10/10?

The trick? Matching those brand expectations with price.

other CX-HLS contenders, Boeing went on to launch the 747, in April 1966, while Douglas, shocked that it had lost the C-5A competition, also turned to a widebody airliner design.

First impressions of the new DC‑10 were made public early in 1966, and the preliminary models looked remarkably similar to today’s Airbus A380, with a double-deck fuselage to accommodate as many as 650 passengers and four engines slung underneath the wings.

The design was far too big, even in the heady mid-60s, and the Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC) was in no position to launch any new programs as it was then beset with financial and production problems associated with its DC-8 and DC-9 programs. Not until after the reluctant merger in April 1967 with McDonnell to form the McDonnell Douglas Corporation was significant effort focused on the DC-10.

Genesis for the eventual DC‑10 was an American Airlines requirement for a twin-engine widebody, seating 250 in a mixedclass arrangement, and capable of flying nonstop with a full payload between New York-LaGuardia and Chicago, or from the west coast to Chicago.

As Boeing was pre-occupied with the 747, first Lockheed, then Douglas emerged as the contenders. After looking at a twin, both Douglas and Lockheed concluded that a US transcontinental-range tri-jet would offer greater sales potential.

There was also significant resistance, due to historic engine reliability issues, to flying a big twin over the Rockies on transcontinental flights.

By mid-1967 the DC-10 banner covered two separate proposals: the three-engine DC-10-3, with an unusual bifurcated intake arrangement for the center engine located at the base of the fin, and the four-engine DC-10-4, which resembled the future Boeing 747SP.

At this stage, the DC-10 had a wider cabin than the 747 to permit up to 11-across seating, plus it featured under-floor seating. Both models had the same wing.

In September of that year Lockheed announced preliminary specifications for the L-1011, later named TriStar. The following month the Douglas board voted to continue development of a tri-jet, with the focus on two versions, the DC-l0A and longer DC-10B. Soon afterwards, the configuration of the center engine was changed with a simpler straight-through duct, made possible by large milled aluminum ‘banjo’ structural components in the vertical stabiliser.

Eastern and Delta liked both the DC-10 and TriStar; TWA much preferred the TriStar; United and particularly American were unlikely to buy from Lockheed. Many executives were concerned about Lockheed’s commitment to the commercial market and were upbeat about the McDonnell money rescuing Douglas. There was also disquiet in some circles about the ambitious claims for the TriStar’s RB211 engine from Rolls-Royce.

Thus a clean sweep to Douglas was a distinct possibility but the chance was lost despite the DC-10 receiving an order for 25 plus 25 options from American Airlines on February 19 1968 for an aircraft sized between the A and B models, subsequently designated Series 10. At the time, Aviation Week surmised that Eastern Airlines would follow suit, choosing the larger DC-10B.

James McDonnell, chairman of the company that bore his name, had already expressed his views on the commercial market and his desire to make it more like the military aircraft business. He wanted to dictate terms to the airlines in a similar way that his F-4Phantom fighter had flown around the flak put up by Congress and the Pentagon.

However, the airlines were not interested to hear his views; a famous ‘day-long’ meeting scheduled with the legendary C R Smith of American lasted just ten minutes when Mr Mac was shown the door. This situation was to be a telling factor as opportunities to control the market slipped by.

Had McDonnell been more entrepreneurial and less dictatorial perhaps he may have had the market to himself.

Twenty years later, Sandy McDonnell, then chairman of MDC, reflected that “(Douglas) felt they knew how to run the commercial business better than we, their bosses, and they were probably right. ” Sieg Strange, director of business planning, went further in the MDC Spirit magazine in 1988: “. . . in the case of the DC-10 it was Jack McGowen [then president of DAC] and Dave Lewis [then president of MDC] trying to convince [MDC chairman] Mr Mac that there was an opportunity to literally make the DC-10 the only widebody tri-jet. But there was a lack of understanding of how airlines made decisions and it circumvented some opportunities. ” Unfortunately, the no-nonsense manner of Mr Mac – that which had won for his company the dominant role in the military aviation market – was now working against sales of the DC‑10. Simply put, the DC-10 was offered at a price – take it, or leave it.

Lockheed’s chairman Dan Houghton seized the opportunity and offered airlines generous discounts. On Friday March 29 1968, Lockheed launched the L-1011 with orders and options for 144 from TWA, Eastern and Air Holdings (Britain). Delta and Northeast later followed suit. The game was on.

McGowen, who probably knew the commercial air transport industry as well as anyone, wanted to pull out of the race and focus on a twin-engine type, but the competitive juices were flowing at MDC. A formal offer to United resulted, on April 25, in a crucial order for 30 DC-10s, plus 30 options, enough for Douglas to give the go-ahead to the program.

