Defence white paper reflections

In all, apart from the extra subs and the two extra battalions for the Army already promised by the former Howard government, the White Paper confirms a force structure largely in place today. But given the ever growing costs of defence capabilities, and today’s global recession, that’s arguably no mean feat. Perhaps the White Paper’s biggest achievement is setting in train a funding path to sustain and replace the current force structure and capabilities.

For the Air Force the affirmation of the requirement for 100 JSFs to replace a similar number of F/A-18s and F-111s should be welcomed. Can you think of any other western air force that gets to replace its tactical fighter fleet on a one-for-one basis? Certainly not the USAF. And indeed the RAAF itself was only able to replace the survivors of 116 Mirage IIIs with 75 F/A-18A/Bs.

The White Paper states that the Air Combat Capability Review, which fed into the White Paper’s development, “concluded that a fleet of around 100 fifth generation multirole combat aircraft would provide Australia with an effective and flexible air combat capability to 2030,” before going on to affirm JSF’s as “the preferred solution for that requirement. ” Still, it will be interesting to see if the RAAF indeed ever does operate a fleet of 100 JSFs. There are three points to consider here.

Firstly, the White Paper confirms an initial 72 or so JSFs will be acquired to replace the current 71 strong F/A-18 ‘Classic’ Hornet fleet, enough for three operational squadrons and a training unit. They will augment the 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets to be delivered from next March, which will be used to form one operational and one training squadron.

“Australia’s future air combat capability will therefore be based on four operational air combat squadrons consisting initially of three JSF squadrons and a squadron of Super Hornet aircraft, which will be replaced by a fourth JSF squadron,” says the White Paper. That suggests the final number of JSFs could in fact be somewhat fewer than 100 and perhaps closer to 90, as for a single type fighter fleet you only need one training squadron, not the current two.

Secondly, while the White Paper endorses the Super Hornet’s acquisition as a bridging capability, with the aircraft expected to “remain effective until at least 2020”, really the goal of 100 JSFs seems aspirational rather than definitive. Who can say whether a future government will elect to save money and keep the Super Hornets in service for 20 or 30 years which is more typical for fast jets, rather than a mere 10, and better amortise the government’s multi-billion dollar acquisition of the aircraft? And the third point to make is that if indeed the replacement of the Super Hornets does go ahead on the current timeline, who knows what unmanned combat air vehicles will be available by the early 2020s? But regardless of the exact composition, the reaffirmation of a future fighter fleet of 100 or so jets is significant.

Still, it’s interesting to note that the White Paper heralds a shift in how the ADF’s delivers Australia’s strategic strike capabilities, away from the an F-111 bomber and a JASSM armed Hornet equipped Air Force to a Navy with cruise missile firing submarines and ships.

“The government places a priority on broadening our strategic strike options, which will occur through the acquisition of maritime-based land attack cruise missiles,” the White Paper reads. “The acquisition of a maritime-based land attack cruise missile capability for the ADF will provide the government with additional options to conduct long range precision strike operations against hardened, defended and difficult to access targets, while minimising the exposure of ADF platforms and personnel to attack by enemy forces. ” The RAAF has had responsibility for Australia’s strategic strike capabilities since its first B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were delivered in 1944, while since the early 1970s the F-111 has held the mantle of Australia’s strategic deterrent. Tomorrow’s Air Force of missile firing F-35s supported by tankers and AEW&C platforms promises the RAAF strategic reach like never before, but it’s interesting to reflect that airpower alone will no longer be the sole means of delivering strategic strike capabilities – arguably the cornerstone of Australia’s self defence.