Fitted for, not with

Certainly the decision to deploy six F-111Cs to the US for Red Flag in February, barely 18 months before their retirement was a curious one. The RAAF had planned to take recently upgraded F/A-18s equipped with new Link-16 datalinks, new colour displays, JHMCS helmet displays and other situational awareness enhancements, Litening AT pods, GPS-guided weapons, and new ALR-67(V)3 Radar Warning Receivers to Red Flag, but a lack of available tanker support meant the Hornets couldn’t make it across the Pacific so the self-deploying F-111s went instead. But the relevance of the F-111s being at Red Flag is, at best, questionable, as these aircraft have no datalinks, no high end integrated EW gear, and no GPS guided precision weapons capability, all of which are now considered vital in today’s coalition operations which Red Flag is designed to emulate. But anecdotal evidence suggests this was one reason the RAAF deployed the F/A-18 to Iraq back in 2003 instead of the longer legged and heavier armed F-111, as integrating the F-111 into the coalition environment would have proven problematical. Therefore, an observer may reasonably ask why a decision wasn’t taken on whether to retire or further upgrade the F-111 prior to 2003 deployment if these issues were known then?

In the transport world many of the RAAF’s platforms have been similarly afflicted. The C-130H and J Hercules only recently were fitted with sufficient EWSP kits for all airframes, rather than having to share eight kits between 22 platforms, after being in service for 30 and 10 years respectively. And the Caribou, despite its remarkable rough field performance, has never really been suitable for use in even a low threat environment due to a total lack of any EW equipment, its unique thirst for Avgas, and its cumbersome handling qualities – surely this was known when the decision was taken a decade ago to extend the Caribou after its replacement Project Air 5190 collapsed?!

Army’s Chinook helicopters have provided a strong and vital capability to coalition efforts in Afghanistan, but despite being in service for well over a decade; these were only deployed after a ‘crash’ program to equip them with improved communications, electronic and weapons-based self defence systems, and ballistic protection for crews and passengers.

But perhaps worst of all is the non-deployability of Army’s fleet of Black Hawk helicopters, particularly in light of recent calls for the ADF to have its own helicopter medevac capability to support Australian SAS and RTF troops in Afghanistan after questions were raised after an incident last year about the reported slow response time of US helicopters. Despite requests from this magazine and other media outlets, Defence has been unable to explain the delays in integrating a locally designed RWR under Project Air 5416 instead of buying an off-the-shelf system similar to that used by US Black Hawks.

Even embattled Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has been caught unawares by the lack of combat capability of many of the ADF’s platforms. “I’ve been quite surprised by the range of situations I have inherited and none has come as a greater surprise than the hollowness we have in a range of capabilities,” he told The Australian recently. But Opposition politicians say Fitzgibbon has been in the job long enough now to have at least started addressing them. “I would like the minister to name one new project he has initiated to deal with the current deployable capability of the ADF,” Opposition defence spokesman Senator David Johnston said. “We are now seeing the minister’s clumsy handling of so many issues peripheral to our core capabilities spilling over into operational deployability. I have no doubt he will blame it on the previous government, or on defence industry, but the real responsibility lies … at his feet.”

“None has come as a greater surprise than the hollowness we have.”

But the range of platforms in just this small sample suggests the ‘for, not with’ mentality has been endemic within Defence for decades, and cannot be attributed to any one side of the political fence. Moves in recent years to purchase off-the-shelf equipment such as the C-17 and Super Hornet will allow a small defence force such as Australia’s to tap into upgrade and enhancement programs undertaken by our major allies in a timely manner.

Future programs such as the Air 8000 Caribou and Air 7000 Orion replacement programs will likely take this into account.