From Caribou to Spartan

But many observers saw the BFA project as low-hanging fruit ripe for the budget pickers, especially as the ADF already had gone without the capability offered by the Caribou for more than two years since its retirement in late 2009.

Indeed, many would argue that, without modern electronic warfare self-protection, digital communications and with its orphan fuel radial engines, the Caribou had been tactically irrelevant in all but the most benign combat environments close to home for much longer than that.

Survivor

But survive it did, and on May 10, only 36 hours after a federal budget in which several key Defence projects took a big hit, Defence Minister Stephen Smith announced to the Airpower Conference in Canberra that the C-27J had been down-selected to fulfil the BFA requirement.

This after more than 30 years of searching for a Caribou replacement, a process initially kicked off in the late 1970s — and covered by founding publisher Jim Thorn in our inaugural issue in 1977 — through a series of studies that matured into Project AIR 5190, cancelled at the 11th hour in 1999 before being reinvented as AIR 8000 Phase 2 in 2001.

The C-27J announcement also confirmed the RAAF’s eight remaining C-130H Hercules would be retired early as part of Defence’s contribution to the government’s plan to return to surplus. Industry insiders commented that the H-model, in service since 1978 and which previously had been set to remain in service until 2016, had been traded off for the arguably more capable and flexible C-27J.

A May 10 ministerial statement read: “The C-27J was assessed by Defence as the aircraft that best met all the essential capability requirements and provides the best value for money. It was assessed as being able to fly further, faster, higher while carrying more cargo and requiring a smaller runway than the other aircraft under consideration, the Airbus Military C295.”

A subsequent US Department of Defense contract announcement showed that the 10 aircraft, modification work by L-3 and initial logistics and software support comprises US$321.7 million, about a quarter of the total project cost. The balance is expected to be taken up by facilities costs, ground support equipment, training systems including a full flight simulator, initial spares holdings, training of RAAF and industry crews and technicians and technical and training publications.

The minister’s statement added: “Initial logistic support, including training for aircrew and maintenance personnel will be provided through the FMS program, utilising the system that has been established in the US,” “Defence will seek a separate agreement with the C-27J manufacturer Alenia to ensure that RAAF can operate, maintain and modify the aircraft throughout its planned life.”

And barely three weeks after the selection of the C-27J, Defence followed up by announcing it had awarded a contract to original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Alenia Aermacchi to “allow for” the long-term operation, maintenance, modification and upgrade of the aircraft and its support systems.

In a joint June 3 statement, Minister Stephen Smith and Defence Materiel Minister Jason Clare said: “The contract, which is worth around $63 million, will also provide Defence with the ability to compete and sub-license third parties, including Australian industry, to provide the maintenance services, training services and the ability to modify the C-27J capability.”

With little local presence, it’s likely Alenia will sub-contract much of the C-27J’s support work. Local firms such as Qantas Defence Services (QDS) and Australian Aerospace, which support the C-130H and C-130J at Richmond respectively, are likely candidates to compete for this work.

The May 10 statement also reaffirmed RAAF claims that the C-27J can access nearly four times the number of airfields in Australia than the larger C-130J and double the number of airfields in our wider region, as well as being able to operate into softer or unprepared fields.

The new aircraft will be based at RAAF Richmond west of Sydney with a resurrected 35SQN, disbanded in 1999 when Caribou operations were consolidated with 38SQN, under the command of 84WG. Defence says the aircraft and associated spares, training and equipment will cost about $1.4 billion.

The choice of Richmond as the C-27J’s base seems strange on face value, as much of the aircraft’s work is expected to be done in Australia’s north and in neighbouring locations such as PNG, the Solomon Islands and East Timor.

But co-locating the C-27J with its bigger cousin the C-130J brings economies of scale in supporting their similar engines and avionics. And Richmond has excess ramp and hangar capacity following the retirement of the 707s in 2008 and their subsequent departure to Omega in the US late last year and the impending retirement of the C-130Hs.

Longer term, it’s no secret that Defence has been considering or some years moving all the Hercules north to Amberley or Townsville, although both of those bases are at or near capacity.

Background

Arguably the worst kept secret in Defence, the C-27J has long been the RAAF’s preferred candidate to replace the Caribou over the competing lighter, lower but longer Airbus Military C-295, despite the then EADS CASA product being selected for AIR 5190 before it was cancelled.

The C-27J builds upon the proven, rugged G.222/C-27A airframe developed in the late 70s but has gained more efficient and powerful Rolls-Royce AE2100 engines, a modern glass cockpit and an improved cargo handling system as part of the enhancements that came with the C-27J model — initially developed from 1997 by the Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems teaming as a ‘baby brother’ adjunct to the larger C-130J ‘Super’ Hercules.

Despite the teaming being dissolved in 2006 when Lockheed decided to go it alone and offer the C-130J for the USAF/Army Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) requirement, L-3 Communications and later Boeing stepped into the breach to team with Alenia as the Global Military Aircraft Systems joint venture to successfully offer the C-27J for JCA in 2007.

Perhaps tellingly, the C-295 was an unsuccessful bidder for JCA, being offered by a teaming of Raytheon and EADS North America. The JCA C-27J was to be built at Boeing’s Cecil Field facility in Florida, where L-3 would install the mission and weapons systems.

