Asian Air Power, Japan

The post-war pacifism ingrained into the Japanese political, legal and educational system as a result of defeat and foreign occupation in 1945 has created substantial restrictions on the development of the Japanese armed forces. The aircraft of the Air Force were once denied essential items like in-flight refuelling probes and bombsights because such items were deemed ‘offensive’ rather than ‘defensive’. It has only been recently that Japanese fighter aircraft scrambling to challenge Soviet intruders about to enter Japan’s airspace have been allowed to carry ‘live’ missiles. The opposition Japanese Socialist Party, in fact, only recognised the ‘legal existence’ of the Japanese armed forces on 29 February 1984! It has only been in recent years that Japanese public opinion polls have shown that a majority of the Japanese people regard the Japanese armed forces as ‘constitutional’.

A major limitation to the development of the Japanese armed forces is the fact that only 1 % of GNP can be expended on defence – this limitation espoused by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki has now taken on the form of ‘holy writ’ within the ruling Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party. The manpower levels of the armed forces are also limited by an arbitrary ceiling; retirees and resignees are only required to muster for one week a year for seven years as an ‘active’ reserve and conscription is officially ruled out as an option by all parties.

Even within the uppermost limit of 1 % of GNP placed on the defence budget, Japan could make a more substantial contribution to its own defence. This 1% is a large sum given the size of Japan’s GNP but its size is diluted by official Japanese arms procurement policy. All major items of defence equipment must be produced within Japan – meaning that the Japanese defence industry gains substantial technology transfer and protection from overseas competition. The fact that Japan is not allowed to export arms means that the Japanese defence industry is committed to producing small numbers of highly expensive equipment; for the purposes of keeping assembly lines in production from contract to contract, major items of equipment are constructed and assembled at a relatively slow rate.

This means that the equipment cost is artificially high compared to the option of buying equipment outright from the United States and it is delivered slowly to the Defence forces, with the possibility that outmoded items will be kept in production long after US assembly lines have closed down. Thus the P-2J Neptune production line closed down in Japan in 1979 thirty-four years after the. first model was built in Burbank, USA, and twenty-one years after the US line closed down. This aircraft was still being produced ten years after it had been phased out of the air forces of many Western nations. Similarly, one year Japanese industry could only manage to produce three F-15’s. Although the rate was increased, this is still an indication of what Western commentators have referred to as the ‘leisurely’ rate of major equipment production in Japan.

Air Force Organisation

The Japan Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) is divided into three regions – each the home of an air command. Each command has full jurisdiction over all air defence operations in the region as well as missile units of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF).

The ‘hottest’ command is in the north. These units have Soviet territory 20 km. from Japanese shores – the Kurile island chain with major Soviet bases – Sakhalin Island – only 40 km. away. Behind these island territories is Soviet Siberia and the full strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces. These forces include some 2,100 Soviet aircraft. Facing these forces are Japan’s 2nd Air Wing operating F-15J aircraft, backed up by USAF F-16s. These aircraft are responsible for air defence of the island most likely to be invaded first by Soviet forces, Hokkaido.

Covering the approaches to the industrial ‘heartland’ of Japan including the capital, Tokyo, is the Central Air Command based at Lruma. Covering the sea approaches to Japan (see Map 2) is the Western Air Command based at Kasuga.

The ASDF is tasked with the protection of mainland Japan and its approaches (feasibly 150 nautical miles from existing radar bases). The ASDF is also tasked with the air defence of the Japanese fleet, which for political reasons cannot possess aircraft carriers. With the beginnings of an airborne early warning squadron, the ASDF is tasked with adding to Japan’s radar coverage of approaches to its territory. (Ideally, the United States would like the ASDF to play the role of ‘barrier force’ to Backfires and Blackjacks attempting to break out from Siberian bases to attack the US Pacific Fleet; this aim is unlikely to be realised unless there is a radical change in Japanese defence thinking. )

Interceptors

Japanese air-intercept squadrons operate a mix of F-15 (built under license by Mitsubishi), F-4EJ and F-104J. The F-104J is being phased out as the F-15J enters service.

