Across the spectrum

Covering a wide spectrum of new (and not so new) capabilities, non-kinetic effects basically denotes an ability to influence or degrade an enemy’s war fighting capability without resorting to the more traditional method of physically destroying targets and potentially killing opposing forces or civilians. Many of the concepts and techniques of non-kinetic warfare are not new, but recent advances in technology have allowed nations who may not previously have had access to such capabilities to explore them further.

Show Of Force

There may be many reasons for wanting to employ non-kinetic effects instead of more destructive methods; the most common of these being plausible deniability; in not wanting to escalate a situation; and to avoid collateral damage or casualties.

In recent times, we have seen examples of the latter in its perhaps most basic form with US and coalition partners occasionally using modern jet aircraft in a ‘show of force’, where troops in contact on the ground may call in an aircraft to provide a fast pass at near or supersonic speeds in order to disorientate, scatter, or break the will of an opposing force. But it must be noted that shows of force only works so well in the current context in Iraq and Afghanistan because the insurgents generally associate the presence of aircraft with the likely application of kinetic weapons, and that its success in future conflicts will only assured if interspersed with actual weapons drops.
One anecdotal story from the 2002 Gulf War is of US forces wanting to clear a large cement works of enemy forces in the Iraqi western desert, but not wanting to destroy the factory as workers were also inside and it would likely be needed to help rebuild the country after the war. Two US Navy F-14s answered a call for a show of force and made two low passes at supersonic speeds, and the Iraqi forces reportedly threw down their weapons and surrendered without a shot being fired.

The presence of aircraft can also be a stabilising influence in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq for events such as elections, by causing insurgents to keep their heads down and giving the general populace more confidence to attend these events knowing aircraft are available for an immediate response to any threat.

Electronic Warfare

Another form of non-kinetic effects is Electronic Warfare (EW) which has seen extensive use for decades to deny an enemy the use of or access to areas of the electromagnetic spectrum.

In WW2, clouds of strips of foil or ‘chaff’ were dropped by British and Germans aircraft to disrupt the first generation of early warning radars then being employed along the coasts of southern England and western Europe, and later by Allied bombers to spoof the radars used by German night fighters. Today, more concentrated chaff packets are still an effective means of defeating third generation air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles in end-game manoeuvres, but less so against the latest fifth generation weapons.

In an Australian context, electronic warfare has mostly been restricted to date to those self defence systems carried by front line fighters such as the F/A-18 Hornet and F-111, and more recently, transports and helicopters fulfilling tactical roles like the C-130H/J, C-17A and the CH-47D Chinook.

These systems generally combine a radar warning receiver which detects, locates, and then identifies an enemy radar via an onboard threat library, with an onboard jammer and chaff/flare countermeasures dispenser which, when combined with often aggressive manoeuvring, are designed to help defeat an incoming missile. Some aircraft such as the upgraded AP-3C Orion , the newly introduced Boeing 737 Wedgetail AEW&C and Navy’s upgraded S-70B Seahawk have or are receiving more sophisticated Electronic Support Measures (ESM) equipment which allows for passive threat identification at longer ranges and dissemination via datalinks to other aircraft, ships or a larger command and control (C2) network.

In the electro-optical spectrum lies the AN/AAQ-24 DIRCM (Directional Infra-Red Countermeasures) and LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infra-Red Countermeasures) self defence systems which are designed to detect a missile launch, determine its intent, and try to defeat the missile with laser energy aimed at its infra-red seeker, in combination with the use of flares and manoeuvring. DIRCM and LAIRCM have been installed on the RAAF’s Wedgetails and C-17As, and is planned for the C-130J and forthcoming KC-30A tanker transports.

Another form of electronic warfare includes recent moves by the ADF and other coalition forces to employ counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capabilities from aircraft such as helicopters or transports. Anti-IED weapons can be as basic as a helicopter mounted blanket-jamming device which jams mobile phone and radio networks within a given area surrounding a road convoy or patrol such as that used whenever US President George W Bush travelled by road during the 2008 APEC conference in Sydney.

Conversely, it could be as sophisticated as an airborne system with ground penetrating radar which can not only see where an IED has been placed, but can either jam a remote detonation signal or disable the weapon itself via an electromagnetic or laser pulse. Another tactic being used in Afghanistan is one where electronic means are used to pre-detonate IEDs in a given area, preferably whilst they are being assembled, stored or transported by the insurgents, thus preventing IEDs from being set.

The successful deployment of such tactics not only constrains the choice of attack options open to the insurgency, but also broadens the range of options and choices of manoeuvre for coalition forces.

Cyber

Another way to achieve non-kinetic effects is via the cyber spectrum, another medium in which the ADF is building its capabilities. Following recommendations arising from the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) was established within the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) to ostensibly mitigate the cyber threat to Australia’s national security, but no doubt to also provide the ADF with an offensive cyber warfare capability.

Also known as information operations, cyber warfare can take many forms, from the relatively simple tapping of mobile and land line telephone networks, to accessing an adversary’s computer networks, to disrupting enemy infrastructure via the planting of viruses in military and civilian computer systems.

