Politics before performance?

There are two key players in this version of events: the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine, which originally was intended to compete with the F135; and former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in 2011 unilaterally cancelled official support for the F136.

The JSF program was originally planned with two competing engines.

It was hoped this approach would generate competition to ensure the final engine was cheaper, better, and in service on time.

The F135’s four-year head-start meant that it was closer to completion in 2011, but many regarded its rival as more advanced. The F136 had more inherent power potential, a bigger core, and greater general airflow, which made it better equipped to deal with any increases in the JSF’s weight.

Nevertheless, it was cancelled.

Short-term savings were claimed to be the primary consideration, with Gates asserting that his decision saved $2 billion. This was, however, arguably short-sighted, and perhaps politically motivated.

With up to $100 billion expected to be spent on engine purchases for the F-35, the competition generated by having two viable powerplants could have saved very large sums of money. Proponents of the F136 argued that funding it to completion could have saved more than $20 billion over the life of the program. While such outcomes are difficult to predict, the Independent Quadrennial Defense Review Panel’s 2010 report noted that “history has shown that the only reliable source of price reduction through the life of a program is competition between dual sources”. The “great engine war” from 1984 to 1994 supported this conclusion, with competition between P&W and GE on F-16 engine production yielding almost 30 per cent cumulative savings on acquisition costs.

F136 development was more than 80 per cent complete when it was cancelled. The $2 billion saved by axing it equated to merely onehalf of one per cent of the F-35’s total procurement cost. Furthermore, competition has indisputable non-monetary benefits. The availability of an interchangeable, alternative engine would preclude the thousands of planned F-35s from being grounded if in future the sole available engine develops significant problems. Parochialism may have decided the F136’s fate, noting that the F135 engine was wholly American-made. Gates feared that “if there’s a European engine or a Rolls-Royce/GE engine…our European partners are probably going to buy that one [instead]. ” Non-US participants in the F-35 program might feel betrayed. The US vigorously pursued allied participation to defray costs. Britain has been the largest co-contributor, committing $2 billion on development of the F-35. This was based partly on expectations that British industry, including the UK-based Rolls-Royce, would benefit from F136 development.

Other international participants had similar expectations – for instance, Dutch companies Nedtech and DutchAero had contracts to supply Rolls-Royce with backup motors and blisks. In 2006 the UK’s defence procurement chief threatened to withdraw from the F-35 program if the F136 engine was cancelled. Although this threat was not carried through, it indicates partner dissatisfaction with the decision.

Senior US officials believe that ending the engine-building competition adversely affected P&W’s performance. USAF Lt Gen Christopher Bogdan, the F-35 program chief executive officer, has criticised P&W for slow deliveries and inadequate manufacturing quality. His deputy, Rear Admiral Randy Mahr, has stated that the company halted cost-cutting measures once they secured a monopoly on engine production for the F-35.

Interim fixes will resolve the excessive rubbing and overheating that caused the June 2014 fire, but a longer-term solution remains elusive. The F-35 is a heavy aircraft – with full fuel it weighs some 35 tonnes. Generating sufficient thrust to ensure an acceptable level of high-end performance, including combat manoeuvrability, places a significant strain on engine components, which may cause different problems in the future. With its greater potential for upgrades, the F136 could have been better placed to deal with such issues.

Competition is a proven performance booster. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Gates’s decision to cancel the F136 engine was motivated more by US self-interest than by the best interests of the global F-35 program. The Pentagon is now funding a competition between GE and P&W to develop a replacement engine for the F-35. It would have been better if this policy had been followed properly in the first instance.