Mitsubishi began cutting metal for the first Japanese-produced F-15J in 1980. Military procurements in Japan are approved by the Finance Ministry, Cabinet, and Diet (parliament) in batches and manufacture in Japan is always a slow process. By June 1983 the ASDF had received its first ten of the aircraft. The first operational F-15J squadron was formed within the Fifth Air Wing at Nyutabaru Air Base (Kyushu) and the second within the Second Air Wing at Chitose (Hokkaido). The third squadron, a component of the Seventh Air Wing at Hyakuri Air Base (Honshu) is scheduled to have its full complement (18 plus attrition aircraft) by March 1985. This means that a former goal of having 75 F-15J aircraft operational by the end of 1984 is considerably behind schedule and this will further put back the ultimate aim of 138 operational aircraft by 1987. Notably, the F-15J has been allowed to keep its in-flight refuel- Ing equipment. When the F-4J was purchased it was decided by the Diet that its in-flight refuelling equipment constituted ‘offensive’ weaponry. This past view has been revoked and the United States is seeking to have the ASDF equipped with in-flight refuelling aircraft-clearly essential if Japan is to protect its sea- lanes to a stated ‘goal’ of 1000 nautical miles from the main islands.

In addition to the F-15J, it is intended to have four to five refurbished F-4J squadrons operational by 1987. The modernised F-4J will have APG-66 FCS, a central computer similar to the CP-1075/AYK, provision for Litton LN-39 inertial guidance nav-system, Hazeltine APX-76 IFF, Kaiser VDO/KM- 808 HUD, Tokyo Jeiki rear warning radar and provision for a variety of missiles including AIM-9L, AIM-7F and Mitsubishi Type 80 ASM-1. It has been suggested that 100 F-4J could be updated although this may depend on economies.

The ASDF has joined with the Defence Agency’s Technical Research and Development Institute to prepare studies for a fighter for the 21st century. Various foreign firms have expressed interest-F-16, Tomado, British Harrier and a greatly updated Phantom are said to be on the ASDF preliminary list. Should the Phantom, using updated avionics and PW 1120 turbojet, be accepted then this might allow non-updated Phantom surplus to ASDF interceptor requirements to be transferred to the FGA role. The modernisation programme at present envisaged will extend the life of the present F-4s from 3000 hours to 5000 hours.

Whereas various NATO nations have sent their F-104s to other nations Turkey being a major NATO repository of old Starfighters cannot export arms. As a consequence, the ASDF F-104s will become the target drones-rather expensive RPVS known as QF-104Js.

FGA/Air Base Defence

The Mitsubishi F-1 was developed to take over the FGA role of ageing F-86Fs which were still being operated by Japan in the late ‘seventies’. The F-1 is a variant of the T-2 trainer-the F-1 is most comparable to the SEPECAT Jaguar to the extent that one West European journal in 1980 called the F-1 ‘a shameful copy. Nevertheless, the performance of the Japanese aircraft is not fully up to Jaguar standards. In 1981 it was decided that the F-1 originally developed for the FGA role would also play the base defence role and to this end it has been armed with AIM-9L, AIM- 7F and ASM-1 missiles like the other ASDF front-line aircraft. There is a project being developed for an F-1 replacement. It is hoped that this aircraft will enter service in 1987-88. There is great debate at present as to whether this should be ant indigenous design or production under license, although it would seem that, with the precedent of the F-1, a Japanese design will be accepted. To date the main contenders are Kawasaki, Fuji and Mitsubishi. Regardless of which design is accepted, all three companies are liable to be included in the development of the aircraft.

