A new voice for the airpower debate

As a former Chief of Air Force and inaugural chairman of the Williams Foundation, I’m pleased to take this opportunity to explain our organisation’s aims and structure.

It is with pleasure that on February 23 that we formally launched the Williams Foundation, a subsidiary of the RAAF Association, at Parliament House in Canberra.

The Williams Foundation is named after Sir Richard Williams (pictured above), a WW1 Army pilot who became the first Chief of the independent Royal Australian Air Force when it was formed in 1921.

The foundation aims to broaden public debate on issues relating to Australian defence and security. We plan to do this by developing discussion papers on topical issues relating to defence and security and holding seminars and discussion groups with decision makers and people with influence and/or ideas.

The Williams Foundation is an independently funded not-for-profit organisation.

Our organisation is controlled by a board, whose members have a great depth and breadth of experience in the airpower domain. Our board members comprise: Dr Al Stephens, a former RAAF pilot and noted author on Defence issues; AM Barry Gration (Retd) – former CAF and Air Commander; RADM Raydon Gates (Retd) – former Maritime Commander and Commander of the Australian Defence College; AVM John Blackburn (Retd) – former DCAF and now a director of the Kokoda Foundation; AVM Brendan O’Lochlin (Retd) – former defence attache to Washington and principal of the College of Defence and Strategic Studies; AVM Roxley McLennan (Retd) – former DCAF and National President of the RAAF Association; and WGCDR Lance Halvorson (Retd) – former RAAF navigator and president of the ACT Division of the RAAF Association.

We also hope to encourage an ex-Army member to join us shortly to further enhance our joint approach to our discussions and presentations.

Some may ask why launch another think-tank now? We believe now is the correct time because Australia’s national security and defence environment is in a period of significant change. The Prime Minister’s National Security Statement reflects a significant and most welcome change in how we address national security issues in this country. His statement will be followed by the Defence White Paper and associated companion reviews in the next few months.

We also anticipate detailed announcement of the outcomes of the Pappas and Mortimer reviews, both of which will have significant impacts on how Defence functions.

In addition to changes instigated by government, the global financial crisis will affect all aspects of our lives; full impact of the crisis will become evident over the next few years.

Thus, the government is setting new policy directions in a time of significant global economic change. In this complex environment, the Defence Department is concurrently undergoing multiple, overlapping, reviews and commencing one of the most significant changes in capabilities since the Second World War.

Many of us have experienced large scale, concurrent and often poorly coordinated change programs in the past. While many positive outcomes were achieved from the Defence reviews and reforms of the past, unintended damage was also done, much of which is still being addressed by the Department.

It is critical that lessons identified in previous change programs are remembered and applied to the challenges ahead.

Our view is that constructive debate and discussion will be essential as the government directs and implements its policy changes if we are to learn the lessons of the past and avoid a legacy of poorly implemented change programs in the future.

Our goal is for the Williams Foundation to foster and support constructive debate in that environment of change.

We launch the Williams Foundation with the release two papers, on defence policy and the New Air Combat Capability debate.

Our defence policy paper titled ‘A Uniquely Australian Defence Policy: Control and Protect’ proposes a policy that directly addresses Australia’s 21st century circumstances. This policy supersedes both expeditionary and defence of Australia models; unambiguously distinguishes between wars of necessity and wars of choice; maximises our comparative advantages; minimises the risk of unintended consequences; does not invent threats; recognises that there are things that military action cannot and should not do; explicitly connects our national security to that of our neighbours; and is not an adjunct of someone else’s policy.

The policy proposes that defence of Australia and its interests is best achieved through use of a maritime strategy throughout our immediate region, to shape and to control our strategic environment, protect our people and values, and cooperate closely with our friends, allies and neighbours.

The second paper is on the New Air Combat Capability.

Discussion on the air combat capability has concentrated on the performance of various aircraft and missiles – topicssuch as speed, range, stealth, turning performance, radar performance and missile performance.

These parameters are important but by themselves are insufficient. The debate must address the full range of capability elements and the affordability of the capability as part of the total force.

Any discussion on affordability must include an assessment of the number of airframes necessary to provide minimum levels of capability and sustainability.

The Kokoda Foundation released an authoritative paper on fleet size and concluded that five squadrons with about 120 aircraft gave the government the greatest degree of flexibility as well as being sustainable over an adequate period. Sustainability also applies to personnel training and development; a force that is not self sustaining in personnel is not viable.

Turning to the less visible but nevertheless critical factors, the “ultimate performing” aircraft in the world (whatever that means) will not meet our needs unless it has: Supportability – the logistics chain has a very high probability of obtaining the correct parts on time; Maintainability – training and maintenance systems are geared to minimum turnaround times; Reliability – there is a high probability that the aircraft will return from a mission combat ready; Affordability – acquisition of 100+ aircraft and more importantly maintenance of those aircraft does not unduly distort defence budgets; Interoperability – an air combat capability is but one important cog in a very large network of air, land and sea based systems, and the aircraft must be able to interact with systems such as the Air Warfare Destroyer, Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft as well as systems of our friends and allies; Operability – it must have highly integrated sensor and weapons systems that can be operated effectively and efficiently by our people; and Upgradability – no platform can be operated for its structural life of type and remain operationally relevant without significant through-life capability upgrades. Platform systems architectures must be designed for easy upgrade and integration of future systems and there must be a large enough user community to share the nonrecurring costs of such development programs.

We cannot stress enough the fact that defence forces that do not have these qualities cannot generate an effective air combat capability. Merely owning a fighter like a Sukhoi Su-30 does not equate to an effective air combat capability.

Because we do not have access to classified information, If Defence uses a list of issues like we have postulated the F-35 should be very high on the list because it has been designed from the start to address all of those issues.

It is critical that lessons identified in previous change programs are remembered and applied to the challenges ahead.

the paper does not categorically state that Australia must purchase the F-35. However,

if Defence uses a list of issues like we have postulated the F-35 should be very high on the list because it has been designed from the start to address all of those issues.

In summary, our aim is to broaden the debate on defence and security in a positive manner and not simply throw barbs at anything and everything affecting Australian defence and security.

Finally, I would like to thank our sponsors. The board invites sponsorship from individuals and organisations wishing to contribute constructively to forward looking Australian defence policy.

Chemring Australia, a manufacturer of defence pyrotechnics and air, land and sea based decoys, and Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the F‑22 and the F-35, have given us adequate funding to commence activities, and we plan to broaden our sponsorship base across a wide range of companies.

With their aid and your support, we look forward to broadening the airpower debate. n Further details on the Williams Foundation can be found at www. williamsfoundation. org. au.

Australian Aviation is pleased to support the Foundation through providing a forum for articles and columns.