Dibb Report Analysis

The reasons for the Dibb Report in the first place were due to what Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, terms “the disparity of views between the services towards a total defence concept”. What the Dibb Report sets out to achieve is to eliminate much of the ever present, and often negative, effects of inter-service rivalry in the presence of a lack of a definitive defence policy.

One specific problem identified by the Review was that each of the three services continues to do much of their initial force structure planning in isolation. This can often lead to narrow and competitive views of Australia’s defence needs in the wider context. As a direct result of the Report, Kim Beazley has already moved to appoint a Vice Chief of the Defence Force to coordinate military policy. This officer will be equal in rank to the Chiefs of the individual services and his appointment will mean that, increasingly, planning by the separate services will be fully co-ordinated.

Essentially the Report has set out to develop a defence force that could meet low level threats arising with little warning and yet could also be expanded fast enough to meet a higher-level threat should a potential adversary begin to develop the necessary capabilities.

This has been designated as a “Strategy of Denial” by both the Minister and Paul Dibb and is based on a three-level spectrum of defence aimed at resolving a hostile military threat to Australia’s mainland or its offshore territories. Essentially the Report uses our natural asset, our geography, to its greatest advantage. Australia’s sea-air gap would be the outer perimeter of our defence using both air and naval assets out to roughly 1000 nautical miles from our boundaries. Further inshore an attacker would come across a heavier and more in-depth threat from shorter-ranging elements within the RAAF and RAN. Finally, if a beachhead should be actually gained a hard hitting and highly mobile Army would neutralise the threat with support from the RAAF and RAN as required. Though Kim Beazley has gone to great lengths to stress that the Dibb Report is not a foreign policy document it is good to see that in the final stages of a high-level threat becoming hostile that hitting the enemy’s primary bases remains as a viable course of action.

What does all this then hold for the future of the ADF? Obviously, plenty, though for reasons of space in this article we shall concentrate solely upon the ramifications as they apply to airpower.

Much of the RAAF’s future capability has been awaiting the outcome of the Dibb Report. The ramifications on AEW aircraft, the future of the F-111, air refuelling for the F-18s, Caribou replacements and the ultimate fate of the RAAF helicopter force, etc, have all been entirely dependent on the recommendations of the Report. The implications for the RAAF are great and certainly go a long way to ensuring that the assets required to be able to meet the obligations of the Report will be in place via future defence budgets. In basic detail let’s examine the Report as it applies to the future role of airpower.

The F-111 force probably more than any had more to lose or gain if pre-Report scuttlebutt could be believed. Many had lipped the demise of the expensive F-111 force while others opted for an update that would take the type well into the next century. The outcome is a mix of these. The option of performing a comprehensive update on the ageing aircraft would cost some $470m in 1986 dollars. The Report claims that our 23 F-111s require some 1800 support personnel and consume around $72m of the defence budget each year. This is certainly an expensive force and one the Report states will cost more each year as spares become harder to source and more expensive in lieu of major systems updating. Even with nearly half a billion dollars invested in the systems, etc the aircraft would still retain its often troublesome TF30 engines and inbuilt hydraulic and airframe problems that can be traced back to its early design compromise as a navy aircraft. Instead, Dibb opts for spending $225m on the F-111 which would upgrade the avionics system sufficiently to take the aircraft through till the early to mid-nineties when it will be replaced by an advanced two-seat dedicated strike version of the F-18 Hornet.

Dibb points out that while the F-111 has a superb warlord radius of action of over 1000nm the F-18 can almost match this with the aid of one refuelling. Albeit the Hornet would carry a lighter weapons load though in the maritime role using Harpoon, etc this is largely irrelevant due to the precision of the new generation of ASMs and their proven lethality against surface combatants. The F-111s though will also be employed as long-range interceptors and equipped with four AIM-9L Sidewinder AAMs, their potential presence would certainly prove a deterrent to any aggressor while providing added security for the LAMP Orion force.

The additional requirement for Hornets would see up to 25 extra aircraft purchased with the eventual F-18 force designating individual squadrons towards a relative specialisation in either air support or air defence tasks while still maintaining their multi-role capabilities overall. Dibb argues that the F-111, when purchased in the sixties, was required to perform a role that the Mirage was unable to do and replace the relatively long-ranging Canberra bomber. Nowadays with the Hornet coming online, there is not the same need for such an expensive and dedicated strike aircraft if we sensibly use our greatest natural defensive asset- the sea-air gap, to our benefit.

The key to making the F-18s viable though is having a long-range surveillance capability and tankers. Funds have apparently been set aside in the ’86/87 budget for modifying the RAAF’s four Boeing 707s to tankers for the F-18s using the standard probe and drogue system. Regarding radar, the Report was very much in favour of the further development of Jindalee. So much so that it envisages the construction of up to five such stations that would ultimately be able to monitor the entire western and northern approaches out to a range of several thousand kilometres conservatively. Much research though has yet to be done with Jindalee operating in a realistic combat environment, so a decision on the system’s ultimate fate won’t really be known till at least 1988. This is also a pacing factor on the AEW&C programme as the Dibb Report feels that much of the work of an expensive AEW&C force can be undertaken by Jindalee. Present Defence estimates place an investment of over $750m on the acquisition of only four AEW-type aircraft and while Defence has not dismissed the possibilities of acquiring AEW it has most definitely hedged its bets with further developing the Jindalee OTHB radar system.

