747 at 40

At the time the 747 was considered only an interim solution and an aircraft for economy class while well heeled travellers went supersonic, but fortunately Boeing had appointed Joe Sutter, a brilliant young designer, to the project and he was to father the classic of the jet age.

And it is this classic design that Boeing is striving to wring just one last version from and in doing so create history, as no widebody aircraft will have been in production for as long, and only the 737 in the jet era beats the longevity of the 747.

But like the 747-100 in the late ’60s, Boeing’s efforts since launching the 747-8 have been distracted, this time by the glamorous and fast selling 787. For some time after it launched the 747-8 Boeing hadn’t completed a proper mockup of the interior, showing customers instead an unimpressive patchwork of partial mockups, while Airbus was showing off a magnificent full scale mockup of its competing A380.

And when key customers such as Emirates requested solutions to cabin layout problems and range issues Boeing’s focus was elsewhere, say insiders at Boeing and Emirates.

“We dropped the ball big time,” conceded one senior Boeing executive to industry magazine Air Transport World.

Boeing also underestimated Airbus’s efforts to keep the 747-8I out of the passenger market, say some airline executives, and a number of key campaigns were lost to pricing and political pressure, while Boeing’s inability to quickly offer solutions to Emirates’s range requirements has likely cost the company any chance of securing an order for the passenger version of the 747‑8 from the Gulf giant.

Airbus and Boeing have traded blows over the merits and performance of the A380 and 747-8, and Boeing executives are counting down the days for the 747-8 to take to the air to prove their numbers.

Trippe’s numbers

And it was numbers – passenger numbers – that were in the mind of Pan Am’s founder and chairman Juan Trippe, who had led the airline world in launching many new designs including the 707 and DC-8. Trippe was a champion of mass travel, starting in 1948 when he introduced an international tourist configuration on DC‑4s to San Juan.

On December 22 1965, just 12 weeks after losing the C-5A competition to Lockheed, Boeing’s chairman Bill Allen and Trippe signed a letter of intent to launch the 747 program. It is impossible to find anyone who recalls if there was a definitive business plan for the 747. The problem was the 747-8I was not the main game – the 787 commanded all the sales, marketing and engineering attention. But traffic was booming for the airline industry which had enjoyed growth of 15 per cent a year through the early 1960s as passengers flocked to jet aircraft.

Trippe was a man on a mission. He wanted to make travel affordable for everyone and he believed that the 747, with its high bypass engines, could do just that. The 747 was expected to cut operating costs per seat by 30 per cent over the 707.

Regardless of the reticence of other airlines, on April 13 1966 Pan Am ordered 25 747s at US$22 million a piece.

It is hard to imagine today, with 1524 747s sold – including 106 747-8s – that the aircraft almost bankrupted Boeing and Pratt & Whitney and started the demise of Pan Am. Orders for the big jet only trickled in initially. Japan Airlines and Lufthansa wanted three each, British Airways six, American 10, TWA 12 and United five.

These numbers were a far cry from the orders for 30-plus from each airline that launched the jet era. However, sales were not the major problem.

The overriding challenge was weight – and tonnes of it. When the 747 was first envisaged in late December 1965, it was to weigh 250,000kg at takeoff. When the order was signed six months later, Pan Am and Boeing agreed that the takeoff weight of the 747 would not exceed 297,000kg.

Pratt & Whitney committed to supply an engine with 41,000lb (182kN) of thrust and increased it to 44,000lb (196kN) within three years of the first deliveries.

By June 1967, the 747’s takeoff weight was 310,000kg and climbing. Pan Am and Boeing agreed that the 747’s range would drop by 780nm (1450km) to 4350nm (8050km) and the maximum altitude would drop 2000ft to 33,000ft. While the change in altitude may not seem a problem, it was a significant one for the airlines operating the 747. The aim was to cruise 10 per cent faster than other jets. The reduction in altitude meant that the 747 would not be able to fly above them and thus would have to fly at a lower speed.

But Boeing’s problems couldn’t be solved that easily. The company realised that it needed to increase the 747’s weight to 322,727kg and thus needed P&W to deliver an engine at 43,500lb (193kN) of thrust three years ahead of its guarantee.

According to some insiders at Boeing, the company threatened to cancel the 747 program unless the engine maker agreed to the additional thrust. Boeing realised that it had serious competition looming from Lockheed and Rolls-Royce, which had started production of the TriStar, and Mc- Donnell Douglas and GE with the DC-10.

