Opinion: Complexity v affordability

“The aircraft developed to date have been specifically designed to meet the Royal Australian Air Force provided Design Reference Missions,” said Boeing MQ-28 global program director Glen Ferguson at the time.

“We are working options for Block 3, including a larger wingspan to provide extended range, updated communications systems and an internal weapons bay capable of accommodating one medium range missile or two Small Diameter Bombs to meet the next layer of RAAF priorities and also address the needs of allied nations.”

There are some important benefits to utilising an internal weapons bay on the MQ-28 Ghost Bat; with reduced drag and better aerodynamics, as well as fuel efficiency benefits and lower radar signature advantages. There is great flexibility in weapon configuration, and the co-operation aspect is also important, with the original design philosophy of flying alongside a directing quarterback, such as the stealthy F-35 fighter jet.

The forecast of future upgrades brings some crucial strategy and economic questions to the fore. Are the goals for the MQ-28 Ghost Bat stealth and survivability, or affordability and disposability?

An internal weapons bay itself would be considered a major development; doubtless, it would potentially require significant design work to accommodate. This is, of course, a question that neither Boeing nor the Department of Defence can answer. It’s a question regarding the crucial operating mechanics of a highly classified military platform shrouded in the utmost secrecy.

Instead, we can look to other international unmanned aircraft designs, ideally those with similar goals and functions.

Examples include the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper drone, which carries a weaponised payload of missiles and bombs on external hardpoints; likewise, the Bayraktar TB2 medium-altitude long-endurance uncrewed combat vehicle carries external munitions.

In the stealth category, the Dassault nEUROn experimental unmanned combat aerial vehicle is built around its internal weapons bay and stealth aspects, while the Northrop Grumman X-47B has two internal weapons bays.

The Turkish Baykar Kızılelma ‘Red Apple’ supersonic-capable unmanned fighter was designed from the start with an internal weapons bay to preserve low observability and survive in higher-threat airspace.

A key reminder is that significant taxpayer money is tied up in this Ghost Bat program. Last year, the Australian government announced that it would invest $1.4 billion to transition the MQ-28A Ghost Bat into a fully operational warfighting asset for the Australian Defence Force.

That announcement included new contracts with Boeing Defence Australia for six operational Block 2 MQ-28A aircraft and the development of an enhanced Block 3 prototype.

Australian Minister for Defence industry Pat Conroy has previously stated that the aircraft was initially pegged as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset.

Minister Conroy, speaking to defence industry representatives at the Defence Connect Defence Industry Development Strategy Summit 2024, said heated public commentary at the time had ‘gotten the wrong end of the stick’ by calling out the perceived lack of weaponisation for the Ghost Bat.

“We have made it clear we are looking for immediate bang for buck (regarding ISR on the Ghost Bat program),” he said at the conference.

“Certainly, we are very open for Ghost Bat to have strike capability, we just want the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance first.”

A major concern here is that the government was unexpectedly assailed with media and public criticism that the original ISR Ghost Bat was an unarmed design, and politicians immediately picked up the panic phone to the manufacturer and Defence to complain.

If Boeing is now taking minor change advice from Defence in this matter; “to meet the next layer of RAAF priorities”, that’s a worry.

Let’s not forget that the Australian government has toyed with massive cost overruns on Defence projects in the past. We already know that those small changes add up to taxpayer dollar disasters.

Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston, spoke to the ABC in 2025, citing that the Department of Defence needed to ‘do better’ to avoid cost overruns and major project delays.

“We aim to do better… We want to see every acquisition project that we are on, deliver on time and capability,” he said at the time.

“These are highly complex systems, by nature pushing the edge in capabilities… because that’s what you need when you’re looking at capabilities that provide for the defence of your country … (But) we do need to spend (public money) well.”

How can a modular low-cost loyal wingman now be re-rolled into a hardened and battle-ready stealth combat configuration attacker in a cost-effective way?

The MQ-28A program must be carefully monitored, including the clarified goals for the previously mentioned Block 3 modifications that Boeing is working toward. It would be concerning economically if the reasoning behind the aircraft were to change, and with it the upgrades.