The Dream That Never Was

Dealing first with what was formerly the Imperial Iranian Air Force, the most advanced fighter in the country is the Phoenixarmed Grumman F-14A Tomcat, of which 77 are believed to survive in four squadrons from the initial purchase of 80 aircraft. The IIAF had requested a further 70 F-14As and planned to purchase two General Dynamics F-16s for each F-14A in the inventory. A firm order for 55 F-16s had been placed (of which 10 two-seat F-16Bs were to have been delivered this year), but none had arrived when the new government cancelled the contract. Ironically, these F-16s will now provide accelerated deliveries for Israel, and the resulting production cutback will slightly increase the price to remaining customers.

Of the preceding generation of fighters, the IIAF had 10 squadrons of McDonnell Douglas Phantom tells, a 200-plus force of F-4Ds, F-4Es, and RF-4Es, and eight squadrons (169 aircraft) of Northrop F-SE/Fs. The air force planned to support and control these various fighters with the Boeing E-3A Sentry (AWACS), of which the sale of seven had been approved by Congress, although none have been delivered. Tanker support was available in the form of six Boeing 707-320Cs and three ex-TWA Boeing 747s. The IIAF was also responsible for maritime patrol of the Gulf and adjacent areas of the Indian Ocean, and to this end purchased six LockheedP-3F Orions, although these lack the highly classified ASW equipment of the P-3C. Plans to provide a strategic airlift capability with the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy were abandoned before the take-over, but the service does have a very useful transport force, including eight 747s and a total of 64 Lockheed Hercules (including 49 of the latest C- 130H model).

Airborne armament includes the long-range Phoenix, medium-range Sparrow, and short-range Sidewinder air-air missiles, and the Maverick and Condor air-surface weapons, and laser-guided bombs. In the SAM category, the IIAF bought the BAe Rapier and Short Tigercat for low level air defence. Early warning of enemy intruders was provided by highly advanced US 3-D surveillance radars supplied under the “Peace Crown” program.

The air force also has a large number of helicopters, but the principal rotary-wing operator in Iran is the army, with well over 5 00 aircraft. The Imperial Iranian Army Aviation had a fleet that included 40 Boeing Vertol CH-47C Chinooks, with an additional 50 being supplied by Italy’s Ellicotteri Meridionali, some 202 Bell AH-1J SeaCobra gunships with TOW anti-tank missiles, and 2 8 7 Bell 214A u prated Hueys for troop transport and liaison duties. Some 350 Bell 214ST medium-lift helicopters were to have been assembled at a purpose-built factory in Iran.

The Army is also responsible for the Improved Hawk SAM system and has financed the development of the BAe Tracked Rapier based on the M113 APC. Missiles already in service include the MDC Dragon antitank weapon.

Iranian army equipment comes from several countries, and includes French anti-tank missiles, and the highly lethal ZSU23-4 and -57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns from the Soviet Union. Purchases from Britain include 900 Chieftain main battle tanks. More than 1000 improved Chieftains were on order with the latest Chobham armour, which is still not available to the British Army.

The Iranian Navy has three destroyers (of which one is an ex-RN Battle-class with Seacat SAMs, and two are ex-USN Summer-class with Standard SSM/SAMs), four frigates and four corvettes. In addition, the IIN had ordered three Ten class submarines and four Spruance-class guided missile destroyers from the US, six Type 209 submarines from West Germany, and six Lupo-class frigates from Italy. Weaponry on order included over 200 harpoon ship-ship missiles. Most of these naval contracts have been cut back be the new government, rather than cancelled outright. It is noteworthy that at one stage the Shah planned to acquire a number of Invincible-class cruisers with Sea Harrier V/STOL fighters and Sea King ASW helicopters, but this plan was abandoned due to manpower shortages.

Benefit of Hindsight

It is thus clear that by the end of 1978 Iran had accumulated an array of modern arms that was totally out of proportion to its population of 36 million, a number directly comparable to that of Burma or South Korea. However, viewed in terms of putting Western defence technology at risk, it is also clear that the situation would have been far worse if the overthrow of the Shah had been delayed until the most advanced US equipment (notably the E-3A and f-16) had arrived in the country.

Why did Iran purchase all this equipment? Firstly, because of a traditional rivalry with Iraq, the nation’s strongly armed neighbour to the West. Secondly, because Iran aimed to replace the UK as the policeman of the Gulf, after the British withdrew in 1970. Thirdly, Iran saw a need to be able to deter any Soviet thrust toward the Gulf, and to provide some degree of security for the shipping lanes of the Arabian Sea, ie, the north-west corner of the Indian Ocean.

