Under attack?

Boeing’s Multi-Year Contract with the US Navy for Super Hornet production will see aircraft delivered out to 2015. Beyond that, AA understands Boeing will look to maintain the Super Hornet industrial base using company funds as it has previously in the case of the C-17 production line.

The precise number would be subject to advised government decisions as we went. MINISTER SMITH

Regardless, any new orders would need to be made as soon as possible to ensure long-lead items can still be produced. The longer a decision is delayed on the purchase of additional Super Hornets the better the chances of a significant F-35 buy.

Still, the government’s Super Hornet cost and availability inquiry will undoubtedly cause further consternation among other F-35 partner nations, particularly following the inaccurate news of a Canadian cancellation of the F-35 program late in 2012.

Air power think-tank The Williams Foundation has questioned the government’s decision process, saying further delays to Australia’s air combat capability transition plan demonstrate inconsistencies in defence acquisition policy.

In a late-2012 release, the Foundation laid out the four options which government considered before announcing the Letter of Request, including a previously unreported option to accelerate the F-35A acquisition under Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B and return it to the original schedule before it was delayed by two years in May’s federal budget.

“There are two very important points that highlight government inconsistency in defence acquisition policy by the Minister’s recent announcement,” the release reads. “The first relates to tolerance for risk, and the second relates to attitude towards Australian industry. In terms of risk the government appears to be willing to accept an extreme level of risk with the Future Submarine Project, a program where Australia would be taking the lead and be the sole customer for a small fleet of conventional submarines, that are yet to be designed, that are pushing the edge of technology. . . This is in stark contrast to the JSF program where the US has the lead of a nine-nation partnership, development and testing is now largely complete, production is ramping up such that by the end of 2018 over 400 F-35 aircraft will have been delivered and there is a clear upgrade path well into the future. ” The release also compared “the treatment of the Australian aerospace sector versus the land and maritime sectors”, describing it as “stark”, and claiming that, “Ongoing lack of support for Australian aerospace industry and ongoing questions about Australia’s commitment to the F-35 program will further undermine Australia’s aerospace industry sector. ” Lockheed Martin, meanwhile, notes the F-35, with the 100th jet now in production, is coming down the price-curve, with each subsequent production lot cheaper than the previous one.

“Between the first and fifth years of production, we cut the price in half,” Lockheed Martin’s director of international customer engagement Dave Scott told AA. “And we will continue to reduce the price over the next few years. Australia is buying the most common variant within the group of nations purchasing the F-35, also the least expensive variant. Our forecast is that the average cost of the CTOL variant of the aircraft in 2012 dollars is about US$70 million, known as ‘fly-away’ cost. That is very comparable to other aircraft including F-16s and F-18s and quite honestly cheaper than some competing planes,” Scott said.

The projected US$70 million average unit cost for the F-35A CTOL variant of the F-35 (notably, from a mature production line) is in comparison to the fly-away cost of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, estimated at US$67 million in 2012.

The comparable cost of aircraft without the threat of further program delays and higher-risk developments is believed to contribute to Minister Smith’s reluctance to commit further to the F-35.

A leaked draft of the 2013 Defence White Paper has furthered the argument that the future of the RAAF’s air combat capability lies in a mixed fleet of F-35As and Super Hornets, along

The only decision that the government has made with respect to purchase of Joint Strike Fighters is we’re contractually committed to two. . . MINISTER SMITH with the Growlers.

“As a key part of its Defence strategy, government requires the Royal Australian Air Force to be able to control Australia’s air approaches and support friendly operations in the land, sea, and air environments without interference from enemy aircraft,” the draft document reads.

“The delivery of Australia’s F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft . . . will ensure the continued potency of Australia’s air combat system in projecting decisive air power in the defence of Australia and its interests.

“The government announced in 2012 its decision to convert 12 of Australia’s 24 Super Hornet aircraft into the E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare variant. Australia’s Growler aircraft will enhance significantly the ADF’s electronic warfare capability, and together with the Joint Strike Fighter and the Super Hornet, will form a formidable air combat force capable of controlling both the air and electronic environments. ” The White Paper goes on to note the challenge of emerging advanced air combat and air defence capabilities within the region as well as the proliferation of modern electronic warfare systems. “To meet this challenge, government remains committed to acquiring the fifth generation F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter,” although only goes so far as to name the initial two F-35 jets the government has already approved.

The strength of that “commitment” remains to be seen.