With Douglas’s experience of building for subsequent growth, the DC-10 was designed from the outset to accommodate an extra centerline landing gear to cope with increased weights. Also, the General Electric CF6 engine immediately offered extra thrust for a long-range version. Consequently, the intercontinental DC-10-30 made almost a clean sweep of the major carriers in Europe, with only Air France, BEA, and BOAC not placing orders. McGowen and Lewis made a formidable team and the DC-10 steadily gained on the TriStar’s stunning sales lead. The sales battle was bloody, as the future of both companies hung on the success of their respective tri-jets. At the end of 1970, when both the TriStar and the DC-10 had taken wing, the DC-10 held 241 orders and options from 15 airlines, while the L-1011 had 178 from six customers.

Both Ansett Airlines and Trans Australian Airlines looked closely at the DC-10 and TriStar but opted for a ‘wide-look’ Boeing 727-200 in late 1970.

The first DC-10s for American and United were handed over on July 29 1971, the same day that Federal Aviation Administration certification was awarded, and the type entered service with American on August 5, on the Los Angeles-Chicago route.

The following year was a significant one for the DC-10. Swissair introduced the long-range DC-10-30 into service on December 15 1972; two days earlier, Northwest Orient had introduced the Pratt & Whitney JT9D-powered DC-10-40 (changed from -20 at the airline’s request). MDC was also studying the DC-10 Twin to compete with the Airbus A300B, a Convertible Freighter (CF), an All Freighter (AF), and a stretched DC-10.

At the end of 1972 MDC’s domination of the airliner market looked likely. The Boeing 747 line was only ticking over; for the year it had sold just 17 for a total of 223. Lockheed’s TriStar had logged 126 orders. In contrast, MDC had orders for 178 DC-l0s and was able to report record earnings, backlog and working capital.

DC-10 Twin and Paris tragedy

According to John Brizendine, who was president of Douglas from 1973 through to 1982, Mr Mac approached Airbus with a proposal that Airbus and Douglas combine on a 50/50 basis to produce a big twin based on the DC-10 cross-section. Brizendine recalls that Airbus president and CEO Henri Ziegler told Mr Mac “France must have its own. ” Spurned by France on October 4 1971, MDC announced its DC-11 twin jet development of the DC-10 which would go head-to-head with the A300. This aircraft was to have 89 per cent commonality with the DC-10-30 which had been widely sold in Europe and 93 per cent with the DC-10-10. At that time, Douglas executives predicted the advent of dual rating for pilots on the two types.

McGowan said he was bullish on the DC-10 Twin as it became known, but claimed that Mr Mac’s son, John McDonnell, who at the time was VP finance & development, was wary on expenditure and the head-to-head competition with Airbus. McGowan told this writer in 2004 that “The risk would have been minimal and at the time development costs were put at just $250 million. ”After a spectacular career with Douglas, McGowan resigned in 1973 at the age of just 55. “I knew damn well that with the McDonnell’s influence, Douglas was not going any place. ” While somewhat coy on elaborating, many believe that he resigned because Mr Mac quashed deals that McGowan had worked hard to put together because he felt they were too generous. Those deals may well have seen the DC-10 totally dominate the market.

The McDonnell-dominated board baulked at a go-ahead for the DC-10 twin at a July 30 1973 board meeting. McGowan maintains that “the orders were there from European airlines such as Swissair” but Mr Mac insisted on a US carrier. The project was later scrapped and the die was cast, closing the window of opportunity for domination of both the widebody tri-jet and big twin markets.

Brizendine adds: “Mr Mac was involved in everything and would ‘pull the plug’ instantly – this seriously affected morale. ” Mr Mac also decided that he would hand over the reins to nephew Sandy McDonnell and Lewis, an engineering genius and dynamic salesman, left to head up General Dynamics.

With the DC-10 Twin cancelled the next setback to the program came dramatically on Sunday March 3 1974, when a THY DC-10-10 crashed after takeoff from Paris-Orly, killing all 346 people on board. The events of the disaster are well documented. Twenty months earlier, on June 12 1972, an American DC-10 had experienced a failure of the rear cargo door over Windsor, Ontario which highlighted a fundamental design problem that could lead to sudden depressurisation and a loss of flying controls. Several modifications were implemented under an inadequate gentlemen’s agreement between MDC and the FAA.

The THY aircraft, however, one of six originally destined for ANA, was delivered only partly modified, although MDC’s records indicated that the work had been completed and inspected.

Other facts surrounding the crash have been largely ignored by media such as the popular Air Crash Investigation. Capt Bryce McCormick, captain of a DC-10 involved in a similar incident, a year earlier wrote a letter to Aviation Week after the publication of the final findings of the THY accident investigation. He claimed that all of the tampering of the cargo door (after delivery) would have “rendered the missing [modification] inoperative even if it had been installed” and went on to say “I don’t see how MDC could be blamed for this. ” To compound the problem, the cargo door warning light system had been disconnected so that the flight engineer’s light showed it closed even when it was open.

