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Other factors likely to contribute to the acquisition of a major strategic shareholding in Qantas by JAL is the relative strength of the yen, the strong financial position of JAL and the extensive trading and financial links between the two countries. In the past year many of Qantas’ potential suitors such as BA, American, United, Cathay. Lufthansa and Singapore have seen much of their sur- plus cash reserves eaten up by the effects of high fuel costs, recession and the loss of traffic due to the Gulf War. At presstime only JAL and to a lesser extent, Singapore and Cathay were in any position to realistically consider forays into foreign carriers.

Managing a Transport Disaster:

This promising BDW Aviation Services seminar-subtitled A Seminar on Aviation, Maritime and Land Transport has been organised for 3/4 June at the Inter-Continental Hotel, Sydney.

As the organisers note, “A major transport disaster will have a traumatic effect on the transport organisation, its employees and on associated bodies”, even more so in a nation like Australia which has yet to experience a major disaster of the magnitude of some of the more horrific events overseas. The seminar therefore aims to discuss and better prepare those likely to be affected by a major transport disaster by addressing problems faced by transport operators, emergency services and infrastructure providers. To do this the seminar will draw on both Australian and intemational experiences. The seminar will cover four main themes: Practical case studies experiences; Planning for emergencies; Preparing for prevention and damage control; and Managing the aftermath. During all sessions keynote speakers will address the seminar prior to a panel discussion, with audience participation encouraged.

Keynote speakers include Collin Freeland, chairman of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority and former CAA CEO; Capt W Frisbie, PanAm Senior Flight Ops Rep at Lockerbie, Roger Jones, Australian Counter Disaster College; Capt Ken Lewis, Qantas head of safety and chairman of IATA Subcommittee on Disaster Management. For further information contact BDW Avia- tion Services (02) 258 6790, fax (02) 258 6791.

Product Liability Laws Scuttle Piper Rescue Package:

Negotiations with France’s Socata, the general aviation subsidiary of Aerospatiale, for takeover of financially struggling Piper have failed.

Socata have dismissed the possibility of further talks, though Piper claim that other potential buyers have been contacted and discussion with new interested parties could be arranged. Socata itself withdrew from the negotiations because of the costly US product liability laws, the potential expense of which made the Socata rescue package “too risky”. Piper has long maintained a strategy of self insurance whilst strongly fighting product liability suits, and to date has had reasonable success, however Socata doubted its ability to continue this strategy with the same effectiveness.

Meanwhile, Piper’s cash problems continue. Though the company has solid assets valued at over $US100m, comparatively small debt and a healthy order backlog, it has little ready cash to sustain operations. To obtain funds to enable the company to sustain operations at a reduced level in the near term, Piper recently entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of its Lakeland, Florida facilities. However a longer term solution is desperately needed.

Basi Blasts Sydney Airport Procedures:

A Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) investigation has strongly criticised the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for its Sydney Airport control procedures.

The investigation, into the near miss in September last year of a departing Cathay Pacific 747 and an empty Qantas 747 being towed across the main runway (refer p5 Oct 90 AA), has found that control procedures at Sydney Airport were such that “there was little doubt that the potential for this particular air safety incident scenario had existed for many years. ” The Sydney control system was described as a labour intensive system utilising methods which “created the potential for serious human error. ” Procedures for controllers remained undefined and far from uniform, resulting in the situation where a near miss or even collision was “waiting to happen”.

In the actual incident, BASI concluded that it occurred after the aerodrome controller was distracted by the approach of a light aircraft on the shorter east-west runway, and failed to advise a fellow surface controller of the Cathay Pacific aircraft’s departure on the main north-south runway. As a result the Qantas aircraft was cleared to cross the main runway just as the Cathay 747 was commencing its takeoff run. The aerodrome controller communicating with the Cathay aircraft failed to see the Qantas aircraft because a structural beam in the tower

obscured that part of the runway. A major catastrophe was only averted by the 747 crew managing to get their aircraft airborne early. A hot summer’s day with a heavier payload may have resulted in a less kindly end to the incident.

However, rather than condemn the air traffic controllers concerned, BASI have targeted the CAA’s control procedures at the airport. In particular it has criticised the Authority to failing to implement recommendations made in 1987 by a US consultant to introduce standardised, well defined, consistent and uniform procedures for multiple runway use. The CAA moved the day after the incident to initiate procedures to ensure that a similar incident could not happen in the future. The CAA cited an anomaly in the system of interpreting runway indicator lights which has since been clarified whilst jurisdiction of the complete runway complex is now under the control of a single aerodrome controller. It is just a shame that a near disaster has to always be the means that eventually motivates a change in official policy.

