Australian Aviation

The final report on the Lion Air 610 crash of 29 October 2018 makes for sobering reading. The crew on the previous flight, Lion Air 43, managed to overcome erroneous MCAS activation and land safely after cutting off the automatic trimming system. This content is available exclusively to Australian Aviation members. Subscribe to Australian Aviation

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When the final history of the Boeing 737 MAX is written, one of the most vital topics for scrutiny — and likely one of the greatest lessons learned — will be how and why the industry reacted in the way that it did during the four months between the 29 October 2018 crash of Lion

And why is Boeing’s Maneuvring Characteristics Augmentation System a problem? Boeing had a problem with the 737 MAX, and it was not a new problem. Rather, it was one of several awkward characteristics that dogged the manufacturer since the 1960s, when the 737 originally entered service, and which has confronted engineers working on revised generations

The morning of 29 October 2018 dawned bright in Jakarta. As the sun rose over Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft operating Lion Air flight 610 taxied for takeoff. In the flight deck of PK-LQP that morning were captain Bhavye Suneja and his first officer Harvino. With over 6,000 hours in the

Delving deep into an unprecedented story The fallout of the story behind the 737 MAX will change aviation forever. In fact, it already has, already is and will continue to do so. It is becoming increasingly clear that the commercial aircraft we imagined would be the hallmark of aviation in the 2020s — the jets