Sales were impacted and were lackluster through the middle part of the ’70s, being boosted in 1978 by a US Air Force order for 60

Qantas took options on two DC-10s around 1977 but they lapsed and it opted for the 747SP.

as KC-10 tankers and renewed commercial interest in the tri-jet.

Even Qantas took options on two DC-10s around 1977 but they lapsed and it opted for the 747SP.

In 1978 MDC was in good shape with the DC-9 Super 80 (MD-80) and the F-18 Hornet in flight test. Profits were back to record levels and working capital was at an all-time high.

Super 60 and Chicago

A number of airlines had purchased the DC-10 with the understanding that a stretched version would follow. Without this development they would be forced to look to the 747. The original Twin idea had been dropped and a revised design, the DC-X-200, emerged in 1975 from a series of Advanced Medium Range Aircraft (AMRA) studies, with an all-new wing tailored for the short-haul mission. The launch of the 767 and A310, together with a surge in A300 orders, caused the board to cancel the project.

The stretched DC-10 ideas being proposed were now dubbed the Super 60 series. These models would follow closely the DC-8 Super 60 series with three models. The first, the 61, a simple stretch would carry 390, while the 62 would be a small stretch with greater span and the 63 would combine the 61’s length and 62’s span.

During 1978 momentum was building for a launch of the Super 60 series. United would be the launch customer and other airlines which had expressed solid interest included Swissair, World Airways, Air New Zealand, Thai Airways and JAL.

That rosy picture changed dramatically on May 25 1979, when an American DC-10 crashed when taking off from Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, killing all 279 occupants. The aircraft’s engine/pylon assembly tore away due to a fatigue crack caused by faulty maintenance procedures by American Airlines. The tragedy and the subsequent five-week grounding of the type by the FAA seriously undermined the sales outlook for the DC-10.

MDC bore the brunt for the industry’s so-called ‘shortcomings’ and the political conflict between the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FAA. The design of the pylon was common to all manufacturers and many claim that the FAA acted on impulse.

Two more serious accidents, at Mexico City and in Antarctica with Air New Zealand, left the DC-10’s reputation in tatters despite the fact the aircraft was blameless in both.

That the DC-10 had the best (mechanical) on-time departure rate and incident records half that of the TriStar and 747 did not matter. In the month following the grounding, every engine shutdown– eight in all – of a DC‑10 made the newspapers but the 21 for the 747 and 12 for the TriStar were ignored.

The US media in particular crucified the DC-10 and dramatically weakened MDC’s ability to continue in the commercial aircraft business.

Sanford McDonnell, then chairman of MDC, summed up the situation perfectly in an address at the company’s annual general meeting in April 1980: “If there are in America or the world people who hesitate to fly by DC-10, those people are, like our airplane and our company, victims of a great mass of misinformation and baseless speculation. They have been misled, as we have been maligned, by so much falsehood that the truth, when it finally emerged, was scarcely recognised. ” Despite the grounding, orders for another 34 DC-10s were announced in 1979, but certainly some – such as Egyptair and Alitalia (for the DC-10‑62) were lost because of the negative publicity.

More variants and Sioux City

In 1983 MDC announced the MD-100, yet another attempt to breathe life into the DC-10 program. Although the MD- prefix indicated the participation of McDonnell with Douglas in the new proposal, the real reason for the change was that the adverse publicity about the Paris and Chicago crashes had made the famous DC label a liability. (Similarly, the DC-9 Super 80 series became the MD-80 series, although the type certificate remained unchanged until certification of the MD-88. ) The MD-100 looked very like the 1981-vintage DC-10 Super 10 and Super 30 designs, and the 1982 MD-EEE, which featured PW2037 engines and a number of aerodynamic and structural refinements. The shortened MD-100-10 would carry between 220 and 340 passengers up to 5,650nm (10,450km). The stretched -20 accommodated 280-410 passengers over the same distance. New features included winglets, carbon brakes, two-crew flightdeck, an extended tail cone, and increased use of advanced composites resulting in fuel savings of up to 23 per cent compared to the DC-10-30.

There were also design studies for an MD-100-10ER which offered a range of 7,000nm (13,000km) and the MD-100-30 which was to be a ‘super stretch’ for 387 passengers with a range of 4,500mn (8,300km).

Lufthansa and JAL were the most likely launch customers, but the board again balked at the estimated $1 billion development cost for this and the proposed MD-90 (then an MD‑87 upgrade) and canceled all work in November 1983, citing a “lack of airline commitment”.

There was no possibility of a brand-new design ever leaving the Douglas drawing boards if simple derivatives could not be sanctioned. Jackson was being proved correct.

