Clubbing baby seals in a forest of hype

The ball was subsequently picked up by Liberal backbencher and former RAAF air traffic controller, Dr Denis Jensen who, fed by an interest group that thinks Australia’s future airpower solution lies not with the F-35, but with the role limited, expensive, and unavailable F-22 Raptor, told The West Australian newspaper that “sources” had revealed to him that F-35s had been “clubbed like baby seals” in a recent classified ‘virtual exercise’ conducted in Hawaii against current frontline Russian and Chinese fighters.

But LockMart and the JPO retaliated, releasing a comprehensive point by point critique of the Jane’s article, and revealing the true scenario behind the Hawaii exercise. Overseen by the RAND Corporation thinktank, rather than the F-35 being the featured performer, the exercise actually centred around just six Guam-based F-22s supported by tankers trying to defend Taiwan against hoards of Chinese Flankers.

“The reports are completely false and misleading and have absolutely no basis in fact,” JPO head Major General Charles Davis said. “The August 2008 Pacific Vision Wargame that has been referenced recently in the media did not even address air-to-air combat effectiveness. ” But in many ways, the Lock- Mart/JPO team has brought many of these criticisms on itself. There’s no doubt the LockMart marketing effort for the aircraft, backed primarily by the USAF globally and the RAAF and DMO here in Australia, has been stunning. But there are still so many questions about the aircraft which are important to Australia, which are yet to be answered, such as unit cost, development and in-service timings, and the aircraft’s development path.

Granted, the question of cost is a difficult one, especially as the aircraft is still at least five years away from delivery to partner nations, but also because the JSF program is like no other before it. Partner nations will not only buy a fleet of aircraft, but will also be in effect forced to sign on to a comprehensive long term logistics support program expected to last the life of the aircraft itself. Therefore, it’s very difficult to provide a true picture of the actual cost of the upfront ‘flyaway’ hardware, compared to the cost of providing software upgrades, logistics and spares for the next 15 to 25 years, and even more difficult to compare the JSF to previous or current ‘legacy’ programs.

But instead of explaining this to inquisitive specialist and mainstream media in the regular briefings conducted by the company, they instead float the prospect of yet to be approved “consortium buys” which may or may not keep the F-35A’s unit price at around US$60 million, while partner nation spokesmen quote 2002 dollar figures of around US$47 million, even though they won’t see or pay for an aircraft until 2012.

And then there’s the ADF’s allocated budget of between A$12 and $15 billion dollars (and similar numbers for other partner nations for the program), which the mainstream press understandably interprets that, for the 100 aircraft requirement, each aircraft will cost between $120 and $150 million. Someone just needs to lay it all out in a consistent and easy to understand format.

And then there’s the inservice date and development path. Assuming the F-35 is selected, the RAAF expects to take delivery of its first aircraft in 2013 or 2014, but these first four aircraft will be delivered to Eglin AFB in Florida for training, meaning we probably won’t see any of the following 12 F- 35s wearing kangaroo roundels in Australia until late 2015 at the earliest. But according to the current development plan, these aircraft will be delivered in a Block 2 or at best, a Block 3 configuration, without the allimportant maritime strike capability, auxiliary drop tanks, and other software loads which the RAAF considers vital for a fully operational air combat capability to adequately replace the F/ A-18A/B Hornets and ‘bridging’ F/A-18F Super Hornets.

And we are yet to see an adequate counter to the argument that keeps resurfacing about the F-35’s apparent aerodynamic shortfalls compared to the competition, which it’s detractors say will see it at a disadvantage in dogfights. While some specialist observers have a basic appreciation for the F-35’s sensor and beyond visual range capabilities and the fact the aircraft was designed to and meets a specification laid down by the USAF and the partner nations, this fact is still yet to be picked up by much of the mainstream and specialist media.

There’s little doubt that, if the F-35’s development goes as planned, it will be an extremely capable aircraft which promises to bring unheard of levels of situational awareness capability to its operators. It’s just that it’s sometimes hard to see the detail in the trees, for all the marketing hype that is the forest.