The Great Carrier Debate

The Navy’s annihilation in the NAP study of the early 1970s was so total that replacing the Melbourne would not now be an issue, unless the CSE analysis had contained gross errors or the defence situation had since changed radically. As it happens, there is reason to believe that both of these conditions apply.

Although CSE went to great lengths to ensure a fair comparison, the results were nonetheless biased in the sense that the study reportedly emphasised a counter-insurgency scenario in PNG. There was little real interest in high threat levels or in more distant scenarios. Secondly, CSE had to take the RAAF’s word for the suitability of PNG airfields to fighter operations, although it was suspected that Air Force assumptions on runway-bearing strengths were optimistic. Thirdly, costing was done not from scratch, but on the basis that the RAAF already had the F-111 and that a Mirage replacement was already in the pipeline, whereas sea-based air power would require new funds for both ships and planes. In these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that land-based air power won the day.

The original NAP study findings are even more questionable today, since the defence outlook for the 1980s differs markedly from that of the early 70s. Ten years ago politicians could speak of “no forseeable threat to Australia” with hand on heart. Today the crises in Iran and Afghanistan brings home not only the threat of a major war. but also Australia’s reliance on the freedom of shipping lanes.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has injected sizeable maritime forces (including an aircraft carrier and ships for amphibious operations) into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and is reactivating the US-built base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. India and Pakistan are re-arming, while Japan, which is watching developments in both Korea and the Kuril Islands with apprehension, is under pressure from America to employ some of its vast wealth in building up defence forces to play a larger role in the Pacific theatre, a role which includes protecting the sea lane to Guam. Japan has already extended its Self-Defence Force commitments to provide aircraft patrols out to 500nm (925km) and MSDF protection out to 1000nm (1850km). A spokesman for the Japan Defense Agency has said that there is nothing in the constitution to prevent the country from building aircraft carriers of 30. 000 tons or more. Given the constant potential threat to Japan’s sea lanes from Soviet aircraft, submarines, and ships, the commissioning of major carriers for the MSDF appears quite likely before the end of the century.

The regional situation has thus changed beyond recognition since early considerations of a Melbourne replacement. Australia is still far from facing the possibility of invasion, but the forseeable threat to the nation’s interests has come a long way from the idea of a handful of insurgents hiking from West lrian into PNG.

Roles and Missions

As a starting-point for any discussion of the Melbourne-replacement issue, it is useful to restate the principles on which Australia’s defence effort is based. and the essential roles and missions of the RAN.

The nation’s defences are funded (at the expense of education. health and welfare services, etc) to protect Australia’s mainland and offshore territories and interests, which include trade routes and EEZ resources. This protection against (non-nuclear) aqqression is primarily by deterrence. but — if this fails – the armed forces would take direct action either on a national basis or in concert with allies. Enemy aggression might take any form from outright invasion, harassment of shipping or coastal raids, down to comparatively minor acts of terrorism.

Since demands on the armed services could materialise in any number of ways, it was decided many years ago to develop a “core force” – ie, a little of everything from which a purpose-built capability could be expanded, when the nature of the developing threat became apparent.

In any high threat scenario, Australia would depend on US assistance being provided under the ANZUS treaty. although strictly speaking this is limited to acts of armed aggression in the Pacific. However, major commitments could arise in situations in which the US could not afford to become involved. either because America was too heavily committed elsewhere, or because the scenario had the appearance of a mini-Vietnam or might be interpreted by the Third World as a colonialist action. A considerable degree of self-reliance is therefore essential.

Another fundamental is that Australia is obliged to plan its defences on the assumption that the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 is still in force, i. e. , the US guarantees help only to those of its allies who help themselves. The re-arming of Pakistan demonstrates that America will make exceptions to this rule, but Australia cannot base its planning on this premise.

In addition to fulfilling Australia’s formal commitments to Pacific defence under the ANZUS Treaty, the Defence Force would also assist “regional friends”, which presumably refers primarily to PNG, but may also extend to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia andeven the Philippines if the government of the day decides that the circumstances are right. Australia has often stated and demonstrated her willingness to contribute to UN peacekeeping forces. The Defence Force also provides assistance to the civil community in the form of disaster relief services and the military arm of the Coast Guard (pending the long-overdue advent of a separate Coast Guard service).

Throughout the last decade, Australian defence has been the subject of endless agonising debate, beginning with the basic conceptual argument of “Fortress Australia” vs “Forward Defence” and culminating with the more down-to-earth issues of the TFF and Melbourne replacement. Arising from this debate. Commonwealth thinking has been spelled out in far more detail than is generally the case overseas, and the ardent student can find some important pointers in the fine print of the official documents.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the pronouncements from Canberra over the last few years is the way in which Australia’s defence horizons have been narrowed to suit the funding available for the armed forces. For example, whereas Australian forces played a significant part in the Korean War (this participation including the use of HMAS Sydney with Fireflies and Sea Furies), it is now formally stated that “events in distant areas such as. . . North-East Asia. . . are beyond the reach of effective defence activity by Australia”. This evident lack. of ambition for any long-range strike capability is a major blow to RAN hopes for new aircraft carriers. It could also be argued to make nonsense of Australia’s ANZUS commitment to “act to meet the common danger” (which presumably means using its defence force) in the event of an armed attack on either of its allies anywhere in the Pacific area.

