Defence Update

He explained that the ADF’s operational concepts for the defence of Australia in the north in low level operations were correctly based on good intelligence and surveillance, maritime and air interdiction, and by having highly mobile ground forces. All those aspects, under current planning, should be further improved in the coming years. As will the need to give greater assistance to the manpower intensive tasks of repelling an invader, or protecting vital assets. Plans for the procurement of top level ground surveillance and night observation equipment come into this category.

One obvious improvement on K89 was the fact that the new Black Hawk helicopters with 5 Aviation Regiment, based at Townsville, along with the C-130 Hercules and Caribou transports, provided a sharp increase in capability. Only a few Australian Black Hawks were available in 1989. Later in the decade one C-130E Hercules squadron and probably the 14 remaining Caribous will be up for replacement and so will the Army’s reconnaissance helicopter, the Kiowa. Improving the tactical airlift capability currently is listed for implementation around 1997-98, and the C-130E replacement for about 1995-96. The possibility of giving the C-130s air-to-air refuelling capability is programmed from 1996-97 onwards.

But the important role that AEW&C and the Chinooks (the latter particularly for the task of moving fuel for the Black Hawks) was again emphasised. Which brings us to consider just what is programmed in those regards. At the time of writing the acquisition of four D model Chinooks in an exchange deal with Boeing helicopters, through the US Army, ever so slowly appeared to be winning acceptance in US circles (refer last issue’s Defence Update).

This would be in exchange for returning the 11 C model machines which have been stored at Amberley air base, southern Queensland, for several years. The ADF’s Major Capital Equipment Programme indicates the Chinook swap deal running from 1992-93 to 1996-97.

The arrangement is considered revenue neutral, and the Army is extremely keen to retain the capability, even if the numbers are low. It is accepted that Army aircrew would be trained to fly the more modern helicopters. What was not totally clear at the time of going to press was whether the arrangements required Congressional approval. Apparently it has been given the big tick by the Pentagon.

Under the basic heading of Air Defence, provision of the AEW&C capability is planned to start in 1993-94 and run through for seven years. That seems a lot of time to get relatively few new aircraft, so presumably they will arrive at the latter stages of the project. It is highly unlikely that substantial funds will be available in those early years of the programme.

So in spite of the lessons of K89 and K92, the priority, or more probably the money, is not there for some years yet even though the capability is regarded by most senior military as essential. The big hope, of course, is that the technology breakthrough which may provide this airborne early warning and control systems on a relatively cheaper air platform will arrive in the next few years.

Certainly the Swedes, and possibly the Israelis, are working to providing a vastly improved but relatively inexpensive surveillance, detection and intercept radar in the AEW&C mode. AEW&C capability clearly is required to provide more precise information from surveillance systems such at the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN), which is to become operational in the second half of the 90s.

A helicopter support and training ship, which could be use- ful in inhospitable areas around northern Australia and for other tasks such as regional requests apart from just training. is also listed in the Major Capital Equipment Programme, starting in 1993-94, but does not appear at this stage to have high priority.

Apart from the matters already outline, General Gration sees other major lessons to come out of K92 as improving staff management and intelligence skills to handle the growing flood of information.

In a post exercise review, Gration said the Australian Defence Force would have to work better to achieve unity of command. An annual command post exercise is likely to be organised to further develop the skills of headquarters staffs in managing ADF assets. He added that the key challenge was to process all the information that came in. Gration said recently that Kangaroo 92 was probably one of the most valuable exercises conducted since the inception of the Kangaroo series back in the 1970s. “It exercised the ADF in joint operations more realistically, and in a more demanding environment that ever before. It subjected the joint command and arrangements to thorough scrutiny, while validating operational concepts, including the role of the Darwin based Northern Command. Better means of conducting operations and managing information had been identified, and their implementation would be progressed. One other lesson, reinforcing those earlier evident, was that the troops require longer acclimatisation if they are to perform well in hot, humid and rainy conditions. There were problems in keeping water cooled, and the inside of many vehicles was in the 55C range. Some cooling equipment is obviously required for the LAV 25 wheeled armoured fighting vehicles, other APCs and tanks.