Mr Dibb also recommends the acquisition of additional state-of-the-art air defence and surveillance radars for Darwin, Tindal and Williamtown with a number of mobile units available for deployment as required. Development of another bare-bones air base on Cape York Peninsula is also envisaged similar to that at Derby in the west. In this way a single squadron of Tindal-based F-18s would be able to deploy to operational bases stretching from Learmouth in the west through to Townsville in the east.

In this environment, the aggressor of the nineties would have to contend with defending his seaborne assets against concerted attack from F-111, F-18 and P-3 aircraft (which would be retained as is) at a range of around 1000nm in addition to having to withstand an ever-increasing magnitude of attack from these aircraft as their range from base enhanced their mission capability. Furthermore, RAN submarines and surface vessels would work in conjunction (or the other way around depending upon which colour uniform you wear!) with the RAAF aircraft via the newly introduced joint Maritime Command.

Probably the greatest change to the RAAF order of battle though rests with the units traditionally tasked with army support. While Mr Dibb does not see the justification for the acquisition of a dedicated close support aircraft or for that matter an anti-armour attack helicopter, he does envisage a massive change in capability for Army Aviation and RAAF tactical transport.

Fundamental to this recommendation is the ability to give the army mobility, when and where it needs it, and controlled by its own command. In short the Report endorses the growing body of opinion supporting the army operating its own transport helicopters. Presently in the ownership of the RAAF, the existing Iroquois fleet could be replaced by up to 120 Black Hawk assault helicopters, some of which would be configured as gunships in similar fashion to the existing Iroquois force. The Black Hawk however is far more flexible in this role and can carry a much wider variety of weapons in the gunship configuration than the old technology Iroquois. This in fact is the single biggest item in the programme though it would be spread over many years and would have considerable industrial implications for Australia. If the full number of helos are taken up, which is about double the sixty or so envisaged, then the programme could total $1. 6bn and havE? The capability to uplift a full battalion. This needless to say would provide an unmatched capability for a new look lightly armed high mobility army of the nineties using precision-guided weapons and advanced communications and electronic warfare equipment to defeat an enemy lodgement on our shores.

On the fixed-wing front the Report envisages retiring the existing Caribou fleet and the 12 C-130E Hercules aircraft once sufficient helicopter assets are in place. The C-130Es will be ready for retirement by the early nineties anyway and the veteran Caribous will be nudging thirty years of service by then. Their replacement would be with up to 20 C-130 Hercules of the latest type so, if anything, RAAF long-range tactical transport would be greatly enhanced by this move. The existing CH-47C Chinooks would remain in RAAF control.

An interesting sidelight here is Dibb’s overall belief that the Reserve Forces should be strengthened and restructured to allow them a greater role in the operation of the ADF. To this extent, the Report envisages a programme of allowing Air Force Reserve pilots to fly such aircraft as the C-130s and 707s, something that must hold a lot of appeal to many young civilian aircrew in the commercial environment who want a little more excitement and variation in their day. Our personal view is that it is a tragedy that it has taken this long for someone in power to officially sanction such a logical policy that could ultimately go a long way to relieving existing and perceived RAAF aircrew shortages by the use of experienced civilian assets. For the Navy, the Report suggests the construction of 8 light patrol frigates in the 2000-tonne class. These vessels would be fast, have good endurance and sea-keeping capabilities and be armed with SAM, SSM and a rapid-fire gun. They would also be equipped with a single light helicopter in the Seahawk class though not equipped to the same high standard as the Seahawks presently on order for our 6 FFGs. This class of helo would also ultimately be required to replace the existing Wessex utility force. A requirement for which 15 would be needed. Additionally to this the RAN will continue with its Sea King mine countermeasures trials as reported in our January issue and will focus on a greatly enhanced MCM role for the navy. Essentially the Report has achieved what it was appointed to do: define a precise objective from which an integrated defence force can then prepare to defend against low-level threats in the short term and greater threats in the longer term. While this may appear a simplistic requirement the effect upon existing and mooted defence programmes is considerable. In summary, the following aviation-related recommendations have been made-

• F-111: To conduct a moderate level of avionics and support facility upgrade capability for this aircraft which will take it through till around 1995.

• F-18: To purchase an additional 25+ aircraft to replace the F-111s. These would be advanced two-seat strike versions of the existing Hornet which the USN hopes to deploy during the early nineties.

• 707: The 4 Boeing 707s will be converted to probe and drogue tankers to support long-range F-18 operations.

• AEW: The requirement for dedicated AEW&C aircraft has slipped pending the feasibility of Jindalee as an operational system. AEW will however eventually be acquired by the RAAF.

• RAAF Helicopters: The Army will take control of the Iroquois and Black Hawk helos with an eventual purchase of up to 120 machines envisaged. Chinooks will remain with the RAAF.

• RAAF Fixed Wing Transports: The existing Caribou and C-130E fleet to be replaced progressively with up to 20 advanced version C-130 Hercules aircraft.

• RAN Helicopters: New helos to be acquired for the 8 light patrol frigates and 15 new helos for utility roles as a Wessex replacement. Both would not be required till the early nineties and would most probably be in the form of a simplified Seahawk. Sea Kings would continue in service till the mid-nineties in the MCM role. Sea Kings to be deployed aboard chartered merchant vessels if threat warning time allows in the ASW role.

The long-awaited Dibb Report has now been tabled in Parliament, it is now history. Its value now will be in promoting an intense level of discussion within the defence community to the eventual aim of producing an authoritative defence White Paper for release later this year.