy numbers will move around and so the exact unit price will jump about as a consequence, and sure early production aircraft will be expensive. But there’s no doubt that come mid next decade and the F-35 product line is humming, no other fighter currently in production could hope to match its economies of scale and unit price. And then there is the upgrade path, the development cost of which will be borne by several partner nations and amortised over a production run in the thousands.

It’s a compelling argument, from a capability perspective, and a bang-for-buck viewpoint. And despite all the arguments of effectively curtailing the Air 6000 process to evaluate all likely options to replace the fighter force, the then government’s 2002 decision to join the JSF program has always been a no-brainer.

Undoubtedly there are risks with the JSF program. Even as production ramps up the flight test development program is still immature. Then there are political and budgetary induced risks. The new US Obama administration is facing trillion dollar deficits in coming years as it battles recession, so trimming or slowing the JSF production program might be an irresistible target for budget pruning, especially seeing as the US GAO has called for JSF production to be slowed to allow the development program to mature (witness the problems the RAAF Wedgetail is experiencing, where development is running concurrently with production – see p52).

That then makes the decision to acquire 24 Super Hornets as a bridging fighter to allow for the retirement of the F-111 seem smarter by the day, as it makes the JSF’s RAAF service entry less time critical – meaning Australia can buy later, cheaper and more capable JSFs if it chooses. Further, it removes the risk of further ageing aircraft issues with the F-111 and introduces into the RAAF a generational jump in capabilities (AESA radar, networking).

But how does the Super Hornet fit into the drive for a single type fighter force – even moreso now the government has announced 12 of the 24 Supers will be wired from the outset to be easily converted into EA-18G Growler EW jammer aircraft? Ostensibly the Supers are being acquired for a 10 year service career while the F-111 and ‘classic’ Hornet to F-35 transition occurs, so ultimately the single fighter force plan would be realised. But on the other hand history suggests that no fighter will be in service for such a short period (Australia’s classic Hornets began entering service nearly 25 years ago), and the decision to wire 12 Fs for possible Growler conversion only reinforces that.

Maybe the Growler decision is just being prudent in increasing the F’s possible resale value back to the US Navy. Or maybe with a force of 12 Growlers in RAAF service in a decade’s time, the goal of a single fighter force will remain far off.

And should the JSF encounter more difficulties and delays, does that then crack the door open ever so slightly for a dual fighter force of F-22s and EA‑18G-F/A‑18Fs instead? Alternatively, with Australia facing budgetary pressures of its own, a more likely outcome could well be additional Super Hornets for a long term all Super/classic Hornet force. n