Issue 66: May 1991

Saddam’s fate via his Kuwaiti adventure is now ancient history. What is not so clear is the overall state of play in world politics. Despite the massive Allied commitment in support of the UN in the Gulf, particularly from Britain and the US, both countries are embarking upon a defence cutting exercise unparalleled since the end of WW2. For that matter many other nations are following suit, including Australia where massive cuts are being speculated on as a product of the imminent Force Structures Review which is due for release this May.

In the UK, the British are preparing for a military of less than 300,000- the smallest since the 1920s. Much of Europe has followed suit at a time when that continent is potentially anything but stable. Whilst most of the problems in the newly free states of what was once Eastern Europe are internal, it is worth remembering that such “internal problems” were what created that momentous event we now refer to as World War One.

Pacifists assuredly point to the new era of non aggression emanating from the Soviet Union. However, of all the potential flashpoints the USSR is perhaps the major. Mikhail Gorbachev hangs onto power by a slender thread against arch-rival Boris Yeltsin, whilst the possibility of an eventual military coup firms to shorter odds as the territorial, economic and ethnic turmoil increases with each passing month. It is no secret that there is, and has been for many years, substantial friction between Gorbachev and the very powerful Soviet military. For the military to engineer a coup, amidst the constant political turmoil that unfortunately nowadays epitomises the USSR, would be relatively easy and a scenario that a year or two from now could well be, like Iraq’s foray into what it termed its 19th Province, ancient history. We sincerely hope we are wrong.

That the Soviet military often works at odds to its political leadership is graphically illustrated by the unexpected resignation late last year of former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze.

By his own admission, the popular Shevardnadze resigned because of cheating by his own military in the vital Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty. Whilst NATO was busy dismantling real systems and planning for a less fearful future the Soviet military was simply transporting many of its ‘to be destroyed’ tanks, APCs and armoured vehicles to the Urals where they would be beyond the reach of the Treaty’s influence. Recent evidence verifies that the number of assets illegally transferred included 10,000 tanks, 4,000 APCs and over 20,000 artillery items that all should have been disabled via the CFE treaty.

A performance like that gives you great hope for the future, doesn’t it?

Yet amidst this potential Soviet time bomb, the spectre of continuing Middle East foment (which has been going on for thousands of years) and a dozen other international hot spots, the West looks like disarming at a rate unseen in modern times.

The US experience is particularly sobering. USAF will take delivery of its final F-15 Eagles next year while F-16 production is to terminate in 1993, the F-14D lives from day to day with no real long term replacement in the offing. The A-12 fiasco leaves two major defence contractors economically paralysed whilst providing no viable replacement for the A-6 Intruder. The C-17 transport, B-2 bomber and numerous other programs of all three services are stretched out or cancelled ad hoc. The Army is to lose almost a third of its manpower whilst the Navy goes from 15 air wings to just 13.

When another Kuwait occurs, what then? The Allies got off easily in the Gulf, largely thanks to an incompetent foe. Maybe next time it won’t be so clear cut and if ground forces are actively engaged in combat for more than a few weeks then they better have a good line of back up or they might as well go home. That line of back up is now what is being eliminated from the inventories of most Western nations.

Here at home things aren’t much better. As mentioned in our Reece of last August, Australia’s fiscal commitment to its only insurance policy – a credible defence force – has gone from 2. 9% of GDP in 84/85 to just 2. 2% in the current year. That type of two faced commitment to defence has made a mockery of firstly the Government’s much vaunted Dibb Report of 1986 and the White Paper that grew from Dibb’s recommendations the following year. If the Government had been honest about its own White Paper then the ADF would now be ahead by almost $2. 5bn.

Mooted in the imminent Force Structures Review cutbacks (refer Defence Update this issue) is the axing of thousands of ADF jobs in addition to a number of bases. We certainly wouldn’t argue that the ADF has to be smarter in the way in which it manages its finances. Almost every visit to a military base highlights simple ways in which they operate differently (ie waste money) compared with a small, privately owned and tightly run business such as this magazine. However, Australia must not trim its already slim defence forces to the point where, like in the 1930s, we have a defence force that is simply not a viable deterrent for even a low level regional threat.

If personnel cuts are to be made en masse then they must be compensated for by a viable investment in technology. The ADF must get more smart weapons and all three services must have sufficient stockpiles of such weaponry to be able to fight an engagement without worrying about the fact that there is little back up in the supply inventories. For instance, how many Harpoon missiles are stockpiled, how many Sidewinder and Sparrow AAMs, how many Harms for both the F-111 and F/A-18? Answers to these questions from Defence (or. the Minister) are virtually impossible to get though we feel, from what our informed sources tell us, that the average taxpayer would be shocked at the truth if it were available.

The bringing down of the Iron Curtain has been a wonderful step forward for world peace. However, it comes with a price and the so called peace dividend is not to be found in the squabbling minorities of central Europe and the USSR. Unfortunately there will always be Kuwaits and in an uncertain world it would be folly to reduce one’s deterrent posture to the point where inevitably the ultimate price must be paid.