Initially, up to 145 JCAs were required, split roughly equally between the two US services, with the USAF aircraft to be operated mainly by US Air National Guard units. The C-27J was to replace a plethora of smaller and less capable types in service, including the C-23 Sherpa (Shorts 360), Beech C-12 (King Air) and Fairchild C-23 (Metro), as well as a number of older USAF C-130E/H Hercules as they were retired.

Importantly, the C-27J’s cargo hold cross-section lent itself to carrying bulkier loads than that of the lower and narrower C-295 — palletised or built-up loads more common to the larger C-130 and smaller CH-47 Chinook while still being economical enough to operate lightly loaded liaison or passenger missions.

Not long after the JCA winner was announced, a turf war that had broken out between the USAF and Army over who should operate fixed-wing aircraft coincided neatly with the global financial crisis and the requirement was pared back to 78 JCAs to be operated solely by the National Guard.

This number was reduced again to only 38 when the USAF decided it could, after all, fulfil a number of the JCA’s missions using C-130s. At this time, Boeing dropped out of the teaming ostensibly because it was no longer economical to establish a manufacturing line for such a small number of airframes in the US, so Alenia and L-3 went it alone.

Consequently, ‘green’ airframes would be built at Alenia’s line in Italy, after which they would then be flown to L-3’s Waco, Texas factory for the systems fit.

The latest story of the JCA is that the entire program now seems to have fallen victim to the US’s deepening budget crisis with the Pentagon offering up all 21 aircraft in service or in production as part of its efforts to find more than $US400 billion in savings over the next decade.

However, there still appears to be much to play out with both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees questioning the move and the operators, the Ohio National Gaurd, – openly questioning the operating costs of the aircraft that have been quoted by the Pentagon.

Much More Than A Caribou Replacement

Despite the inherent affection in which it was held by its operators and air show attendees alike, apart from its invaluable natural disaster assistance work at home and in the wider region, the Caribou has been of little tactical relevance for more than a decade.

So despite being sold as a Caribou replacement, the C-27J will in fact be so much more, adding new capabilities to the ADF’s order of battle not previously deliverable by the Caribou or the bigger C-130.

At the lower end of the scale, the C-27J’s much longer range, faster speed, greater load capacity and inherent flexibility makes it an ideal Caribou replacement.

Despite not being able to replicate the Caribou’s extreme STOL capabilities, which could see it land in little more than 100 metres on very rough or boggy strips, many would argue there are no other aircraft now on offer in this class that can fulfil this otherwise very narrow requirement anyway.

It’s in the tactical airlift role where we can expect to see the C-27J figure more significant, ably complementing the bigger C-130Js, which have taken on more of this role in recent years with the arrival of the much larger and longer-range C-17s and newer KC-30 Multi-Role Tanker Transports (MRTT).

In fact, the C-27J is almost an ideal replacement for the C-130H, the remaining eight of which will be retired up to four years early after being binned in the latest budget. It has been proven in operations that C-130s rarely fly operationally at full capacity, either by weight or volume, especially in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO).

So it’s more economical to operate the twin-engine C-27J than the larger C-130 on many of these missions, providing greater flexibility in the number of forward airstrips than can be serviced by the fixed-wing aircraft.

What About Me?

The long-awaited C-27J announcement was slightly tempered by Defence having to justify its decision in the face of intense lobbying and public statements from Airbus Military, which had been pitching the rival C-295 for the BFA requirement.

Following the May 10 announcement, Airbus Military issued an unusually harsh response to the decision, saying: “Airbus Military is obliged to place on the public record our disappointment … because there was no tender process and certainly no competition.

“We certainly do not begrudge the ADF making decisions about preferred capability and platforms following careful consideration of tender-quality and commercially-binding information. But on this occasion, selection of the C-27J for $1.4 billion seems to have been based largely on the RAAF’s own desktop assessments.”

A week later, while addressing journalists gathered for the company’s annual technical briefings in Toulouse, CEO of Airbus Military Domingo Ureña called for transparency over the decision and for the right to compete: “Give us the right to demonstrate completely in a transparent way what we are capable of doing and how much value we add for taxpayers,” he urged

Some media reports also quoted him as saying: “The customer is always right, even when the customer is wrong.”

He claimed the C-27J program cost of $1.4 billion was almost double that of a similar acquisition of the C-295: “We are fighting to give us this opportunity [for a competition] and if we have that opportunity I think we will demonstrate like in many countries that we have much more value than the C-27J.”
And although Mr Urena conceded there were some capabilities the C-295 lacked compared with the C-27J, he posed: “What is the value of those requirements versus the total capability that you are looking for?”

Airbus had linked its unsolicited C-295 proposal with an offer of a sixth KC-30A MRTT for the RAAF — and Mr Urena also said the company had not received a response from the Australian government on this.

“This offer is still on the table but unfortunately by the end of [May] we [begin to] shut down the Qantas Defence [conversion activity], we are going to finalise how we are going to finish aircraft number five, and then unfortunately those capabilities are going to be lost.

“We have never got an answer from the Australian government … [but] every country has the sovereign right to say something or to say nothing, so [I make] no criticism of that, [I have] no opposition to how they acted.”