Dissimilar Air Combat Training

Thus came an entire generation of aircraft primarily arm­ed with missiles. The United States Air Force boldly introduced the F101, F102 and F106 which depended upon their big long-range Falcon and Genie air-to-air missiles. The US Navy and Marine Corps prepared for the Phantom II, a Mach 2 missile-only interceptor that was intended to supplement the gun/missile armed Crusader. Years later, over Vietnam, the older Crusader was to score a per sortie-kill ratio four times greater than the missile-armed F48.

Following the Korean conflict the entire spectrum of air-to-air combat swung over to speed and missiles. From the r86 on to the supersonic F100 to the F101 and 102, then the 105 and finally the very fast 106. Guns became a thing of the past while the ability to achieve Mach 2. 5 was far more, important than the ability to pull 8g in a tight turn at 300 knots a few hundred feet above the trees. Supposedly that would never occur again.

With the new long range missiles (notably Sparrow) a fighter pilot would detect his adversary upwards of 20 miles distant, launch his missile and run. In fact, however, the opposite was true as Sparrow after Sparrow either died inert on the rack or simply was lost in the Chinese. In the final month of Operation Rolling Thunder (1964-68) more than 50 missiles were fired by US Navy aircraft, principally F48, with not one missile reaching its target. In some instances, a missile would impact a friendly aircraft impressing upon aircrews the need to gain visual identification before launching an attack. By that time the small, nimble MiG 17 would be tearing off the wings of a lumbering F4 in a 9g turn that the Phantom could never hope to match.

The exact opposite to projections had happened, the radar guided missile was virtually useless in the intense heat of a dogfight while the rapid firing rotary cannon was often the deciding weapon.

Randy Cunningham, the US Navy’s only Vietnam ace, stated that on May 10, 1972, when he downed three VAF MiGs in the single mission he could have brought that up to six kills as his Phantom was positioned perfectly in several instances for a perfect gun kill, only his F4B had no cannon. “I think if I had a gun that day I would have had three more kills, because there was a 17, another 17, and this 21 that were right there for the shooting . . . if I had had a gun!” Cunningham’s sentiments were relived many times in many Phantom cockpits over the humid skies of North Vietnam.

As a result of the debacle over Vietnam, where the overall US kilt ratio was 2. 3:1, in mid-1968 Lieut. Frank W. Ault was commissioned to produce a report on the shortcomings of US Navy air superiority missions. At that time the USAF aircrews felt fairly comfortable with their gun-armed Phantoms despite the fact that prior to the 1968 bombing halt their own kill ratio was slightly less than that of their navy counterparts.

The Ault report was released early in 1969 and stated the obvious. In fact so obvious were the conclusions that the Navy had already set up its Top Cun program. The Top Gun program was designed to teach the vital lessons learned from MiG encounters in Vietnam.

Each MiG mission was minutely dissected to develop a scenario for tactics. The Americans had wisely realised that to fight an enemy you must first understand his tactical philosophy, his weapons and his aircraft capabilities. One of these points had been recognised or evaluated prior to the first American aerial assaults on North Vietnam as they had never really been considered relevant.

The first point in que1ti6n was the fact that by, and large most routine air-to-air combat practice was between the same type of aircraft. Therefore when a pilot flew into hostile airspace he scanned the horizon for an aircraft of similar dimensions to his own Phantom, he even looked for the giveaway smoke trails that the Phantom’s J79 engines are famous for. What he saw was a glimpse of a small, agile MiG minus a telltale smoke trail. By the time he had satisfactorily acquired the target visually and selected boresight on either IR Sidewinder or radar Sparrow (which at that stage was usually well below minimum launch range and thereby ineffective the MiG was at his six o’clock and the Phantom had fired lights, aplenty.

So was born Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (DACT).

From now on the Top Gun program would specialise in training Phantom crews to fight against aircraft that specially resembled their potential enemy. The A4E kyhawk perfectly emulated the much-used MiG 17 while the TJ8 Talon and F106 Delta Dart took the role of the MiG 21. The early Top Gun school sat for four weeks which included 75 classroom hours discussing Soviet-style tactics and weapons and 25 training flights per crew. At the end of the course, each crew felt as if they had learnt more in four weeks than they, had in their entire flying career.

So successful was the concept that the proudly like to classify its Vietnam air-to-air experience into two time zones – before Top Gun and after Top Gun. To further highlight the success of this imaginative and incredibly successful approach the pre-bombing halt kill ratio was 2. 4:1, following the re-introduction of operations against the NVAF in 1972 the USN kill ratio jumped to 13:1. Meanwhile, the USAF figures had actually dropped to 2:1 – it was time for the air force to take a long hard look at its training procedures in light of the Navy experience. A familiar com­ ment made by returning USN MiG killers when asked what it was like, they often said: “It was just like Top Gun, only these guys weren’t half as good!”