This restriction to Australia’s defence horizon is of particular concern in the context of the Indian Ocean, where the ANZUS treaty does not apply, yet over which approximately one-third of Australia’s oil requirement is transported. Nonetheless, RAN terms of reference have been spelled out in a series of annual policy statements, which have become progressively more restrictive with time.

In 1972 we were told that “by no stretch of the imagination could Australia assume in the foreseeable future a capability to control the vast areas of ocean which give access to our continent”. Fair enough, but in 1976 the defence perimeter was defined in terms of “near lines of communication”, “adjacent maritime areas”. “ocean approaches” and “the maritime resources zone”. Shipping would be protected from attack only in “Australia’s focal areas and port approaches”. By 1979 the concept of operations was narrowed down to protecting “supply lines in the maritime areas near to Australia’s principal ports”, or only if there was no significant local threat – “to assisting allies protect our remote sea routes”. Allowing for the optimism of political statements, this might be paraphrased as: “Once outside Sydney Harbour, it’s up to the Americans!” In all of these missions, there are well-established alternatives. Maritime patrol aircraft such as the P-3 can perform the surveillance role (given suitable land bases), provide some anti-submarine capability, and even limit anti-shipping strikes. Helicopters based on escort vessels or modified container ships may be used in both ASW and anti-FPB defence. Submarines can be operated in both patrol and deterrent roles. Escort ships can provide close-in defence against aircraft and missile attacks. Land-based, flight-refuelled fighters and strike aircraft can provide air defence and surface attack out to the order of 1000nm (1850km). Land-based ground attack aircraft can provide close support in a COIN scenario, although, June, 1980 such operations may be delayed by the need for airfield improvements.

The unique advantages of the aircraft carrier are:-

(a) Its range is comparatively unlimited and its operation is not dependent on the consent of foreign governments.

(b) In the patrol mission its surveillance covers a wider swathe than any other system, aside from satellites. (c) In the deterrent mission, it is highly visible.

(d) In the strike mission it is effectively a battleship with firepower ranging out to the order of 250nm (465km).

(e) In the close support (COIN) mission it avoids the need to station troops on foreign soil.

(f) In the interception mission it provides a distant first line of defence that is particularly useful against shadowing aircraft.

Its disadvantages are:- (a) The unit price is extremely high. hence the carrier suffers from the all- eggs-in-one-basket syndrome.

(b) Without the multi-layered defences of the US Navy, it may be more vulnerable than alternative systems.

Crux of the Matter

The carrier issue may therefore be stated in the following terms:

Since Australia cannot support a population bearing any normal relation to its size, the Defence Force will always be comparatively weak. Hence in any number of worst-case scenarios, whether Australian society as we know it today could survive a long conflict would depend on America shouldering most of the defence burden. Furthermore, what Australia does spend on major military items of equipment must be dictated by the direct needs of Australia’s own defence, not by vague commitments to allies or the wish to aid regional friends.

The aircraft carrier has unique capabilities in roles essential to Australian defence, although to some extent it is probably more vulnerable than the alternative systems. Carriers of some nationality would undoubtedly be used to protect Australian shipping routes. The question is whether one or two of these carriers should fly the Australian flag.

The crux of the matter may thus be to decide whether America is still sufficiently powerful to safeguard Australia’s essential lines of communication, especially in the Indian Ocean. At a time when the US is openly acknowledging the severe restrictions to its capabilities (e. g. to oppose a Soviet thrust to the Persian Gulf), the Commonwealth may well decide it can- not afford to lose the capability (however limited) to project fixed-wing air power over long ranges.

If Melbourne is replaced by further flat-tops, their main roles will be to assist in defending Australia’s seaborne trade and maritime forces against attack by submarines, surface vessels with ship-to-ship missiles, subsonic patrol aircraft with long-range air-to-surface missiles, and smaller V/STOL aircraft with weapons in the Harpoon class. In this last context it is noteworthy that the mid-1980s will see considerable proliferation in naval V/STOL. In addition to US Marine Corps AV-8As (which may be superseded by the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B), adjacent waters will be overflown by Indian Navy Sea Harriers from the INS Vikrant, and the Chinese Navy may have its own Harriers operating from flat-tops. On the Soviet side, other V/STOL carriers of the Kiev- class could well join Minsk in the Pacific, and a new super-carrier is expected to make its debut by the mid-1980s.