 Iata Airlines Lose $us2bn:

Member airlines of the International Air Transport Association lost more than $US2bn in the first two months of 1991, including well over one billion in February, according to data supplied to the Association.

In what has been the airline industry’s most difficult period in more than forty years, and one for which the effects will be felt for a long time, IATA data revealed: an average worldwide traffic loss of 17% in February compared to Feb 89, with Middle Eastern carriers losing 49%, European 16%, North American 8% and other regions combined 17%; some 21,400 flights (6%) worldwide were cancelled during February. including 6,600 (38%) by Middle East carriers, 12,000 (8%) by European, 2,000 (2%) by North American and 900 (2%) for the rest of the world. 15,400 fights were also cancelled in January; a worldwide financial loss of over $US1bn was made in February 1991, including $100m by Middle Eastern carriers, $640m by European, $100m for North Ameri- can and $100m for airlines in the rest of the world.

 Compass Posts $1. 8M Loss:

Compass has reported a loss of $1. 82m for the six months to 31 December 1990, and blames both significant start-up problems and recession for the result.

In its initial prospectus Compass predicted an $18. 8m profit for its first year of operations, though this figure was later revised to $15m. The airline has stated that its position has improved during the second half of the financial year and it is breaking even, however further operational problems were experienced during the first two months of the year and the tight economic conditions and high fuel prices persisted to affect Compass’ performance during the period, which included just one month of scheduled services.

Meanwhile, Bryan Grey has gone on record as saying that deregulation is “a bit of a myth; it never was meant to work. ” Speaking at a business luncheon in Adelaide in April, Mr Grey expressed his view that while deregulation had enabled Compass to get off the ground as a challenger to both Ansett and Australian Airlines, the Federal Government had made it difficult for any other new domestic carriers to also start up. Mr Grey has blamed the granting of extensive terminal leases to both Ansett and Australian as the prime preventative measure against new comers, effectively limiting and even block- ing effective access to Australia’s major airports. Also receiving flak was the ownership of various travel agencies by Ansett and Australian, these agencies, it being claimed, were responsible for discouraging many passengers from flying with the new airline.

Tpc Probes Qf, Anz Link:

The Trade Practices Commission (TPC) has asked both Qantas and Air New Zealand to provide information on their trans-Tasman flight sharing arrangements with a view to determining whether the agreement is in fact anti-competitive.

The flight sharing agreement was designed by the two airlines to rationalise services and thereby strengthen each carrier’s marketing position by allowing each to offer a greater frequency of trans-Tasman flights, and also free up aircraft to operate other services, such as 767 flights into South East Asia. Being the two biggest operators on the Tas- man route, and therefore the most competitive, the TPC was “naturally. . . interested in the deal”.

Australian Airlines Announces Net Profit:

Australian Airlines has reported an $8. 97m profit for the half year to 31 December 1990, up from the previous $48. 03m loss suffered in the same period 1989.

Australian has been able to largely recover from the effects of the pilots’ dispute, which forced its profits to plummet to a record low, and has been able to cope with the late 1990 price war, declining passenger traffic and the effects of the Gulf War, such as massive fuel cost increases. Australian’s chairman, Mr. Ted Harris, described the performance as “satisfactory”, being achieved from a sub- stantial sales increase from $411. 87m to $751. 41m, however he refused to forecast a full year financial result, though he did say that the final result would be bolstered by abnormal profits from depreciation, sale of aircraft and excess superannuation provisions.

The airline is currently experiencing fewer than expected passengers (though each passenger is now flying further, hence the overall increase in RPKS) and increased competition, producing an “exceedingly difficult situation and forcing Australian into the red for several months. The airline is now focussing on improving productivity through reforms in work practices, which will ultimately include the shedding of some 1,500 jobs throughout the organisation.

Recce Follow Up:

As a follow up to our April issue Recce editorial on the fitment of Emergency Locating Transmitters (ELTS, sometimes called ELBS) and the wearing of full lap/sash seat belts in light aircraft would make towards improving aviation safety we are pleased to report the following.