In all fairness though, the USAF had not been entirely reticent in introducing a new form of combat training. Back in 1967 Air Defence Command had taken heed of the lessons emanating from the Vietnam environment and had instituted a program to upgrade the F106 Delta Darts. Despite the size of the 106 and the fact that it was solely missile-armed, the air­ craft was very agile, a fact which later led to its use as a MiG 21 imitator. As a result, the ADC F106 was modified to give better cockpit visibility and fitted with an M61 Vulcan cannon. Despite its age, this aircraft is still the bulwark of ADC in­terceptor squadrons charged with the defence of the con­tinental United States against long-range supersonic bombers.

Spurred on by the US Navy’s vastly improved perfor­ mance in 1972 and the practical achievements by their own ADC Darts the Air Force launched into their own advanced combat training program which they named The Aggressor Squadron. Benefiting from hindsight and the extensive lessons learnt from Navy and ADC experience, the Aggressor Squadron was formed in such a way that it would be totally mobile and thus would also lend itself to simulating the “enemy” in exercise situations in an effort to vastly improve the air defence status of US and Allied forces.

Voicing his enthusiasm for the newly formed unit, the then commander Lt Col Jerry Nabors addressed the Tactical Air Power Subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee as to the effectiveness of his special unit with the following statement: “During the Southeast Asian conflict, an extensive study was accomplished to reconstruct each MiG encounter that occurred in the war. The objective was to determine the reasons for success or failure in the encounter and to identify problem areas that could be resolved to provide the United States with a better fighting force.”

The most common problem found could be summed up in the words “insufficient training and experience in air-to-air combat”. The air-to-air training that had been conducted was conducted against similar aircraft using standard USAF tactics. Yet most of the manoeuvres and tactics employed in attacking or defending in aerial engagements depend upon perfor­ mance characteristics of your aircraft versus your adversary’s aircraft, correct estimation of his range, and knowledge of his tactics. It was determined that similar aircraft training – for example, F4 versus F4″ – was unsatisfactory when engaging better turning MiG aircraft. Visual lookout procedures and training were adequate to acquire an aircraft of similar size to yours, but grossly inadequate to detect the smaller MiG’s. As a result, many kills were obtained by the enemy totally un­detected until it was too late to react.

Even when detected, crucial errors were made in visual range estimations which resulted in certain necessary aerial manoeuvres being employed at the wrong point in space or not at all. Also, the enemy tactics had never been flown in training scenarios. An urgent need existed for an air-to-air training program using aircraft with comparable characteristics of the potential enemy aircraft and flown by pilots who had extensively studied the enemy fighter pilot and were skilled in his tactics and fighting philosophy.

Therein lies the justification for the 64th Fighter Weapons Squadron which was formed in October 1972 at Nellis AFB, Nevada and is known as The Aggressor Squadron.

Earlier in the same hearing, the Senate Committee heard testimony from USAF Vietnam ace, Capt Steve Ritchie on just how the Soviet/Chinese trained NVAF fought: “The average MiG tactic was to hit and run. He liked to take off, stay low, get behind, sneak up behind and fire his heat-seeking missiles and dive away. He was normally very closely controlled by his ground radar controller, who was also a pilot. He was told when to jettison his tanks, when to go to full afterburner, when to arm his missiles where to break off and even where to land. In other words, he was not trained to think for himself very much, and I think this is one area where we have always the advantage over our adversaries”.

From the above comments by Capt Ritchie, it becomes obvious that a small force, say four or six aeroplanes, assisted by AWACS aircraft with attacking crews fully trained via the Aggressor Squadron will be able to outmanoeuvre a similar-sized force of pilots trained primarily to slavishly follow direc­tions from a ground controller who can often lose contact due to intense ECM activity or by using natural terrain features to mask radar return.

The MiG itself is a far from perfect machine. Flight tests have revealed that on the standard MiG21J, the most commonly used of that mark, the true dogfight capability is ­restricted by a very short range, a gyro gunsight which topples at 2. 75g and a nose radar with an effective range of around 12 miles. The true maximum Mach number is 1. 9 and the service ceiling is well below 50,000ft. Dogfight tactics with the 21 usually comprise a single attacking pass with either cannon or IR mis­ sile followed by a breakaway. The MiG 17 on the other hand has a peculiar tendency to lock up all flight controls at high speed (500kts) at low level. This design fault led many US pilots to literally drive the 17s straight into the sides of moun­tains.