Training

There are 5 training wings with the ASDF. These wings operate 10 squadrons. Training aircraft include 40 Fuji T-3s (which are a development of and replacement for previous T-34A Mentors) as the basic trainer. ASDF pilots spend some 70 hours in the T-3. Transition to jets occurs via some 90 hours in the Fuji T-1A and T-1B. There are forty of these aircraft operating. Jet training is undertaken in either the venerable T-33A (50 still in ASDF service) and the supersonic Mitsubishi T-2 (59 in service with 8 on order). T-33A/T-2 training may take some 120 hours. The T-2 represents Japan’s entry into modem jet trainer/ fighter design and production. The Mitsubishi design was accepted by the Japan Defence Agency in 1967 the other competitor being a Fuji design. The aircraft was developed by a design team consisting of personnel from Mitsubishi, Fuji, Shin Meiwa and Nihon Hikkoki led by Mitsubishi’s Dr. Kenji Ikeda. During this time the Rolls Royce/Turbomeca Adour was selected as the powerplant in place of the GE-1 first preferred. The project went through numerous problems resistance within the Japanese parliament to the idea of Japan developing its own military aircraft being outstanding. Against all odds, the aircraft made its first flight in 1971. The T-2 is still, in the process of replacing T-33s today – a reflection of the slowness of production. of the aircraft and the fact that much production has been diverted to the F-1, the fighter/ground attack variant of the T-2.

Transport

The ASDF operates a tactical transport wing with 3 squadrons operating a mix of 25 C-1 and 10 YS-11. This fleet allows about one seat per 80 Japanese soldiers which is a good ratio comparable to NATO standards. This tends to be offset by the lack of suitable trasnport helicopters available to the Japanese army.

The transport capabilities of the ASDF is bound to be boosted by the acquisition of C-130 aircraft. Acquisition is, however, going to be slow with only 2 aircraft allowed for in the 1985 fiscal year budget.

Air Bases

The Japanese air force is well-equipped with bases and support infrastructure. This development is aided by USAF use and, in some cases, sharing of ASDF bases.

The major problem for the ASDF is the lack of defended, hardened sites. The ASDF is according to most observers, very vulnerable on the ground. Some provision for airfield defence has been made in the 1985 fiscal year budget – a move not before time.

Ground-to-Air Missile Defence

There are some six SAM groups divided into 19 squadrons operating 150 Nike-J missiles. It was decided in 1984 that these missiles will be replaced by Patriot missiles, currently under production for the US Army with Raytheon as the prime contractor. The Japan Defence Agency has sought 24 tactical Patriot fire units plus 5 training and maintenance fire units. For fiscal year 1985 funding has been approved for the initial purchase of two fire units. The Patriot system will be manufactured in Japan under license.

Early Warning Radar

The current BADGE early warning radar system has obvious limitations. The obsolescent system was revealed inadequate as long ago as 1976 on the occasion of a defecting MIG-25 getting well inside Japanese air defences without interception. At present the system is being supplemented by four E-2C backed up, if necessary, by USAF E-3As from Okinawa. The ASDF has 42 E-2C airborne early warning aircraft on order. The fiscal year 1985 budget has allocated 42,255 million Yen for a new BADGE system.

Sea Air Rescue

Long-range sea-air rescue (SAR) is provided by Shin Meiwa US-1 aircraft flying as part of the Maritime Self Defence Force. Although there are limited organisational means for inter-service cooperation, ideally these aircraft would be available to support the ASDF in time of war. These aircraft are typified by extremely low take-off and landing speeds of around 45 knots. The crew requirement is high-nine – but there is accommodation for some twenty ‘survivors. There are 8 US-1 amphibians and 13 S-61A/2 helicopters operated by the MSDF in the SAR role. The ASDF itself relies on large helicopters for SAR – primarily 29 Kawasaki KV-107 (CH-46s built under license).

Conclusion

The ASDF is a strong force by regional standards – it is, however, not a strong force by the standards of the Japanese economy and industrial capacity. It is unlikely, unless there is a major change in Japanese politics and public opinion, that the Japanese armed forces will ever be on a level comparable to pre-war forces.

The present task of the ASDF is simply to defend the nation and its sea lanes (if possible) until such time as US reinforcements arrive. It is unlikely that Japan would suffer an attack unless in an all-out war between the USA and USSR; as a consequence, the ASDF (and the Japanese armed forces generally) do not contemplate any other scenario. Because of this, the ASDF is being developed, essentially, as a holding force with the aim of ‘bloodying the nose’ of an aggressor’s initial onslaught and causing him to pause until superior US forces are available.