A recent example of the latter is the allegation that Israel engineers targeted Iran’s nuclear program earlier this year with the Stuxnet virus which took control of specific computer systems used by the program, thus disrupting and delaying the opening of Iran’s new Bushehr reactor by several months.

So while cyber operations may be used to disrupt an adversary’s utilities such as its power grid and water treatment plants, it also has applications against television and radio, and telephone and internet services. Such disruptions over an extended period can wear down an adversary’s preparedness and may allow special forces to be inserted to extract high value assets such as hostages without being observed, although it should be stressed that cyber effects would likely be used in concert with other non-kinetic effects.

The cyber arena is also used, often in concert with human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, to spread misinformation or to create false ‘chatter’, or to entice others to reveal information on terror or other threats. In perhaps its most basic and highly publicised form, police authorities use cyber methods such as posing as children in internet chat rooms in the hope of drawing out paedophiles, and no doubt such methods also have applications in obtaining information about drugs, people smuggling and other organised crime.

One area which has crossed in to the cyber arena in the past decade is that of ground, sea or airborne Electronic, Communications and Signals Intelligence (ELINT/COMINT/SIGINT) platforms. Where once these were mostly passive systems restricted to harvesting signals ranging from mobile phone networks to missile test range telemetry, particularly during the height of the cold war, in recent years long serving aircraft such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint and the Nimrod R.1 have been further developed with the capability to electronically disrupt mobile phone and other communications networks in support of ground or air operations.

Cyber operations have also come to the fore in media reporting in recent months following moves by the governments of the UAE and India to pressure Blackberry into handing over its encryption codes for its system. Blackberry has long been a favourite for security conscious organisations because of the protection it offers its customers via an encryption module at the organisation’s email server.
Certainly, with the current wars heavily focussed on irregular and dispersed threats such as IEDs, insurgency, and piracy, the cyber warfare arena has taken a prominent step forward in being able to monitor, anticipate, and disrupt enemy communications and operations.

Electronic Support Measures

Once the domain of dedicated large aircraft with big apertures, banks of computers and multiple system operators, modern miniaturisation and automation has allowed very sophisticated Electronic Support Measures (ESM) systems to now be monitored by a single operator on aircraft such as the AP-3C or Wedgetail, or to be integrated as part of a sensor suite on tactical aircraft.

The role of an ESM system is to detect, identify, locate or intercept, and record or analyse a source of electromagnetic energy in order to assist in the identification of a threat, often in concert with intelligence and visual, radar or other sensor-derived imagery.

For example, systems such as that installed in the Sikorsky MH-60R ‘Romeo’ in service with the US Navy can, from over the horizon, detect navigation, weather and weapons radars on a surface vessel, as well as SATCOM, voice (UHF, VHF, HF) and IFF communications, and can not only determine the type and class of vessel, but often the actual hull number if a robust enough threat library is already in place. When combined with datalinks, this information can be relayed back to a friendly vessel or aircraft in real time for further analysis or, if necessary, for action.

Modern ESM systems can help to substantially shorten an engagement cycle by quickly detecting, locating, identifying and determining the intent of an adversary in time to pre-empt an attack or to mount an appropriate defence.

Perhaps the most important aspect of modern ESM systems is the fact that they are passive and therefore, an adversary likely won’t know they are being monitored. Any area where passive measures can be applied can be effectively secured, and it’s likely an adversary (or the open media!) will never know the full extent of what ESM capabilities we might have. It is safe to say, however, that considerable effort is applied to developing and fielding new ESM capabilities.

Electronic Attack

Electronic Attack (EA) came to the fore in the Vietnam conflict with the advent of USAF ‘Wild Weasel’ configured F-100s, F-105s and F-4s, and Navy EA-6A Intruders for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) mission.

The second seat of these early EA aircraft was occupied by an Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO), and the aircraft were fitted with a basic Radar Homing & Warning System (RHAWS) and often podded jammers. Whilst the electronic kit on these aircraft was rudimentary by today’s standards, often the mere presence of a Wild Weasel within a strike package was enough for the North Vietnamese to shut down their SAM battery radars for fear of a Standard or Shrike anti-radar missile being launched at them.

The later F-4G Phantom, modified from surplus F-4Es, was an advance over the first Wild Weasels, having a more comprehensive electronics fit and sporting the then new AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile. The Navy developed the four seater EA-6B Prowler around podded ALQ-99 jammers and later the ALQ-218 tactical jamming receiver, while the USAF converted many of its F-111As into EF-111A Raven (aka ‘Sparkvarks’), also with ALQ-99s in a podded fairing on the tailfin and a ‘canoe’ fairing in the weapons bay.

The carrier-capable EA-6B remains in service today with the latest ICAP III iteration of the ALQ-99/218 combination, while the EF-111s were retired in the late 1990s, leaving the USAF without its own organic stand off jamming and electronic attack capability. The F-16C/DG and C/DJ fulfils elements of the EA mission in being fitted with ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) and thus being able to employ the HARM missile, and many can carry the ALQ-119 Electronic Jamming Pod for added self protection.

