The First Battle of Britain Part II

There were a few of the raids by single aircraft against coastal towns and an occasional zeppelin attack against the same targets from time to time. However, it certainly looked as if the defences had at last gained complete mastery over the German raiders.

The New Threat

The war in the air over Britain generally became so quiet over the next six months that the lights came on again, most of the guns were withdrawn, and many of the home defence squadrons sent to France. Then suddenly, on 25th May 1917 a force of 29 Gotha bombers attacked Folkestone at 6. 30 p. m. It is probable the attack was meant for London, but was diverted because of heavy cloud. There was no warning, and 95 people were killed and 195 injured.

Although no direct warning had been received, the defences were still in a fair state of alert from one of the rare zeppelin raids that had occurred the night before. They were able to put 74 fighters into the air, but the response was far too late, and in any case few were capable of reaching the height of the raiders. The raiders turned for home unharmed. However, on the return journey they were intercepted by the RNAS at Dunkirk and one was shot down. Another was severely damaged, and crashed on landing at base.

A further raid in strength followed on 5th June when 22 Gothas attacked Sheerness at 6 p. m. , resulting in 13 killed and 34 injured. One of the raiders was shot down by A/A fire, but no contact was made by the fighters. The public and government were already alarmed by these two attacks when the Gothas struck at London a week later.

First Gotha Raid on London

The first Gotha raid on London came at 11. 40 a. m. on 13th June 1917. Eighteen aircraft reached their target and 72 x 50 kg bombs were dropped. All landed within one mile of each other, showing a high degree of concentration and accuracy. There was little A/A fire, and although 92 fighters were airborne in defence, not one made a single contact. The defending aircraft came from a variety of sources and all operated individually without any attempt at coordination. The raiders all returned home safely, leaving 192 killed and 432 injured in one raid. There -was now no doubt that the defences were more or less utterly confused, and powerless, against the new weapon. In fact, very little was even known about it, or its performance.

The Gotha

The Gotha bomber was a natural development from the need to carry heavier bombs and more of them. Early attempts at bombing were not really very effective, even in concentration by large numbers of aircraft, because of the extremely limited size and number of bombs that could be carried by the aircraft of the time. Gradually a twin-engined specialised bomber began to emerge and a prototype first flew in 1915.

The first of this long line of twin-engined machines began to enter service in 1916, and took the name ‘Gotha’ from the first manufacturer, Gothaer Waggonfabrik. About the time it was becoming operational, the limitations of the zeppelin were becoming obvious, and its production became assured. It was produced throughout the war in a variety of models, from GIi to GIX, but all were biplanes, and all were fitted with two engines. However, the one which was produced in any quantity was the GIV.

In general, however, they carried a crew of three and could lift a bomb load of 500 kg over a range of 500 km, or 1000 kg over a shorter distance. The bombs that could be carried included those of 50, 100 and 300 kg individual weights in various combinations, together with incendiaries and the smaller bombs of an earlier vintage. They were three free-firing Parabellum machine guns, one being fitted to fire forward from a gunner’s cockpit in the nose; and a second to fire upwards to the rear and side from another gunner’s position in the rear fuselage. There was a tunnel beneath this which allowed the rear gunner to fire the third gun downwards and behind the tail.

They were fitted with two 260 hp Mercedes DIVa engines, mounted in nacelles between the wings on either side of the nose. Because of the particularly deep, double hum of these engines, the Gothas soon became known to the British as the ‘Wong-Wongs’.

Problems of the Defence

The chief problem in dealing with the new raider, of course, was the very much shortened warning period. The time taken by the Gothas to reach London, in particular, after first being reported by the observers on the coast, was far less than the time needed for the fighters to climb to height. As the fighters were also without radio they could receive no new information once they became airborne. Also, the raiders were not that easy to find. They presented an extremely small target after the giant zeppelins. This was said at the time to be ‘rather like having to switch overnight from harpooning whales to swatting mosquitoes. ‘

Above all, the performance of the British fighters was just no match for the Gothas, even if they could make contact. Most of the aircraft in the home defence squadrons were B. E. 2c’s. They were beautiful aircraft to fly and had been more than good enough for the zeppelins. They now lacked the rate of climb, speed and ceiling to cope with the Gothas. The very latest fighters were going to be needed to handle the new threat, but for the time being they were all heavily committed in France, where the position was most precarious. Meanwhile, the public and the press began to clamour for action.

