Comment – No Threat

The most remarkable point is that the Argentine Junta did not wait another two to three years to make their move. No doubt internal political instability forced their hand but by 1984/85 they would have most probably faced a more dovish UK government, the RN would have been minus both Hermes and Invincible in addition to a third of the escorts and support ships. Even the Vulcan bombers would have been decommissioned. How must the RN have wished they still had the Ark Royal, with her Phantoms and Buccaneers and how lucky they were to even have had Hermes. Chevaline warheads and Trident submarines don’t help much when the conventional forces are stripped to the bone year after year to finance a one-shot armageddon.

And what does this bode for Australia?

A lot under the current circumstances. Certainly, any credible defence force must have large inventories of spares, and munitions and viably equipped While an old ship by any yardstick, HMAS Melbourne still had four or more years left in her as a combat vessel. In this photo she is equipped with A-4G Skyhawks suitable for subsonic air defence environment, attack and reconnaissance. S-2 Tracker aircraft provided Melbourne and the task force with medium range ASW and reconnaissance capability with an endurance and range far superior to any ASW helicopter Also on deck are four Sea King ASW helos, excellent for close-in ASW patrol and attack. The RAN acquired ten Sea Kings in 1975, has to date lost five and expects to take delivery of two new replacements in 1983. Given this established attrition rate, the best HMAS Australia could embark by 1985 would be four such helos, In its haste to acquire a carrier, any carrier, the RAN has effectively said goodbye to the Fleet Air Arm as we knew it. Ships, planes and mobile ground forces. Australia does not have an immediate Falklands counterpart though a destabilisation in say, Indonesia (a Defence Department official once suggested in jest to me that ‘regional threat’ was a euphemism for Indonesia) could put us in an entirely different situation to the relative security we currently enjoy. There have always been low-profile disputes over control of portions of the Arafura and Timor Seas and it only requires the discovery of oil or gas in that region to spark off a border dispute. The isolated oil rigs in the Barrow Island group, while Christmas Island and the Cocos group also could be subjects of future disputes given the right circumstances while the fact that the circumstances’ existed twenty years ago is sufficient reason to maintain an appropriate defence force.

An aircraft carrier without aircraft, ultra-modern and extremely expensive patrol frigates without Close In Weapon Systems or helicopters and defence forces with threadbare spare inventories and reduced training time do not represent an appropriate defence force. The magic word since the dawn of man has been deterrence, deterrence could have been eight or nine hundred well-equipped Marines on the Falklands instead of a few dozen, enough to make the Argentinians think twice about an invasion and the ultimate scenario of a bloody South Atlantic battle required to retrieve them.

Deterrence for Australia through to the year 2000 means an air force boasting FfA-18s, F-111Cs and P-3C Orions in the strike role backed up by well-organised and highly trained transport, reconnaissance and training squadrons. For the navy, it means an aircraft carrier WITH aircraft, frigates and destroyers with modern air defence missiles and guns and a high degree of ability in the ASW role. It also means an adequate support capability with modern fleet replenishment vessels and a realistic patrol boat and mine hunting capability in addition to a strong and independent submarine force. The army requires mobility, spares and munitions in reserve and the maximum use of modern weaponry to ensure the smallest force can pack the biggest punch where needed.

The biggest winner, and ironically loser, of the past year has been the RAN. When the Navy had the Melbourne they enjoyed a balanced and well-trained Fleet Air Arm. The Melbourne was old but far from ineffective. Melbourne in a combat scenario enjoyed a tidy strike and reconnaissance capability with her A-4G Skyhawks, these subsonic aircraft armed with Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles could also provide a limited air defence capability against large Bear and Badger-type maritime strike aircraft. Melbourne also embarked Sea King helos for the short-range intensive ASW role, Tracker medium-range ASW aircraft which could provide an effective ASW capability within hundreds of miles of the task force, a role impossible to achieve solely with helicopters. Yet what the Navy ended up with, in their haste to get a carrier, any carrier, was a ship that would by government decree be equipped solely with Sea King helicopters.