Pratt & Whitney finally agreed to Boeing’s terms. The engine manufacturer recognised that a quick way to get the extra thrust was to run the engine at higher temperatures but this would mean the engine was less efficient and would burn more fuel.

To rectify the fuel consumption problem, however, meant running the engine at even higher temperatures.

Another vexing problem occurred in flight testing when the engines themselves distorted. A solution in the form of stiffening was found but deliveries of the big jet were consequently delayed by several months. Pratt & Whitney worked on other answers to the fuel consumption problem and finally, within about six months of the 747 entering service, fuel consumption was deemed acceptable.

Despite the many problems encountered in its manufacture, the birth of the 747 was an amazing feat. Pan Am took delivery of its first aircraft just three-and-a-half years after its order was placed and that included a 10 month flight test program.

But even after the first commercial flight on January 22 1970 serious problems still existed. The 747’s engines were giving the airline significant problems and Pan Am threatened to withhold $5 million per aircraft until at least 20 modifications were made. The airline also considered grounding its 747 fleet. A solution was eventually found and Boeing and Pratt & Whitney agreed to a penalty.

But while litigation receded, Boeing was mired in debt from the 747 program, owing banks US$1. 2 billion – around US$7 billion in today’s terms.

The result was savage, with Boeing laying off 64,000 staff to survive. For three years not one order was placed for the 747 and production fell from seven a month to below two, while the DC-10 went from strength to strength.

In time though, the 747’s combination of outstanding operating economics and range performance saw the world’s first airliner to introduce a widebody configuration and high bypass turbofan engines become a great success. Deliveries began picking up in the late 1970s (73 deliveries in 1980), while the glory days for production of this ‘Queen of the Skies’ were in the late 1980s and early-mid 1990s as the popular 747-400 entered service (70 747s were delivered in 1990, 64 in 1991).

But a seemingly risk adverse Boeing repeatedly failed to capitalise on the 747’s success in developing modernised variants. “The -8I certainly looks vulnerable, and the very weak cargo market [also] weakens the -8F business case. ”In the April 4 2004 issue of the highly respected business magazine Fortune, it was claimed that Boeing CEO and president Phil Condit was conflict-averse and was freaked out by the gigantic bets it took to build aircraft. The article referred to the often told story of Condit welling up in tears after a blistering meeting with Wall Street analysts who wanted short term profits, not huge R&D and launch costs. Indeed, with the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing took on another company that was risk-averse when it came to building commercial aircraft.

Certainly Boeing studied 747 derivatives in great detail – most ambitiously with the 747-500X, -600X and -700X with a new wing and fuselage stretches, and in the case of the 650-seat -700X a widened fuselage – but none made if off the drawing board until the November 2005 launch of the 747-8. But by that time the all-new, bigger Airbus A380 was flying, seemingly relegating the passenger 747-8I to niche customers.

History Repeats

Forty years on from first flight the 747 is again facing technical problems and delays, although of a much smaller order. Further, prospects for the passenger version of the 747-8 have dimmed through the failure to win key orders from Emirates, Etihad and British Airways that would have given the program significant momentum, even before the recent and dramatic weakening of the global economy.

Boeing has sold 78 Freighters, eight 747‑8BBJs and 20 Intercontinental passenger models, although only four sales were recorded in 2008, all for BBJ versions.

In mid November Boeing revealed significant delays in the 747 program, with the first 747-8 Freighter not to be delivered until the third quarter of 2010 instead of late 2009 and the first 747-8 Intercontinental slipping to the second quarter of 2011 instead of late 2010.

Boeing said that the “remaining work on the 747-8 program was well defined” and to ensure that it remained that way the company reorganised its aircraft program leadership structure, with Patrick Shanahan, former VP and general manager of the 787, named VP and general manager of Airplane Programs for Boeing Commercial Airplanes.

Boeing also created a new organisation called Supply Chain Management and Operations, to be headed by Ray Conner, formerly VP sales Commercial Airplanes.

But the problem for Boeing is that the market conditions are anything but defined – particularly for a 747 sized aircraft.

Key customers All Nippon Airways and Asiana have both put off any decision between the A380 and the 747-8, citing “market conditions. ” Another prospect, Cathay Pacific, has locked its order book away and is looking to defer deliveries.

And working hard on those customers is Airbus with significant improvements in weight in its A380 offering, which has enjoyed a very smooth entry into service.