Government Action

The very first of the Gotha raids (against Folkestone) clearly revealed the utter failure of the defences. What had been successful against the airship at night was obviously of no use against fast, high-flying aircraft by day. A high level committee was set up at once ‘to consider and report upon the question of the Defence of the United Kingdom against attack by aeroplanes

No really constructive ideas emerged, other than to strengthen the observer posts, and to make training units more readily available. It was also proposed to build up the front-line strength as and when machines and men became available. Even while these talks were going on, there was the second raid (on Sheerness), and then came the first raid on London. The casualties from the latter, totalling 594, were by far the heaviest yet in any single raid. In fact this total was just about the equivalent of three-quarters of all casualties inflicted by the 23 airship raids in 1915, which was the peak year for zeppelins. There was an immediate feeling of deep anxiety and uneasiness among the population. The government at once appreciated the full gravity of the situation and instituted more immediate steps to overcome the weakness in defence.

On the very day following the raid, the Government recalled two fighter squadrons from France for the defence of London, despite the gravity of the situation at the front. One of these squadrons was armed with S. E. Sa’s which were more than a match for the Gothas. They could climb to 3000 metres in twelve minutes, and had a speed of 190 km/hr, as well as being armed with two forward-firing machine guns. The other squadron was armed with Sopwith Pups. These had a ceiling of 5000 metres and an endurance of three hours. They would be ideal for standing patrols.

At the same time it was decided that many more aircraft for all purposes would be required. An immediate increase in production was ordered, even if it was to be at the expense of other munitions. Plans were drawn up to increase the RFC from 108 squadrons to 200, with the RNAS being expanded in proportion. In effect, this meant that the strength of the air services was to be almost doubled. The significant fact, however, was that most of the new squadrons were to be equipped with bombers.

This, then, was the immediate outcome of a single raid by just on fifty German airmen in eighteen aircraft. Certainly they had caused nearly 600 casualties, but this was a trifle compared to the 2500 casualties the British alone suffered each and every day at the front. Even more than the immediate effects mentioned above, the raid in fact even changed the whole strategy of the war for a time.

The view was strongly put forward, and accepted by the government that the most effective step of all against the raiders would be to capture the Belgian coastal area. This would not only break up the hostile air bases in Belgium and force the raiders to fly longer distances. It would also force the bombers to cross territory occupied by the allies, both going and coming. Three months later and after a quarter of a million casualties, the front was not even pierced and the offensive was called off. The Gotha bases remained intact and undisturbed except for the occasional raid by the RNAS from Dunkirk.

Second Raid on London

On 7th July there was a second Gotha daylight raid on London. Seventeen raiders approached in two groups, each of eight, flying in company and all led by a single aircraft. A force of 95 fighters was sent up against them, and 57 gun positions were activated. By a strange twist of fate the two squadrons from France had been sent back to France only the day before. The defenders, although high in numbers, were once again a very motley collection from training and maintenance units as well as the few, but outdated, operational squadrons. Most were of little or no fighting value, and once again the raid showed the futility of an unorganised defence.

Nevertheless, three of the defenders did succeed in making contact, but two were killed by the well-coordinated and heavy fire from the Gothas. The third was turned away severely wounded. The guns managed to damage one of the Gothas, and this was forced to land in the sea. Total casualties in London were 103 people killed and 316 injured. It was this raid, more than any other single event, that led to the creation of the Royal Air Force as an independent service.

Separate Air Service

The Air Force Bill, which created the Royal Air Force, was introduced into Parliament on 8th November 1917, and received Royal assent on 29th November. The Air Council was formally constituted on 3rd January, 1918, with the Royal Air Force officially coming into being on 1st April 1918. On that date, all naval personnel serving with the RNAS, and all army personnel serving with the RFC were automatically attached to the RAF. The new terms of reference made it quite clear that the air service now had a role of its own, and was no longer merely an ancillary to naval and military operations.

Daylight Raids End

Oddly enough, after the raid of 7th July, London was never again attacked by day. In fact, throughout the whole of Britain, there were only three more daylight raids before they stopped altogether on 22nd August. During these last few daylight raids, the new defences were already to prove most successful. The gun barrage was so intensive and accurate that four of the Gothas were shot down in flames. The defending fighters were also able to shoot down two more of the raiders.