The CAA has been for some time inves- tigating the compulsory fitment of ELTS in light aircraft. The Australian Aviation Advisory Committee has already recommended to the CAA that, as a general principle, aircraft should be fitted with ELTS. The CAA is presently considering options associated with the proposal, including examining the approach adopted by other major aviation countries, prior to consulting with the aviation industry and drafting the necessary legislation.

With every aircraft on the Australian register equipped with modern ELTS the ability to quickly locate a downed aircraft would be very greatly improved. However, AA has learnt that not all ELTs currently fitted in GA aircraft or carried by their owners are actually that effective due to a number of technical reasons. AA will report on this in greater detail in our next issue.

On the issue of upper torso restraint, ie; the sash component of the lap/sash seat belt. The Dept of Aviation back in 1988 initi- ated a directive that all aircraft built after 1986 with less than nine seats must be equipped with full lap/sash belts. Whilst this doesn’t legally cover a great number of aircraft the onus is till very much on the pilot/ passenger to ensure that the full belt is always worn when flying. A lackadaisical “it won’t happen to me” attitude in this regard could leave you paying a very high price indeed!

Latest Caa Foray Into Commercial Aviation Raises Heckles of Industry:

Due for signing as this issue went to press was a contract between the CSIRO and the Civil Aviation Authority for the operation and support of their F27, VH-CAT.

The victory by the CAA in gaining this contract over a number of GA bidders is seen by many within industry as being unfair in that the CAA is theoretically able to undersell its package at the expense of industry. The General Aviation Association responded to the situation quoting that “it is hard enough for operators to stay in business under the current economic conditions, and faced with ever increasing operating costs, it seems that to also have to compete directly with an organisation that is literally funded from GA’s pocket, is grossly unfair”.

In defence of this the CAA states that it has a stated objective of only ever competing on the open market for work for its own flying unit when GA, or industry, cannot provide the level of service and expertise required by the tenderer. In this case the CSIRO clearly pre- ferred the CAA as it considered them more capable for operating the Friendship in the demanding environment that the aircraft. of ten finds itself operationally involved. The other point raised by the CSIRO, in defence of their opting for the CAA over GA operators, was that the contract in question is of short term duration (one year) and they did not wish to spend months getting a new and untried operator up to speed on the aircraft and its operating requirement.

The contract begins on July 1 and lasts for just one year. After that, the eventual fate of the CSIRO’s F27 is unclear. After many years of sterling service in the research role the aircraft may have to be sold off it. Federal Government funding of the CSIRO’s Office of Space Science and Applications is cut further, a tragic situation indeed.

AA Comment:

An interesting sidelight to this story is that the primary reason the CSIRO decided to opt for the CAA, rather than industry, is that after the Amann Aviation Coastwatch fiasco they simply didn’t want to deal with a small business that is relatively unknown to them and has to work its expertise up to the level required by the tenderer.

Since this magazine began in 1977 we at AA have watched a squadron of so called entrepreneurs come into aviation, promising to shake the earth, usually leaving the industry with many unsuspecting people holding the can for their own stupidity and fiscal ineptitude.

These people do enormous damage to the legion of professional operators throughout GA that do work hard, try even harder and plan ahead to be efficient and productive. It is the credibility of these people that the high flyers destroy every time another wildcat scheme is launched by people who have no credibility and even less expertise in this most demanding of industrys.

 Oxley to Fly Lord Howe Route:

Oxley Airlines have been granted a licence to operate a twice daily service linking Sydney with Lord Howe Island.

Coincidentally, the licence was granted on the same day that Norfolk Airlines ceased operations. Oxley have been operating a Lord Howe/Norfolk Island service each Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday for several months. The airline also continues to service major coastal centres between Sydney and Brisbane as well as Lismore, Armidale and Tamworth. Oxley operate a fleet of three Beech King Air 2008 and nine Piper Chieftains.

South Pacific Regional Airlines Rises From the Norfolk Group Ashes:

A new airline called South Pacific Regional Airlines is replacing Norfolk on many of the routes flown, by the recently defunct airline.

Sources have revealed that a Dash 8 will service the Sydney/Wagga and Sydney/Lord Howe routes whilst Nord Mohawks will be used to service many of the Queensland coastal ports previously serviced by Norfolk. The new airline is associated with tourist company Pacific Unlimited Holidays. whilst aircraft will be crewed by the ex-Norfolk pilots and flight attendants.