Airbus engineers claim they can take up to two tonnes out of the A380 in a stepped weight-reduction program to 2012. That reduction plus interior fit-out weight savings identified by Emirates will enable it to use the aircraft from Dubai to the US West Coast nonstop, routes it had earmarked for the 747-8I. Richard Aboulafia, VP of the Washington DC based Teal Group, warns that the “greatest threat to the -8I is Airbus’s very aggressive A380 pricing. ” He adds that while the 747-8 is a good aeroplane, sharp pricing makes the A380 an almost irresistible draw for any airline that wants a small fleet of large aircraft.

Airbus denies the discounting claim.

Aboulafia adds that “the -8I certainly looks vulnerable, and the very weak cargo market [also] weakens the -8F business case.

But if Boeing can stick with the program it will have a superb cargo aircraft that’s well placed to benefit when the cargo market resumes its growth. ” Still, Boeing’s orders for 106 747-8s translates into about four years’ production at the current rate of two a month. And the success of the 747-8F helped force Airbus to ditch its A380F.

Aboulafia also says that with tougher times the 747-8’s lower seat kilometre or freight tonne costs will help the Boeing jumbo.

Clearly the 747-8F is a standout. The aircraft is 5. 6m longer than the 747-400F with a maximum structural payload capability of 140 tonnes and a range of more than 4420nm (8185km). Boeing says it offers 16 per cent more revenue cargo volume than the -400F and that its GEnx engines will enable it to be 17 per cent more fuel efficient than the -400F and 30 per cent quieter.

Cathay Pacific is a big fan of the 747-8F, ordering 10 in 2007 to help, along with six 747-400ERFs, replace its 19 747 freighters – a combination of -200Fs, -400Fs and -400BCFs.

“We are very excited about the 747‑8 Freighter, which provides the highest payload of any commercial freighter,” Cathay Pacific CEO Tony Tyler said at the time of the order. “More importantly, this is a highly fuel-efficient aircraft which consumes 22 per cent less fuel per revenue payload tonne than a 747-200F and 12 per cent less than a 747-400F. ” While the business case for the 747-8F appears to be rock solid, the development and definition for the 747-8I has been somewhat shaky.

Boeing initially went for range over capacity, but launch (and so far only) customer Lufthansa wanted capacity so Boeing stretched the passenger version the full 5. 6m, whereas airlines such as Emirates preferred the shorter initial 3. 6m stretched proposal for its additional range.

Stretching the airframe 5. 6m gives the 747-8I a range of approximately 8000nm (14,815km), while Emirates had sought a 3. 6m stretch with a range of 8300-8400nm (15,380-15,565km).

The 747-8I will seat 467 in a three-class configuration, and its 787 derived GEnx engines will help provide nearly equivalent trip costs to those on the 747-400 and 10 per cent lower seat-kilometre costs, plus 28 per cent greater cargo volume, according to Boeing.

Emirates and Boeing worked through 2008 trying to reduce the weight of the 747-8 so the airline could operate it Dubai- Los Angeles with 400 passengers (a 45 tonne payload) year round.

“We need another 500 miles and we are not there yet,” Emirates president Tim Clark told Australian Aviation in September 2008.

However, it wasn’t just range that was a problem for Emirates and others. The A380 had ushered in larger first class suites and even double beds (with Singapore Airlines), which would not fit into what had been one of the 747’s most attractive features – the first class zone in the nose.

Again Emirates laments that Boeing was slow to respond to this new challenge, something Boeing executives concede. Options included using the upper deck, but to segregate the first class passengers it would have been necessary to move the staircase to the front of the upper deck – and thus direct access through Door 1.

Other suggestions to sex up the 747-8I, such as reviving a United Airlines suggestion from 1967 to have cockpit style windows on the main deck nose section, were given the thumbs down.

The problem was the 747-8I was not the main game – the 787 commanded all the sales, marketing and engineering attention.

Locally the 747-8I appears to be off Qantas’s radar screen, despite a possible gap in its long term fleet between the A380 and 787-9 once the 747-400 fleet is retired.

“We constantly evaluate aircraft and at this stage the 747-8 is not right for us although it is a great aircraft,” said Qantas executive general manager John Borghetti during a September 21 ‘webchat’ with the public marking the airline’s first A380 delivery.

Today the 747-8’s future lies in its first flight, when hard numbers can prove its economic and environmental credentials.

And when it flies, the global economy may just be showing signs of recovery.