The new defences were now forcing the Gothas to either fly above 5000 metres or abandon their daylight tactics altogether. The Germans decided on the latter, and henceforth all raids against Britain would be at night. This in itself would create new problems for the defence, but in addition, the Germans introduced new tactics which made it even more difficult.

The Moonlight Campaign

The first of the night bomber attacks began on 2nd September, with a raid on Dover. It was a moonlit night, and two Gothas appeared over the town at 11. 15 p. m. without warning, dropped their bombs and disappeared without any of the guns or aircraft coming into action. Casualties on the ground were light. The next night two more bombers crossed the coast and attacked Chatham, where they dropped 26 bombs at 11. 00 p. m. Two of these fell on the naval barracks and killed 130 sailors, and injuring another 88. Again, neither of the Gothas were seen, and no A/A guns or aircraft came into action.

Then the following night they came to London. The moon was still full, and 26 bombers in all crossed the coast. Now they were to use their new tactics and further confuse the defence. The raiders attacked in seven separate groups, or waves, spread out over two hours. To make it even more protracted and difficult for the defences, individual aircraft within each group were spaced out with about five minutes intervals between them. Damage to buildings was quite heavy, but casualties were light. In all, about 800 A/A shells were fired, but only one hit was recorded. Eighteen aircraft went up to attack, only two made contact, and they were only able to fire a few rounds before they also lost their targets.

New Defence Measures

These night attacks caused further immediate and extreme concern to the government. On 5th September Smuts was once more called upon, and asked ‘to hold an investigation into the last two nights’ raids and forward this to War Cabinet with his views on the provision of protection for the civil population in the future, and his proposals as to carrying the air war into Germany at the earliest moment. ‘ Smuts actually had the, paper ready the following day, in which he set out the main’ aspects of the problem.

He stressed that ‘the only proper defence against the night attacks was an offensive aimed at the enemy’s air bases. Our aeroplanes afford no means of defence at night, as they find it impossible to see the enemy machines even at a distance of a few hundred yards. In recent night raids. . . they might just as well have remained on the ground. ‘ He went on to suggest the introduction of two special measures.

The first was the installation of much more powerful searchlights with the object of blinding the enemy pilots, and so making it difficult to navigate and aim their bombs. The second idea was to establish a wire screen, or apron, hung from balloons to form a barrier in which the enemy machines might be caught, or which would force them higher up. Ten of these were eventually deployed on the approaches to London, with their tops at 3000 metres.

The remarks by Smuts about the fighters were certainly true in regard to the ‘state of the art’ at the time. However, a new but simple technique soon enabled the defending fighters to achieve some spectacular successes. The idea was for two or more searchlights to direct their beams as accurately as possible on the sound made by enemy aircraft, and not to weave the beams back and forth in a search pattern as they had been doing. The defending fighter would then fly towards the meeting point of the beams. While these may not actually be right on the enemy raider, the pilot now had a reasonable chance of finding his target by its exhaust flames.

All guns were required to remain silent within a recognised area. Conversely, none of the defending fighters were to fly outside this zone, and the guns could then assume any aircraft found in the outer zone were hostile. The system was soon refined by the introduction of accurate height finding and sound locator systems.

The Blitz Begins

After the raid on 5th September, there was a lull until 24th September, when the moon again entered its first quarter. This now became the signal for a nightly series of heavy attacks to begin. On the 24th sixteen Gothas crossed the coast at intervals, but only three had London as their objective. The remainder attacked Dover and other targets in Kent and Essex. Thirty defending aircraft were sent aloft, but no contacts were made. The guns also failed to secure a hit and all Gothas returned safely to base. But now yet another dimension had been introduced by the Germans. Hardly had the last of the Gothas left the coast, when ten zeppelins crossed the coast and bombed targets in Lincolnshire. They also escaped unharmed.

Then, following this ‘double’ raid, and starting on the 28th September, raids by up to 25 Gothas at a time were made on London on four successive nights. Actual casualties were light, but property damage was severe. In One raid alone, 700 houses were destroyed. Between twenty and thirty fighters were sent up for each raid, but had rio successes. The guns were now capable of putting up a particularly fearsome barrage. On one of the nights in question, for example, the guns around London fired 12,700 shells. In fact the falling shrapnel and other debris from these barrages were beginning to create problems and damage of their own. No doubt all this concentrated fire managed to keep some of the raiders away, but over the four nights they only managed to shoot down one of them.

