The long march

There were plenty of other headlines around the world that took the same line. Really? Time, I think, for a reality check.

It was certainly an achievement for China and a significant marker in the ongoing development of the country’s aerospace industry. The C919 reportedly cost some $9 billion in a seven-year development program that suffered countless delays and glitches. The 168-seat jet has a flying range of 3,000 miles, which is the market segment dominated by the popular B737 and A320.

The fact, however, is that this plane is essentially made from a collection of parts, from engines to avionics and various computer systems, from Western suppliers, with only about 30 per cent actually Chinese-made. The engines, for example, are from CFM, the joint venture between America’s GE and France’s Safran. Other contributors include the likes of Rockwell Collins, Honeywell and Thales. But analysts suggest that many suppliers have held back their best technology from COMAC in order to protect their intellectual property.

“Really? Time, I think, for a reality check.”

The plane will be cheaper than its Western rivals but it will also be heavier, less efficient and less trusted. And it is highly unlikely that when it finally enters commercial service, in two or three years’ time, its performance will stack up against the latest MAX and NEO offerings from Boeing and Airbus. Will its fuel burn be satisfactory? What will maintenance costs be? It will be years before these questions are answered. The C919 has yet to be licenced for commercial operations by Chinese authorities and clearance from regulators such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a key to Western sales – if there are any – is probably also years away.

And talking about sales, the more than 600 that have already been chalked up are nearly all to Chinese airlines and leasing companies, who have had little choice but to sign up as Beijing drives is aerospace development. The only real exception is a 20-aircraft order from U.S. lessor GECAS and it is almost certain all of these will end up leased back into Chinese airline fleets.

Privately, even Chinese officials concede this is a first generation product and that COMAC has a long way to go before its production capabilities are anywhere near those of Seattle and Toulouse, or even Brazil’s Embraer. It is understood there have already been discussions within COMAC about a C929 and a C939 but again, these are in the distant future.

In his book tracing China’s efforts to build the C919, “The Dragon Takes Flight”, Derek Levine wrote that China wanted to build a homegrown airliner so it would no longer relinquish its lucrative large commercial airplane market to foreign companies. However, he added that the project “has more to do with nationalism than commercial intent”. From a Chinese viewpoint, that is more than evident.

As COMAC chairman Jin Zhuanglong put it, the C919 is a result of “the will of the state, the dream of the Chinese nation and the expectations of the Chinese people”. It was, he added, in line with the spirit of “aeronautical patriotism”.

That may be so but, in reality, the days when a C919 or its successors bears the tail livery of a Qantas, British Airways or American Airlines, or truly compete with Boeing, Airbus or Embraer, are so far out in the future they are hard to imagine.

Not that this means the aircraft will be a failure in terms of commercial sales. Even within China there is plenty of demand to keep the C919 rolling off the production line, given that Boeing anticipates the country will need $1 trillion worth of planes, more than 6,800 of them, in the twenty years through 2036.

But if anyone is asking if the aircraft has commercial credibility internationally, the answer right now and for some time to come is “No”.