On the other hand, the F4 Phantom developed into a fine aircraft following direct battle experience in Vietnam. Addi­tion of the Vulcan M61 rotary cannon and wing leading edge slats, which resulted in a reduction of 25 per cent in radius of turn, enabled the F4 to be a vastly improved air superiority fighter, though the biggest asset going for the Phantom was the crew, and it was here that the Aggressor Squadron made the single greatest contribution to aircraft improvement.

At first the 64th FWS used the two-seat T38 Talon to simulate MiG21 aircraft. Due to the age of the MiG17 and its unlikely role in any prolonged future air-to-air engagement, it was decided to drop the A4 Skyhawk and concentrate on the later-generation MiG types. Experience with the T38 prov­ed that though the type performed fairly well it lacked in power to such an extent that it was all too easy for F4 pilots to outrun it when disengaging. This shortfall in performance was ably remedied with the introduction in late 1975 of the F5E Tiger II.

Performance of the Tiger II is such that successful engagements have even been flown against multiple threat F15s. Later-generation Sidewinder L IR missiles and the overall improvements in thrust and agility of the Tiger 11 have turned this aircraft into a real MiG killer. By the same token, the F5E exhibits identical traits to that of the potential enemy aircraft – basic dimensions, smoke-free engines, low radar return and overall visual appearance. Aggressor aircraft even have a Soviet-style buzz number painted on their nose in addition to being finished in the five traditional Soviet-inspired colour schemes. One of them is aluminised silver giving a dull grey appearance overall while the other four are camouflage schemes that accurately resemble those painted on poten­ tial enemy aircraft.

Today there are three Aggressor Squadrons, two are bas­ ed at Nellis AFB, Nevada and a third squadron is assigned to NATO, operating out of Alconbury, UK.

Each squadron comprises upwards of 20 F5E aircraft and is geared to be highly mobile in nature with mobile ground support facilities and transport aircraft. Each unit also has its own highly trained Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) per­ personnel who are trained to mimic their Soviet counterparts in the finest detail.

The Nellis-based units have been regularly touring the USA and Pacific (including a visit to RAAF Williamtown to take on our Mirages – more on that in our next issue!) where they conduct their intensive training with various TAC squadrons. In the USAF today there are few graduated fighter pilots who have not learnt at the hands of the Aggressors. All TAC F15/F16 aircrew pass through the course before joining operational units both in the USA and Europe. The West Ger­ man Luftwaffe has also exercised heavily with their F4E units and is reported to be excessively pleased with the overall in­ crease in air-to-air effectiveness afforded by fighting against dissimilar aircraft.

The US Navy meanwhile has refined its operation greatly in the past 10 years and now refers to its Top Gun program as an Air Combat Manoeuvring (ACM) course. Once again Ran­ dy Cunningham takes up the story to ably tell the results of his involvement with ACM.

“My training is the reason I am alive today. Thanks to the foresight of our Navy, after some hindsight, a rigorous tactical air combat manoeuvring program was established. VF121, our training squadron where we first learned to fly the F48, provides 16 ACM flights against various types of aircraft. The idea is that training against dissimilar aircraft best trains us to meet the threat of low-wing-loaded MiG fighters. ”

The embryo scheme that Cunningham refers to has since been replaced by a slick well-oiled unit which operates from two bases, Oceana NAS which trains aircrew of the Atlantic Fleet and Miramar which specialises in the Pacific Fleet region. Like the USAF, the USN also uses the agile F5E, in fact, the two programs are so alike that there is now a fair amount of Navy/Air Force interchange with regular exchanges between the Navy Adversary units and the Air Force Aggressors.

The USN ACM activity is intense with over 2000 hours be­ ing flown per annum on around 5000 missions with F14 and F4 aircraft taking on the F5E. The USMC have also taken on the MiG simulators with their “riffing” Harriers to further perfect this unique art of survival.

The lessons of Vietnam have been well heeded. Every fighter now has modern gun armament, missiles have im­ proved greatly in the past 15 years and the overall design emphasis has shifted away from big aircraft to the smaller more agile fighter with vast reserves of Specific Excess Power (SEP) and manoeuvrability. Virtually all combat over the past 15 years has been fought at subsonic speeds and under 20,000ft. The regime of the mach 2. 5 “straight as a dash” in­ terceptor can ably be left to ADC in their quest to destroy Soviet Backfire bombers as they overfly Alaska. For the rest of us, aircraft like the F16 and F18 are what it is all about; as it is these aircraft in particular that were designed around the specific lessons learnt over North Vietnam’s paddy fields.

It has been estimated that if ever the fracas does break out in Western Europe there would be upwards of 8000 operations sorties per day over West Germany alone. To sur­vive in that environment will take pilots with great skill, ex­perience, confidence and courage – thanks to the Aggressor and Navy ACM units the West will have this all-important cardup its sleeve – human talent.