During these raids the Germans managed to spring yet another surprise. On each of the four nights the Gothas were accompanied by up to three special bombers of an entirely new type. These were the first four-engined bombers to ever enter service on either side. They were officially known as the R-type, or Staaken, but were really an enormous aircraft for their day and soon became known as ‘The Giants’, both by the British and the Germans.

The Giants

The Staaken, or Giant, was a four-engined biplane of extremely large dimensions by any standards. It had a wing span of 42 metres, which was 10 metres more than the Handley-Page Halifax of World War Two, arid only 0. 9 of a metre shorter than the B-29 Superfortresses. In fact it was only two metres shorter along the wing than the present-day Boeing 707 airliner. In total, 64 of these huge aircraft were built, in over twenty variants, at six separate plants. The principal of these was the Zeppelin works at Staakn. from which the giant took its official nanie. Their development goes back to before the start of World War One.

The first four-engined aircraft ever built was designed in . 1912 by Sikorsky in Russia, where it flew for the first time in May 1913. It was known as ‘Le Grand’ and appeared to perform quite well. The forward part of the fuselage, quite ahead of its time, was built as a fully enclosed cabin, with full protection for the occupants. One year later, the Russians successfully built an even bigger version which flew with sixteen people aboard.

The Germans carefully noted these Russian developments, and even had considered a design of their own before the war. The first of their own multi-engined bombers (the RI) actually flew on 11th April 1915. It was very much an experimental machine, being fitted with three engines. One was positioned in the nose, with one other on either side in the wing bays. This was quickly followed by another prototype (RII), but both were considerably underpowered with their all-up weight of nine tonnes. The next in the series (Rill) was fitted with six 11O hp Mercedes Dill engines, mounted in pairs in tandem. One pair was in the nose, geared to drive a single tractor propeller. The other pairs were mounted in nacelles in outboard positions between the wings. Each of these pairs was geared to drive a single pusher propeller at the rear.

These early models led to the final production model, the RIV series, which went into production in September 1917. These were fitted with five 220 hp Mercedes Benz engines, with one in the nose, and two on each side paired in tandem in nacelles. The outboard pairs were now geared to drive tractor propellers. The engine arrangement was later modified in the RVI to just two pairs of engines in nacelles in the wings. Other models did appear from time to time, but usually in no more than a single variant.

The Giants generally carried a crew of seven, but at times this could be increased to eleven. They had positions for seven machine guns, and could carry up to eighteen 100 kg bombs internally, or heavier bombs of 300 kg and even 1000 kg externally. They could lift a total bomb load of 2000 kg, but this was usually averaged out at about 1000 kg for longer trips. the aircraft themselves were extremely strongly constructed. The undercarriage was really sturdy, consisting of sixteen wheels each just on a metre in diameter, and mounted on two great axles. There was also a smaller auxiliary set of two wheels attached to the nose.

Each of the engine nacelles had a small cockpit in the rear to house a mechanic who could thus carry out repairs in flight. Each of these cockpits were also equipped with a machine gun operated by the mechanic. There was also a streamlined machine gun position in the centre of the top wing. It was reached by a ladder from the nose, and was known as the ‘Swallow’s Nest’. Later models all had enclosed cockpits at least for the two pilots, and all aircraft were fully equipped with oxygen for the crew. They even had a pneumatic tube system for communicating with the various crew positions. Each Giant squadron was limited to a total of three aircraft.

The introduction of the Giants once again confused the defenders. The sound detectors and height finders in particular were rendered almost useless by the new aircraft and these were now playing a most important role in the night defences. The sound of the Giants was so much greater than the Gothas to which they had been tuned. A Giant at say 20 kilometres equalled that of a Gotha much closer. A mixed force was most confusing to these items of equipment. Similarly, the pilots of the defending aircraft had become quite proficient at judging range against the Gothas. They were now confused at first when confronted by an aircraft almost twice the size and invariably opened fire at too great a range. Far more serious, however, than these individual problems, was the effect the bomber raids were having on the workforce and the disruption to production.

The Independent Air Force

It was not necessarily the casualties, nor the physical damage, that caused the actual disruption to production. Whenever a warning was sounded, factories (most of which worked round the clock) were evacuated, and all trains and other transport were brought to a standstill. Many workers would not report back for duty for a further twenty-four hours, by which time there would probably be another raid. The disruption to normal family and social life was tremendous. For example, even in those far-off days; at least 100,000 people sought shelter each night in the underground stations. In summary, it was estimated at the time of the September raids that the output from the munition factories alone had been reduced to less than one-fifth of normal.

