Defence Update

In the meantime a contingency study ordered by the Defence Minister, Mr Gordon Scholes, late last year to examine the feasibility of putting the Sea Kings to sea in their ASW role should a relatively sudden need arise through changed strategic circumstances, is proceeding in Navy Office. And there is a separate examination of whether it would be cost-effective to modify the destroyer tender, HMAS Stalwart to enable it to permanently embark just one Sea King helicopter for antisubmarine warfare operations. This basically involves enlarging Sta/wart’s helicopter hangar, a not-insignificant task.

Depending on whether this is judged a cost-effective solution to the aim of maintaining the skills of operating the bigger ASW helicopters at sea, the Navy then might look at the possibility of putting a Sea King on the fleet replenishment ship, HMAS Success, now fitting out in Sydney. Again it would involve enlarging the hangar.

But this prospect is unlikely to be addressed in any serious way until after Success enters Navy service in 1986, and even then could depend on whether Stalwart is modified to embark a Sea King. It is highly unlikely that modification work would be undertaken for the amphibious assault ship, HMAS Tobruk, homeported in Brisbane, to be modified to take a Sea King.

Navy consideration of how to make more meaningful use of the Westland Sea Kings, both in a peacetime environment or should an emergency loom, follows from the Defence statement Mr Scholes made to Parliament on November 3 last year. They also bear in mind that the somewhat delayed acquisition of helicopters for the FFG patrol frigates, now in the light of the carrier axing required to have ASW as well as surveillance and targeting capabilities, will not see the Navy with helicopters at least until 1987, if then. In explaining the Government’s ‘judgement’ that there would be no aircraft carrier replacement because the manpower and material resources devoted to operating fixed-wing aircraft ‘should be re-directed to introducing new and more effective equipment,’ Mr Scholes said.

‘In future the Fleet Air Arm will be an all-helicopter force and enhancement of this aspect of maritime operations is one of the highest equipment priorities for the Defence Force. I expect the assessment of helicopters for operation from Navy’s FFGs, and of the opportunities for commonality between these and other Defence Force helicopter requirements. ‘ Mr Scholes also said: ‘Contingency plans are being prepared so that, should there be an earlier or greater need for helicopters at sea, our eight Sea King ASW helicopters could be operated from an adapted commercial vessel. The Government would not propose to implement these plans unless strategic prospects changed. ‘

The Sea Kings with 817 Squadron at the Naval Air Station at Nowra ‘belong’ to the Fleet Commander, based in Sydney. Policy considerations in Navy Office in Canberra fall within the province of Rear Admiral Phil Kennedy, the Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans, Commodore Tony Horton, the Director General of Policy and Plans in that division, and Captain George Heron, the Director of Naval Aviation Policy.

In 1974-75the Navy acquired 10 Westland Sea Kings which had a basic aircraft cost in 1970 prices of $15 million. Four were lost through mishaps or malfunctions at sea by 1979, and a decision was made to acquire two more. These were delivered in 1983 at a basic aircraft cost of $7 million each. (Basic aircraft costs do not cover items such as support equipment ashore or afloat, spares and training which usually double the final cost apart from currency fluctuations and increases due to inflation.

An average embarkation of HMAS Melbourne would be four Sea Kings, apart from fixed-wing Trackers and Skyhawks, but the mix varied depending on the prime role.

Navy has been working to get the best possible use of the aircraft in the circumstances. This is mainly to fulfill an ASW training role that seeks to retain the state of the art. A supplementary role is participating in maritime exercises which can, like the Sea Eagle exercise last year, move from the NSW South Coast up to Brisbane. This has involved detaching Sea Kings to the RAAF’s main fighter base at Williamtown, near Newcastle. However the constraint on the exercise is that it must be sufficiently proximate to the operating base. Apart from some flexibility that can be achieved by deploying the Sea Kings (as with other aircraft) to other shore bases as the exercise area moves, the helicopters also can be refuelled from a ship at sea because they can land on some of them, and take off again even though they cannot accommodate or support them on a permanent basis.

Another shore-based role for the Sea Kings could be ASW patrols of shipping lanes near major ports. Coverage of these sea approaches, shipping operating close to the coast, or in an area like Bass Strait from East Sale air base, is known as coastal focal activity. Given that the range of a Sea King, as stated in Jane’s Aircraft, is 1230 km (actual endurance and range are classified), the high probability of activity required by ASW helicopters can only be successful if the area is reasonably proximate to the shore base of the aircraft. If shipping channels by the Great Barrier Reef, or the Torres Strait were considered for coverage, that would depend on priorities and also the mobility of support for a Sea King detachment to a suitable operating base.

The problem of permanently embarking a Sea King on HMAS Stalwart centres is mainly on a current hangar which is inadequate for unconstrained operations. It remains to be worked out how cost effective it would be to carry out modifications to enlarge the hangar to simply operate one helicopter. Against that appears the perceived need to acquire an at-sea training capability to sustain the associated skills. But to get a proper operational capability, there would be a need to get a major part of the Sea King Squadron to sea, concentrated in the same sea area. This means either getting the helicopters on to a number of platforms at sea, which would be less efficient because of the dispersal, or putting them all on an adapted merchant ship. This is part of the present contingency plan study. It also includes the possibility of plans for a containerised aviation support system that could be fitted to a commercial ship.

The current study is looking at options as to the most cost effective way of being able to operate the Sea Kings from an adapted merchant ship, while recognising that there is no intention in present circumstances, to implement such plans. The Sea King’s operational life is expected to extend at least into the mid-1990s. So apart from training, and shore-based participation in coastal focal exercises, there are the two endeavours of maintaining the ability to exercise the Sea at sea. off HMAS Stalwart, and the provision of an operational capability from a converted merchant ship should the need arise.

In July, the Acting Defence Minister, Mr Kim Beazley, described a report that the RAN was studying the purchase of a ship for use as a helicopter carrier ‘inaccurate and misleading He said any inference that the Government was giving further consideration to the purchase of an anti-submarine helicopter platform was incorrect. The report mentioned that the New Zealand-registered Union Rotoiti, built at Whyalla (SA) 1977, had been offered by the Union Steamship Company to the RAN at a converted cost of about $25 million. Mr Beazley confirmed that approaches had been made to the Navy by a number of companies with interests in shipbuilding and conversion. ‘It is perfectly understandable given the surplus of merchant shipping now available and recent developments overseas,’ he said. The Navy believes the approaches simply reflect that it has been asked to carry out a contingency study to put the Sea Kings to sea on a merchant ship should the strategic circumstances change unfavourably.

(Max Hawkins is the Editor of Defence Industry Newsletter.)