Instances of defending forces shutting down their SAM radars whenever Prowlers or F-16CJ/Gs were in the area in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts of the late 1990s further highlights the fact that sometimes just the presence of such aircraft means they don’t need to kill an enemy radar to have an effect.

Israel and Singapore have reportedly added similar EA capabilities to some or all of their F-16C/Ds, while Germany operates a dedicated EA version of the Tornado IDS equipped with the HARM, dubbed the Tornado ECR.

The new kid on the EA block is the Boeing EA-18G Growler or ‘Grizzly’ which entered service with the US Navy in 2009. Derived form the F/A-18F airframe, the EA-18G is a dedicated from the ground up EA platform which combines the best from the ICAP III ALQ-99/218 suite with the ability to carry a significant load of precision strike and air-to-air weapons itself, the aerodynamic capability to keep pace with fast strike packages, and the extraordinary existing sensor suite of the Block II Super Hornet.

An Raaf Ea Capability?

As part of the Air 5349 Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC) program, the RAAF fought for and won the option to ‘pre-plumb’ 12 of the 24 F/A-18Fs it ordered in 2007 for future conversion to Growlers, meaning if and when a decision is taken by government to modify some or all of these aircraft, the conversion process should be a relatively easy one.

The modifications included wiring and conduits to the wingtips, and mounting points for additional avionics racks in the forward fuselage, and cost just $40 million for the 12 aircraft, the first of which flew on September 23.

While the US has been reluctant to export an EA capability in the past, the US Technology, Transfer, Security Assistance, Review Board (TTSARB) approved the export of EA-18G technology to Australia in late August. Although the announcement didn’t publicly specify to what level of capability the approval reached or was requested, it clears the way for the export to Australia of components and software required for the EA mission.

An EA capability adds many options to the ADF’s order of battle, not least of which in providing added electronic protection to F-35-led strike packages and high value assets such as Wedgetails, KC-30 tankers, amphibious naval forces, and land targets. For the F-35, an effective EW/EA escort standing dozens or hundreds of kilometres back will only add to the aircraft’s already low observable signature by electronically degrading an adversary’s air defence network.

When attempting to engage low observable aircraft, the ‘kill chain’ or engagement cycle is already an elongated one as it is often difficult to locate and identify such aircraft even if you can detect their presence with ground or airborne radar systems. Further degradation of this process will only further frustrate a defender’s efforts, allowing more time for greater penetration by an attacking force, and thus greater weapons precision and safer egress options.

But the capability also has applications in low-intensity conflicts where non-kinetic effects may be required in order to avoid casualties or to reduce the risk of escalation. For example, stand off electronic support may be useful in degrading an air defence network or a specific air defence site’s radars or communications sufficiently to allow a C-130 to insert Special Forces or to support a high value asset extraction unseen. As with cyber methods, an EA platform could also stand off an adversary’s coast and seemingly randomly degrade mobile phone communications, TV and radio, and even some utilities in an effort to frustrate or confuse defending forces.

The capabilities offered by an advanced EA/EW platform will also add significantly to the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) paradigm currently being established by the ADF. For example, if an EA-18G can be integrated with F/A-18Fs, F-35s, Wedgetails, KC-30s, AP-3C/P-8s, ground based Special Forces, and Navy’s FFGs, new amphibious ships and Air Warfare Destroyers, the situational awareness it adds to the picture as well as the significant effects it can cause will be available to planners in near real-time, significantly reducing the engagement cycle and thus providing substantial flexibility and agility.

But if the RAAF were to go ahead with a Growler-like capability, likely to be later this decade when the JSF nears operational service entry, it is unlikely it would opt for the full capability to begin with, particularly with the ageing ALQ-99 jammer pods currently used by US Navy Growlers and EA-6B Prowlers no longer being in production, and becoming increasingly difficult to support and operationally limited.

More likely is a stepped approach will be undertaken through the development of concepts of operations with a ‘Growler Lite’ configuration, before possibly opting for the ALQ-99’s replacement, the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) which is currently under development in the US, if that becomes available for export from the early 2020s. Another option which is likely to be of considerable interest to the RAAF is that currently being explored by the US Marine Corps for the NGJ to be carried by the F-35, possibly in a low observable pod or even integrated into the aircraft’s internal weapons bay.

There is little doubt the ADF’s increasing use of non-kinetic effects provides an important adjunct to the use of lethal force, and the ability to deceive and deny the adversary information on the battlefield is key to success in warfare. But of concern to ADF planners though must be the capacity of the comparatively tiny ADF to support and maintain such a specialised capability such as EW/EA. The USAF and Navy have more than 100 aircraft and thousands of personnel specifically dedicated to the EA mission, whereas it is likely RAAF crews are going to be required to incorporate the EA mission into their already heavy multi-tasked workloads. The plan to work up through a ‘Growler Lite’ goes some way towards mitigating this risk by building the capability up slowly rather than stepping into it in one big hit, but maintaining the corporate knowledge around the RAAF’s two to three year posting cycle may require some lateral thinking by Air Force Headquarters.