The same, but different

Second, while both aircraft types appeared at the outset to offer ultimate solutions to market challenges – the A380 conquering the issue of mass transportation and Concorde the issue of distance at great speed (albeit at extraordinary ticket cost) – both fell victim to that fatal business combination of the difference between potential and reality.

In many ways, both projects were visionary.

Concorde offered the prospect of passenger transportation at speeds previously the realm of the most advanced fighter jets, and at a level of comfort appropriate to the well-heeled. Sadly for Concorde its supersonic capabilities were limited to trans-ocean by national and/ or environmental regulation. The upshot was that the trans-Atlantic route became the only route with any true viability, and airlines that had committed on the basis of super-fast transit elsewhere abandoned ship.

There is more to the story of course, not least of which are the years of political shenanigans, but we will leave that to aviation expert John Walton who traces the history of the Concorde in an article beginning on Page 72.

The day Airbus CEO Tom Enders announced in February that A380 deliveries would end in 2021, I wrote a feature for the Australian Aviation website, in part drawing on the experience of a recent transit through Dubai Airport. A terminal-change bus ride that took me past A380 after A380 after A380, at gate after gate after gate, spoke volumes: that the future of the type had always been predicated on the continued faith in it by Emirates.

The A380 was meant to revolutionise international hub-to-hub connections while delivering high-density mega-profit to operators. Subsequently, the reality proved to be very different. The A380 has struggled financially and it all has to do with return on seat occupancy per flight, versus distance flown, versus fuel cost. Put very simply: when a four-engine A380 is full, the economic formula tends to add up.

When it isn’t, it doesn’t.

So while it remains a hugely popular type with passengers who appreciate its spaciousness and relatively quiet cabin, it is far less so with operators concerned about maintaining return on investment.

The writing on the wall was underlined by the growing popularity for airlines of cheaper-to-operate, long-haul, twin-engine widebodies with the capacity to deliver customers direct to their destination: from international airport to national airport rather than international hub to international hub.

The irony is that Airbus, with the popularity of its own twin-engine long-haul types, has helped contribute to its A380’s demise.

The crunch came when Emirates cut its A380 forward orders in favour of the A350 and A330neo. The airline said it would take up 14 more A380s up to the year 2021 rather than its original ambition for 20 with options for 16 more.

All that said, it’s not all over just yet. Emirates has stated it will continue to fly the type well into the 2030s. Closer to home, Qantas has restated its faith in the aircraft and is committed to a multi-million dollar upgrade of its A380 fleet interiors.

Clearly, the A380 will feature on our aviation landscape for many years to come. Starting on Page 30, we examine the past and present of this giant of the skies, and speculate on what some airlines might have in store for its near-future.

‘In many ways, both projects were visionary. ’