The press were strongly agitating for reprisals, and the population as a whole wanted to feel that the enemy would also suffer on their home front. The government was not slow to institute a special bombing force for attacks against Germany. A unit of long-range bombers was hurriedly gathered together in France, and was soon expanded into what became known as the Independent Force. This then also became a very significant step in the development of the RAF.

Attacks on enemy aerodromes began on 25th September, and were repeated every day for over a week. These raids resulted in immediate disruption to the daytime overhaul of the night flying squadrons to such an extent that the Gotha squadrons were forced to withdraw and establish bases further to the northeast out of range. Then, as longer range aircraft became available, an offensive was activated against munition plants and military objectives generally in Germany. This campaign was then continued with vigour for the remainder of the war. This campaign deserves a story of its own, but in summary, there were a total of just on 700 raids carried out on important German industrial and other centres, resulting in 750 killed and 1850 injured, with quite heavy damage. The real value, of course was – as in Britain – the increasing effect on morale and disruption to production. Also, again as in Britain, the Germans were forced to divert an ever-increasing amount of resources to the defence of the home land.

Despite the disruption to the German bomber bases, and industry, the Germans were able to maintain the pressure of their raids on Britain. A force of less than thirty German aircraft continued to hold down nearly ten times that number of aircraft in defence against them, to say nothing of the diversion of skilled pilots, mechanics and aircraft from France.

German Attacks Continue

By the end of October, the moon was full once more, and on 29th October the raids over England were resumed with a light attack on the coastal areas by three Gothas. Then on the 31st, a force of 22 Gothas crossed the coast en route to London. Most of the attackers were, however, scattered by a combination of the gun barrage and bad weather, and released their bombs on the coastal towns with only light casualties. There was then a lull until 6th December when six Gothas attacked London, dropping a total of 395 incendiary bombs. Damage from fires was very heavy, although casualties were again light. Two of the raiders were shot down by gunfire, and three others damaged. There were two more raids by Gothas against London during December, for the loss of three more of the raiders, with few casualties and little damage.

Then on 28th January 1918 there was another combined raid by Gothas and Giants. Thirteen Gothas and one Giant had set out, but six had to turn back because of fog and poor visibility. Four Gothas attacked the coastal towns, while three Gothas and the Giant carried on to London. One of the Gothas was shot down by patrolling fighters before dropping its bombs, but the others all reached their objectives. A great number of houses were destroyed, and casualties were heavy, with 51 killed and 136 injured. Most of the casualties came from the Giant, which on this raid carried 1200 kg of bombs, including two of 300 kg each, being the heaviest ever dropped by any aircraft to that date.

On its way in, the Giant had been intercepted by one of the defending fighters. A fierce fight ensued, but a hit in the engine put the British aircraft out of action, and the observer was wounded. The Giant then resumed its course, but flew into the balloon apron. It was apparently unharmed and continued in to its attack, leaving the apron itself badly damaged.

The following night four Giants set out to attack London on their own, but one turned back with engine trouble. Of the three which reached London, one was turned back early by the barrage fire. One of the remaining two was then attacked at 3500 metres by a defending fighter which scored some hits and forced the enemy to turn away before releasing its bombs. The one remaining Giant was then intercepted by four of the defenders who attacked simultaneously. There was no visible damage, but it also was forced to release its full load of bombs harmlessly and turned back immediately.

On 16th February, one of the attacking Giants had on board a bomb weighing 1000 kg, which it released successfully, scoring a direct hit on the Chelsea Barracks, but with very few casualties. Attacks by Gothas and Giants continued into February and March, with some successes on both sides. Then suddenly, the zeppelins returned to the attack.

Last Zeppelins

On 10th March, two zeppelins raided Grimsby and Hull, and again on 13th March a single airship attacked the same area. There was no damage or casualties on either occasion. Several interceptions were attempted, but the zeppelins were at 6000 metres and could not be reached. Then on 12th April, five zeppelins attacked Birmingham and other industrial towns in the Midlands. Each carried 2500 kg of bombs, by far the heaviest load yet. Despite this, they were able to cruise at heights of up to 6500 metres, which made them immune to both gun and· aircraft. It began to appear as if the zeppelin might yet again prove to be a serious menace. However, they only paid one more visit to England before the end of the war, despite their new immunity.

