Context and the F-35

It is ironic that for ten years – from 1963 when Australia ordered the F-111s, until 1973 when they finally arrived in-country – the aircraft was excoriated by politicians and the media, who described the revolutionary swing-wing bomber as a ‘flying opera house’ (because of its escalating price), a ‘white elephant’, and an ‘airborne coffin’.

Despite those criticisms, the F-111 became the Australia Defence Force’s foremost strategic weapon. For thirty years it alone had the capability to strike and to deter unaided from the mainland; and it alone exercised a powerful strategic shaping influence in our region.
Why then, was it subjected to such ill-considered commentary?

The answer can be found in the lack of understanding of the context within which combat aircraft design and development takes place.
It is true that the F-111 experienced difficulties with design and cost. Among other things, structural failures, excessive weight, price increases, and an alleged high accident rate provided easy targets for detractors.

The context here is that, since the end of World War II, the development of high performance strike/fighters has been characterised by complications. Given the extent of the technological challenges involved, it would be surprising if that were not the case.

Everyone of the F-111’s problems was eventually fixed. Costs were contained to acceptable levels (indeed, given the aircraft’s unique capabilities, it should be regarded as a bargain), and components were redesigned or tweaked.

The end result was that leading-edge technology made the F-111 the pre-eminent strategic weapon in Southeast Asia.

But even then some commentators preferred to seek the negative, asserting that the F-111 had a disastrous accident rate. In fact, the F-111’s safety record was far superior to any of its ‘Century’ series contemporaries (the F-100, F-101, F-102, F-105, F-106; the Navy F-4 can also be included).

Unfortunately, the same kind of contextual ignorance has shaped much of the commentary about the F-111’s planned replacement, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Like the F-111, the F-35 is at the forefront of aerospace technology, through its low-observable design and, perhaps more significantly, its exceptional suite of sensors, data links, data fusion, and weapon systems. No strike/fighter in the world will match the F-35’s holistic ability to conduct control of the air, strike, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) missions.

It is for that reason that the Williams Foundation has supported the acquisition of the F-35 over its Lockheed-Martin stablemate, the F-22. The F-22 may be the world’s outstanding air-to-air system, but the F-35 will be the next best, and it will be superior in the strike and ISR roles.

Also like the F-111, the F-35 has experienced challenges during its design and development phase, including excess weight, cost increases, and program delays. But the curve is now trending upwards, as former trenchant critic, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Bob Cox, has acknowledged.

Cox has reported that the rescheduled F-35 program is ‘gaining momentum’. Unit costs are expected to be one-third less than an estimate made last December by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation team; the 2010 flight test program is ahead of schedule; and the Pentagon and Lockheed-Martin are close to concluding a fixed-price agreement for the next low-rate initial production lot (No. 4) of 32 aircraft.

Closer to home, more good news has emerged with announcements that Australian companies have signed MoUs to produce F-35 vertical tails, composite fuselage components, and auxiliary mission equipment worth around A$3 billion. Furthermore, Brisbane firm Ferra Engineering will establish a world-first facility to manufacture titanium components for F-35A vertical tails, a process that could reduce the cost of those parts by up to 50 per cent.

And as the F-35’s immense potential as a warfighting system becomes better understood, the world’s most advanced air forces are placing orders. Confirming a commitment to buy 65 aircraft, Canada’s defence minister described the F-35 as ‘the best aircraft we can provide our men and women in uniform’.

Even more noteworthy is Israel’s growing interest. Effectively at war for over half a century, Israel has made air dominance the sine qua non of national survival; as a consequence, the IAF has become the world’s best air force. Initially the IAF was not part of the F-35 program, but there are now reports that it not only wants to join, but also hopes to establish a maintenance and logistics centre in the Negev.

Given the IAF’s exceptionally close relationship with the USAF, it is reasonable to infer that Israel’s strike/fighter commanders have been given detailed insights into the F-35’s capabilities, and are impressed.

As the F-111 experience demonstrated fifty years ago, and the F-35 debate reveals today, comment without contextual understanding can be superficial at best, irresponsible at worst.