Opinion: Australia needs a Raider

To mitigate these risks, Australia should pursue the acquisition of a squadron of 12 B-21 Raider stealth bombers from the US. This move would not only enhance our long-range strike options but also reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring we remain a credible force amid rising threats from assertive powers like China.

The AUKUS program, while visionary, is fraught with challenges that could undermine its timely delivery. Under the “optimal pathway,” Australia is set to receive three to five Virginia-Class submarines from the US starting in 2032, followed by domestically built SSN-AUKUS vessels in the 2040s.

However, US congressional reports highlight persistent issues in American shipyards, where Virginia-Class production has lagged at about 1.2 boats per year since 2022, far below the needed 2.33 to meet both domestic and allied commitments. Similarly, the UK’s nuclear reactor development for the SSN-AUKUS has been flagged as high-risk, with repeated “red” ratings in infrastructure assessments indicating potential significant delays.

These hurdles are compounded by workforce shortages, supply chain disruptions, and competing US Navy priorities, which could push back transfers and leave Australia with a diminished submarine fleet as our ageing Collins-Class boats reach the end of their extended service life.

Such delays aren’t mere inconveniences; they represent a strategic vulnerability. Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy emphasises a “denial” approach, focusing on preventing adversaries from projecting power into our region through long-range strike and integrated forces.

Yet, with submarine gaps looming, our ability to deter aggression, particularly in contested areas like the South China Sea, could be compromised. Recent analyses, including those from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), underscore gaps in air and missile defence and the need for enhanced strike capabilities to complement maritime assets.

The Royal Australian Air Force currently relies on F-35A stealth fighters and F/A-18F Super Hornets, which are capable but limited in range and payload for deep-strike missions without refuelling support.

Extending these fleets, as proposed in some budget adjustments, may plug short-term holes but won’t deliver the transformative edge required for a protracted conflict.

Enter the B-21 Raider: a sixth-generation stealth bomber designed for penetrating heavily defended airspace, delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions over intercontinental ranges.

With advanced low-observable technologies, open-system architecture for rapid upgrades, and the ability to operate manned or unmanned, the B-21 represents the pinnacle of modern air power.

For Australia, a squadron of 12 would provide immediate long-range strike options, capable of targeting adversary assets from northern bases without relying on vulnerable forward positions.

Unlike submarines, which excel in stealthy underwater operations, the B-21 offers speed and flexibility and could respond in hours rather than days, making it an ideal complement to bridge AUKUS timelines.

Critics might baulk at the cost, estimated at around $700 million per aircraft in 2022 dollars, potentially totalling $8 to $10 billion for the squadron, including support infrastructure. However, this must be weighed against the $368 billion committed to AUKUS, where delays could further inflate costs through life extensions for the Collins Class.

Moreover, acquiring the B-21 could lower unit costs through expanded production runs, benefiting the US Air Force’s goal of at least 100 Raiders.

Think tanks such as the Institute for Public Affairs and ASPI have already recommended this path, noting that it would strengthen AUKUS by hosting US contingents and fostering industrial collaboration. Past discussions confirm Australian interest, with talks held on the B-21 as a long-range alternative before opting for missile upgrades.

Sceptics argue that bombers like the B-21 could escalate tensions or strain our non-proliferation commitments, but Australia would pursue a conventional-only configuration, aligning with our nuclear-free stance.

Furthermore, interoperability with US forces, already a hallmark of AUKUS, would amplify collective deterrence, as evidenced by joint exercises and shared basing proposals.

In a region where China’s missile arsenal and naval expansion pose direct threats, the B-21’s ability to hold targets at risk from afar would deny adversaries easy gains.

To illustrate the strategic fit, consider the following comparison of key capabilities:

Australia cannot afford complacency. With defence spending at 2.05 per cent of GDP – below historical projections we must prioritise high-impact acquisitions. Pursuing the B-21 would signal resolve to allies and adversaries alike, minimising the risks posed by AUKUS setbacks.

The government should initiate formal talks with Washington, leveraging our strong alliance to secure this capability. In doing so, we safeguard not just our shores, but the stability of the Indo-Pacific for generations to come.