The last raid by the airships took place on the night of 5th August 1918, when five airships set out from home. The force included the L70 which had only been commissioned the month before. It was the very latest model and was fitted with seven 290 hp Maybach engines, the most powerful to date. Even more importantly, it carried on board Fregattenkapitan Peter Strasser, who was the overall commander of the entire Zeppelin fleet.

The raiders split into two forces as they approached the British coast, and one group, including the L70, headed for Norfolk. The others turned south towards Yarmouth. Almost at once the northern force was intercepted by a D. H. 4 and L70 was shot down in flames. All aboard, including Strasser, were killed. The remaining airships all turned back and released their bombs harmlessly in the sea. They were never again to be seen over England.

Final Aircraft Attacks

The defences had really reached their peak of efficiency by May, when on the night of 19th May eight Gothas were either destroyed or forced down by defending aircraft and guns. This raid turned out to be not only the largest of the series, but was also the very last. It was a moonlit night, as usual, and from about 10 p. m. and for the next three hours there was a continuous stream of enemy bombers over Dover and London. In total, the attacking force consisted of 43 aircraft, made up of 38 Gothas, three Giants and two smaller aircraft. Between them they carried a total of 14 tonnes of high explosive bombs. Seventy-two bombs fell on London, killing 48 people and injuring 170, as well as damaging over 1000 houses. A further 85 bombs were dropped in the Dover area, but with only superficial damage to property, whilst no one was killed and only four were injured.

This attack ended the German bombing raids by aircraft. On three further occasions- in June and July- enemy aircraft did in fact cross the coast. On each occasion, it was by a single aircraft, and no bombs were dropped. It was thus left to the zeppelins to have the final say with their raid on 5th August, already described. At long last the defenders had cleared the skies over Great Britain.

Final Tally

In retrospect, the German air raids on Great Britain do not appear to have been either sustained enough or powerful enough to have been worth the effort. The total military effort was, however, quite significant. In all, there was a total of 51 airship raids and 52 aircraft raids in which bombs were dropped. The zeppelins dropped 5806 bombs, weighing 196 tons; and the aircraft delivered 2772 bombs weighing 74 tons. The total casualties from both sources were 1414 killed and 3416 injured. The London casualties, included in these figures, were 835 killed and 1972 injured, or a total of 2807. Total damage from all causes was estimated at just under three million pounds. The cost to the Germans was 23 zeppelins and 23 aircraft lost to the defenders, while another 8 zeppelins and 35 aircraft were lost from other causes while on operations.

The above figures in themselves may not appear to have had a very great effect on Great Britain, or its ability to carry on the war. However, for the loss of a comparatively few aircraft and airships, there was a very real effect in diversion of men and material from the active battlefronts to the home front. By June 1918 there were held back in Britain, a total of 469 guns, 622 searchlights, 258 height finders and ten sound locators. These were manned by a force of 6136 officers and men. In addition, the RAF were holding 376 front-line aircraft in Britain solely for home defence, which absorbed a strength of 2665 all ranks.

In addition, there was the vast quantity of material and labour needed to build the airfields, gun positions, air raid shelters, and other military works. Also to be included is the huge amount of other equipment, fuel and ammunition. The barrage had come to fire as many as 20,000 rounds of 3-inch shells during the one raid. The life of a gun was put at 1500 rounds, so this would also mean at least twelve to fourteen guns had to be replaced after each attack.

Compare all this to the strength of the German raiding force. Except for the last great raid in May 1918, the greatest number of bombers that set out to attack Britain at any time was 27. There were, in fact, seldom more than 28 over the target and usually far less. For the airship raids no more than eleven were ever launched at once, and usually it was less than half this number. The number which actually crossed the coast was seldom more than five, and these usually dispersed in ones and twos to separate target areas. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the Germans always had the great advantage of surprise.

For the British, however, it was a great challenge. They did not know in what strength, or how often, the attackers might appear. They were, within a fairly short time, to achieve complete mastery over the zeppelins. Subsequently, despite earlier setbacks, they were also able to defeat the bombers. The manner in which they achieved these victories and the organisation and tactics adopted were to stand the RAF in good stead some just over twenty years later when they faced an even greater threat.

In that vital summer of 1940, just how many realised that the very service itself, and the basic principles in use, had been evolved in that much earlier, and much-forgotten Battle of Britain?