Why did the West sell some of its best arms to Iran? Aside from simple balance-of-payments considerations, it was clear that in any future war between East and West the Gulf would be a particularly sensitive area. For this scenario, arming Iran not only provided a barrier between the Soviet Union and the oil supplies on which the West depended, but it also provided a stockpile to arms on which the US could draw in emergency.

Iran may have been many years away from self-sufficiency in operating such advanced equipment, but a reasonable capability could be achieved with the help of Western advisers, and the rest of the equipment would have been ready when the US flew in manpower to employ it.

Reports indicate that this scheme was tested during the Vietnam War, when USAF pilots flew into Tehran in transport aircraft and flew out in the F-4s direct to SE Asia.

What secrets were at risk? In regard to the most advanced equipment, there is probably far more information in Iran on (for example) the E3A, F-16, and Chobham armour than has ever been made public. However, leakage of such information to the Soviet Union would be an embarrassment to the West, rather than a major blow such as the loss of electronic intelligence gathering sites in northern Iran undoubtedly was.

Western journals have tended to emphasise the risk of information on the F-14 and its long-range Phoenix missiles passing to the Russians, despite the fact that this weapons system is a decade old. The Soviet Union undoubtedly needs a system of this type to counter the threat of American bombers and cruise missiles, but it is doubtful whether that of the F-14 represents a massive advance on current Russian technology.

On the other hand, information on the proximity fuses of US air-air missiles would greatly enhance the chances for countermeasures to produce premature warhead detonation.

The Soviets may also be keen to learn how to make a reliable contact fuse and an effective continuous-rod warhead. In the case of the warhead, detailed examination would immediately reveal how to manufacture a replica, but the same is not true for all types of equipment. For example, examining the turbine blades.

f an advanced turbine engine would not give the Soviets the ability to produce such blades, any more than seeing the titanium box that forms the centre-piece of the F14 s swing-wing would necessarily advance construction techniques in the East.

Given an F-14 to flight test, the Soviets. s might develop techniques to optimise their own fighters’ kill-ratio in short range combat, but the performance of the F-14 is due to be transformed within the next few years by the installation of far more powerful engines. Likewise, there is little for the Russians to learn from the F-SE and F-4, although the latter’s Northrop as a stabilised TV camera for long-range target identification probably has no equal in the East. However, this equipment will soon be superseded by a much improved derivative including laser facilities.

What is going to happen to all these arms? It is, of course, impossible to predict their fate with any great confidence, especially as the present Iranian government may well give way to a new regime within the next few months. It nonetheless seems likely that Iran will stand by the present declared aim of slimming down the IAF to a combat force consisting of mainly F-5Es with some F-4Es, to be operated with limited and discreet help from the USAF.

One key factor governing the disposal of modern weapons systems is the fact that they mostly require continuous support from the manufacturer. Admittedly the USAF has managed to operate a small number of MiG-21s (and reportedly two MiG-23s) without benefit of spares from the Mikoyan organisation, but these aircraft are unusually reliable and have been kept flying regardless of expense. On the other hand, when Soviet aid was cut off from Egypt, the EAF had to get British manufacturers to produce spares for the MiG-21, and paid British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce to overhaul the airframes and engines. With such problems in mind, Iran is hardly likely to find a buyer for complex aircraft such as the F-4 without US approval, and the market for the F-14 must be very limited (Saudi Arabia and Canada now apparently having lost interest).

Disposal to advanced equipment to the Soviet Union is unlikely if Iran wishes to continue using much of the Western equipment already in stock, due to this need for product support. What is more of a risk is the possibility that small numbers of arms (notably anti-tank GW and armed helicopters) might find their way to terrorist organisations (or liberation forces, depending on your viewpoint). Several nations are already concerned about the possibility of attacks on their oil rigs, and some of the equipment now available in Iran could form a serious threat in this context.

What are the lessons for future arms sales? Several major arms buyers (notably Saudi Arabia) might experience Iranian-style upheavals in the next few years, although it is unlikely that any nation in this category will duplicate Iran in the sheer volume and variety of its advanced weaponry.

The indications are that the West had taken some precautions in the case of Iran, removing or modifying the most sensitive equipment from aircraft such as the P-3 to minimise the danger of its loss to the Soviets. Beyond this, perhaps the most important point is to handle arms sales in the way that the Russians do, making sure that the customer is as dependent as possible on on-going support, both in terms of spares and technical manpower.

The West is certainly not going to stop selling arms to wealthy nations that seek to defend themselves (and their oil) against external aggression, but there is a great deal that can be done to limit the potential value of these arms to the Soviet Union, and to emphasise the merits of continuing friendship with the West.