The Case for RAAF KC-135s

The RAAF had always intended to acquire a refuelling capability for the F-111, it is no secret the existing Boeing 707 tankers are partially plumbed and provisioned to support a boom installation. This however never eventuated, with refuelling for the F-111 provided by the USAF during joint exercises.

The recent change in government has seen a new focus in defence policy. Part of this focus is an emphasis on combat capability, and another part is a growing orientation toward regional security. The implication of the latter is that we should orient our capabilities so that we can deal with an opponent threatening the region, rather than being wholly focussed on the “last ditch” defence of the air sea gap.

There is much to be said for this strategy, if for no other reason that it provides Australia with many more options in tackling a problem situation. One important point which should however not be lost is that military aviation capabilities built up to support operations in the region are no less useful in defending the air sea gap. Nothing is lost and much is gained with such capabilities.

The quickest way for the government to put some substance into its new strategic policy is to acquire a force of KC-135R tankers, equipped to refuel the F-111 and the F/A-18 (via a boom attachment). This is for the following reasons:

The best capability which we can offer the region is air power, as the RAAF is without any doubt the technically and operationally strongest air force in the region. With over a hundred first line tactical fighters (72 x F/A-18 and 36 x F-111), the ADF has a tool which can contribute most effectively to regional defence. Tankers enable that tool to be projected up to and beyond the boundaries of the region.

Air power is flexible and can be rapidly deployed to a hot spot. A composite detachment of F-111s and F/A-18s could be deployed in a matter of hours, should a situation develop where Australian intervention or support is required. Moreover, the knowledge that the ADF can very quickly deploy potent capabilities at a significant distance will be politically stabilising. Tankers are a most effective means of supporting such deployments.

A key aspect of regional defence will be the control of shipping lanes. The RAAF’s Harpoon firing tactical jets could engage naval targets at very significant ranges, once supported by a proper tanker force. Indeed it may be argued that the RAAF’s Harpoon firing F-111 Wing, provided with tanker support, becomes a far more potent sea control asset than the RAN’s submarine fleet. Sea lane interdiction and minelaying can be performed by the F-111 with much shorter response times and exposure times than those offered by a submarine.

Tankers such as the KC-135 retain a secondary, albeit reduced, capability as transports. Tankers are therefore not a single purpose asset even in their basic form, and may be used for tasks as diverse as disaster relief, personnel movement and evacuation. We could well expect to see frequent ADF involvement in future UN peacekeeping initiatives, and a strategic tanker force provides an excellent means of supporting such deployments worldwide.

In the context of an eventual regional defence coalition, formed to deal with an external threat, a tanker force which can support the smaller regional air forces with refuelling adds significantly to the total capability of the region. Moreover, making these tankers available for regional exercises is an excellent and economical means of demonstrating commitment to a collective regional defence.

A fleet of tankers can be used as a means of extending the ADF’s Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) network to the boundaries of our areas of interest. Equipping the tanker force with satellite communications and HF relay equipment and datalink relays means that combat aircraft even at extreme ranges can feed data into the national C3I network, and receive instructions and targeting data from the C3I network.

The availability of high performance imaging reconnaissance sensors such as synthetic aperture radars will provide a quantum leap in surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Integrating such a capability into the F-111 Wing, and providing the Wing with tanker support would result in a tremendous improvement in the ADF’s and thus the region’s ability to monitor problem areas. If the tankers are equipped as communications relays, imaging radar reconnaissance pictures can be delivered into the C3I network in near real time.

Equipping some of the tankers with ESM receivers provides a potent strategic capability to gather Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Whilst the ADF has excellent Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities by virtue of ground based equipment, our only ELINT capability lies in the ESM equipped P-3C RAAF force. Tankers already equipped as communications relays could feed ELINT data directly into the C3I network.

Tactical aircraft are more survivable when supported by tankers, as the availability of fuel on demand means that aircrew can fly as defensively as they choose. Tactical fighters reliant on internal fuel always run the risk of evading the bad guy successfully, and then flaming out on the way home. When home is over 1000nm (1850km) away, there is no margin for underestimating fuel consumption.

Tactical aircraft can carry full weapon loads to operationally significant ranges when supported by tankers. Both the Libyan Raid in 1986 and the Gulf War could not have been successfully prosecuted with the force sizes used without significant tanker support. Tankers are a potent force multiplier, significantly reducing the force size required for any given task.

Compared to refuelling pod equipped C-130 transports, KC-135 tankers have much greater range, fuel offload capacity and importantly, can transit to refuelling areas at about twice the airspeed of a turboprop KC-130. Because they can refuel receiving aircraft at speeds from 220kt (410km/h) upward, even turboprops such as the C-130 and P-3C could be refuelled, if these aircraft were fitted with receptacles or probes. Only the provision of refuelling to Army and RAN helicopters would require a slower tanker aircraft.

Australia has had a long standing need for an operational tanker force, but never in the past have our political leaders truly recognised this. Hopefully we are seeing the first signs of change with the new government’s perspective on defence and regional security. An ADF force structure built to produce political consensus within the defence system is a luxury we as a nation can no longer afford. The ADF must focus its resources into its most potent capability, which is the RAAF.

There are several reasons as to why now is a sensible time for the government to act on this matter. The first and foremost is that with the United States’ post Cold War drawdown of forces, surplus USAF KC-135R tankers are available, and we could no doubt expect similar generous discounts as seen with the F-111G purchase. The second reason is that with China’s Taiwan demonstration earlier this year, Australia can capitalise politically in the region by making such a demonstrable commitment to regional defence. As well this consolidates ANZUS capabilities in the region. The third reason is that it puts a lot of backbone into the government’s stated defence policy, for a very modest up front material investment.

The strategic, operational, tactical and technical arguments for a substantial tanker force are beyond dispute. In the face of expensive pork barrel driven capabilities such as minimally equipped Anzac frigates and additional submarines, a batch of a dozen KC-135Rs makes excellent sense. If bang for buck is the driving argument, KC-135R tankers are the best way the ADF can maximise combat capability at short notice.