While DC-10 sales were all but over, Douglas was still selling aircraft. Under new (DAC) president James Worsham’s direction, the MD-80 derivative of the DC-9 had booked more than 100 orders for three years running, which instilled confidence in the MDC board that there were still strong commercial possibilities ahead. Douglas Aircraft was also turning a profit and in 1984 and 1985 made US$158 million.

A renewed effort resulted in the development of the MD-XX and launch, finally in late 1986, of a DC-10 derivative, the MD-11, with orders and options for 92 aircraft from 12 airlines. The final two DC-10 orders were booked in 1988 for a total of 446 DC-10s, including 60 KC-10s; the last aircraft was delivered on July 25 1989, to Nigeria Airways.

In 1989 another series of crashes again focused attention on the DC-10. The most dramatic was the United accident on July 19 at Sioux City, Iowa when the center engine disintegrated and ruptured all hydraulic lines, thus rendering the aircraft almost impossible to control.

Only the skill of the flightcrew to ‘control’ the DC-10 using the power of its remaining engines and the integrity of the structure enabled 186 people to survive the crash-landing.

There was criticism of Douglas for not having four hydraulic systems such as that of the TriStar but, in the case of the Sioux City disaster, four systems would have made no difference. Also, the TriStar had a flying tail which requires four systems to have an acceptable level of safety.

The US media launched a scathing attack on everything and anything connected with the DC-10.

Eight days later a Korean DC-10 crashed on approach to Tripoli, Libya and two months after that a UTA DC‑10 was blown up over Niger. As a result of the Sioux City accident, Douglas incorporated self-sealing hydraulic lines in the case of damage. Boeing had made similar modifications to its 747s and 767s.

Since the accidents of 1989, the DC-10 enjoyed a largely trouble-free existence and established an excellent record for structural integrity and reliability unmatched by any other contemporary widebody type.

FedEx became the champion of the type operating a fleet of up to 92, including MD-10 two-crew glass cockpit conversions. Today it still has a number of MD-10s in service, while the DC-10 soldiers on in uniform with the US Air Force as the KC-10.

But as a passenger plane, the DC-10 is no more. The second to last DC-10 ever built, Biman Bangladesh Airlines’ S2-ACR, operated the type’s last commercial flights with paying passengers in late February – see breakout.

While the DC-10 took off with great promise, board indecision and a lack of understanding of the commercial market thwarted efforts by Douglas ‘veterans’ to return the company to its glory days. Instead, the DC-10 is now in retirement, commercial airliner production at the former Douglas plant at Long Beach wound up in 2006, and only dimishing numbers of MD-11s, MD-80s and 717s keep the Douglas Commercial legacy alive in the skies.

Final flight

At just after 1500hrs on Monday February 24 I am in seat 34J awaiting push-back from stand 86R at Birmingham Airport, writes Paul Marriott.

There is an excited anticipation from the 200-plus passengers on board Biman Bangladesh Airlines DC-10-30 S2-ACR as it is about to make the DC-10’s final passenger flight. This aircraft was in regular commercial service up until mid-February flying from Dhaka to Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Abu Dhabi. It then flew on Thursday February 20 from Dhaka to Birmingham on its farewell tour.

On February 22, 23 and 24 the aircraft flew three local one-hour pleasure flights each day culminating in the last-ever scheduled departure on the 24th.

With checks completed the aircraft is pushed back and we are on our way to the threshold of Runway 15 for a southwesterly departure. With no incoming traffic the captain releases the power of the three General Electric GE CF6-50C2 engines and we are quickly airborne turning to the east for a northerly route that will take us to Scotland.

As soon as the seatbelt sign is switched off the passengers start to explore the cabin, now in three sections with 314 seats in all-economy. S2-ACR was delivered new to Biman at the end of 1988. The cabin interior could now be described as being bright and colourful if a little dated! The seats are comfortable with a 34in (86cm) seat pitch.

Enthusiasts on board have come from all over the world for this one last chance to fly this tri-jet. Kevin Steele the CEO of Biman, himself an enthusiast, wanted the DC-10 to go out in style but even he has been amazed at the reaction to the flights with over 52 different nationalities travelling to Birmingham to experience the DC-10 over the last three days. One lady flew in from New Mexico, others travelled from Singapore, Canada and Uganda. Many enthusiasts from all over Europe also took the chance to fly this famous tri-jet one last time.

Soon we are heading south and it is time to return to our seats for the descent and textbook landing back at Birmingham Airport. Our arrival back includes a fire service cascade of water over the aeroplane. Back on the stand it is not over as each passenger is given a certificate, the staff of Biman are on hand to answer questions and on disembarking everyone is offered the opportunity to visit the flightdeck to take photographs and speak with the crew.

Sadly, S2-ACR was originally due to fly from Birmingham to the United States to be donated to an aviation museum. This unfortunately has not happened and the aircraft was flown empty back to Dhaka to be parted out and sold for scrap.