Australia took delivery of the first of ten Sea Kings back in 1975, since then five have been lost, two are being delivered to the RAN next year which means that given a similar per annum attrition rate HMAS Australia will be battling to embark four Sea Kings on a patrol by 1985. How is that for deterrence?

In striving for the thick end of the wedge Navy have virtually said goodbye to the FAA as we knew it. Subject of a Joint Working Party at the present time the fate of the existing aircraft lies in the hands of DFDC who by September should have digested the lengthy JWP report and made public the fate of the air element of our senior service. Speculation is that the Navy will retain the specially modified 748s, the Wessex utility helos and the Kiowas, will sell off the Trackers and Skyhawks and most probably transfer the Macchis to the RAAF. So by 1984, when HMAS Australia enters home waters she will be equipped with a handful of Sea King helos. Gone will be the strike, reconnaissance and defence capabilities of the Skyhawks, the longer range dedicated ASW capability of the Trackers and the overall ability to provide air and ASW defence to a task force. Gone too will be the morale of the FAA, gone will be the men who learnt at great expense the skills required to operate from an aircraft carrier and gone too will be HMAS Australia if it should ever be called to active service with four helicopters as its only form of combat capability.

The RAN MUST acquire VSTOL aircraft, even Blind Freddy can see how well these aircraft have operated over the Falklands; to deny them to the RAN is simply wasting the total capability of the ship we have just paid $500 m for. The government has stated from the outset that a decision on whether to purchase VSTOL aircraft will be made in 1983. We don’t doubt this, but even if a go-ahead was given to acquire a Sea Harrier of AV-8B Harrier lls in 1983 the earliest the type would become operational aboard (bearing in mind that the FAA fixed wing core of expertise would have long since departed the RAN) Australia would be 1987. There has been talk of Australia leasing Sea Harriers from the RN as an interim measure but in view of the current situation it would seem doubtful that England would be able to afford to trim her own threadbare Sea Harrier force in favour of Australia.

Another bogeyman in the wings for the Navy is the ALP. If the Fraser government lost power in 1983 (hardly unrealistic) then Labor would most probably mothball our new carrier till a buyer could be found for her. This would effectively mean that Navy had lost the Melbourne, an old ship but still good for another four or more years in addition to the vital fixed wing element of naval aviation and all for nothing. In times of economic stringency even the Fraser government might well decide to defer a 1983 decision on acquiring VSTOL aircraft till the economy improved. Hopefully the realisation of what is happening, or has happened in the South Atlantic will provide enough ammunition for the Admirals to be able to argue their way past the Treasury in an effort to equip Australia as she should be – with teeth.

The other casualty, from the current defence cuts, largely being blamed on the fire sale carrier purchase, is the FFG helicopter purchase. HMS Sheffield would have most probably survived if it had had a Close-In Weapon System such as the British Sea Wolf SAM or more relevant to Australia the Vulcan Phalanx cannon. Our first two FFGs aren’t equipped with Phalanx and won’t be retrofitted till their first refit, we believe around 1988 or so, till then they are as vulnerable to sea-skimming cruise missiles such as Harpoon and Exocet (and the Soviet equivalents) as was HMS Sheffield. Likewise to operate all four FFG frigates without their helicopter complement is denying them a great proportion of the Over The Horizon and ASW capability they were designed for. Why buy ultra-expensive weaponry and then fail to equip that system adequately for the sake of another fifteen to twenty per cent of the purchase price? According to Canberra, the FFGs will not embark halos till 1987 at the absolute earliest. Certainly, the combat performance of both the radar-equipped Sea Harrier and the Lynx helo in the South Atlantic have improved their chances for ultimate purchase by the RAN and rightly so.

Australia must have a strong defence force to provide this generation and future generations the security they deserve, by equipping our nation’s namesake with ‘real’ aircraft we show our neighbours that defence is more than just a word. The Navy has its carrier, now it MUST have the VSTOL aircraft to make it credible.