However, since the role that a single carrier (or even two or three) can play in protecting Australia’s convoys is relatively minor, it may well be that equal importance is given to the deterrent role, in which a task force based on the carrier would threaten the enemy’s own resources, trade and interests.

A third carrier role is to provide close air support for troops ashore. One of the lessons of the Vietnam War was the vast effort required to safeguard a conventional airfield against attacks by insurgents armed with mortars and rocket-launchers. In an area such as PNG, in which no point is more than 175nm (325km) from the shore, there would be strong practical arguments for providing CAS from sea bases. Cost-effectiveness studies may favour improving facilities at airfields such as Wewak and Nadzab and bringing in the RAAF but the taxpayer might not take kindly to thousands of Australian soldiers sweating out a mini-Vietnam on some airfield perimeter.

In contrast, the RAN could provide equally good close support from flattops cruising offshore, exposing to danger only a handful of pilots, who would return after each sortie to eat their cow pies and drink their lagers in an air-conditioned, floating piece of Australia. Just as the Americans have found it much more acceptable politically to support their Asian friends with air power rather than troops on the ground, aircraft carriers can beat airfields in supplying low-profile air power, provided the target area is relatively close to the sea.

Recent statements from the Russell Offices lay considerable emphasis on surveillance and patrol. Other carrier roles include the control of maritime and amphibious operations, transporting troops, assisting in disaster relief, and “showing the flag” with visits to foreign ports.

Alternatives to the Carrier

In considering whether the RAN is likely to be given further flat-tops, the basic question is whether aircraft carriers give capabilities that (a) are necessary to Australia’s defence, and (b) cannot be provided by other systems. It is arguable that a cost-effective comparison of the carrier and its alternatives (which in any event is beyond the scope of this discussion are superfluous at this stage, since the RAN will only have more carriers if the electorate can be made to see a clear need for them.

Considering the various roles listed above, it is obvious that a carrier is not going to be justified in terms of flag-waving exercises, disaster relief, transporting troops, or as a floating control centre. The only missions of real significance are patrol, convoy escort, deterrence, and close air support for troops ashore.

In support of such a decision, it seems likely that spending money on carriers could result in far more work for Australians than an equal amount spent on aircraft.

In late 1977 the Department of Defence issued to the major naval constructors an invitation to register interest (ITR) in the Melbourne replacement. This called for ships in the 10,000-25,000 ton category, and the operational roles were specified as tactical reconnaissance and maritime strike. fleet air defence, ASW, mining, strategic strike, CAS for ground forces, and evacuation and disaster relief. Maximum speed was to be 28 knots, with a continuous 26 knot capability. The ship was required to use diesel fuel, and to carry enough for a range of 10,000nm (18,500km) at 18 knots. Draught was specified as less than 32ft (9. 8m), with a preferred limit of 29ft (8. 8m).

The only defensive armament required on the ship was CIWS (Close-1- 1 n Weapon System). The aircraft complement was written in terms of a series of options, ranging from 12 to 24 V/STOL aircraft of Sea Harrier size (or 10 to 20 advanced V/STOL combat aircraft). or a mix of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft the latter being Sea Kings or more advanced helicopters). Two of the earliest entries to be rejected were the Vickers Invincible class anti-submarine cruiser (reportedly too expensive) and the Vosper-Thorneycroft Harrier-Carrier (said to be too short-legged to meet RAN requirements). The current frontrunners are the Spanish Sea Control Ship, the Italian Type 1092 carrier, and America’s improved LPH.

The first Sea Control Ship is under construction at El Ferrot in the northwest of Spain, at the yards of the national shipbuilder, Bazan. The ship is based on a design by Gibbs & Cox of New York, who are retained as consultants. Present indications are that it will be completed in 1983/84, to take over from the old carrier Dedalo, which currently operates a mix of AVBA Matadors, Sea Kings, and AugustaBell AB-212 helicopters.

The SCS (as yet unnamed) will have a full load displacement of approximately 15,000 tons, an overall length of 195m, a beam of 24. 4m, and a maximum draught of 6. 7m. It will carry a mixture of up to 17 Harriers, Sea Kings, and LAMPS helicopters. The flight deck will be 173. 3m long and 29m wide, with a ski jump to improve the Harrier’s take-off performance. Unlike the majority of modern carriers, the SCS will not have an angled deck. In fact, the take-off run is skewed slightly to the right (to allow aircraft to be parked on the starboard side of the aft deck), but the deck planform is symmetrical about the longitudinal axis. Two aircraft lifts are provided: one just ahead of the island, and a deckedge lift at the stern.

The main propulsion machinery takes the form of two General Electric LM2500 gas turbines, giving some 40,000shp. They drive the ship via a single variable-pitch screw (a feature that may well be criticised by the RAN). The SCS has a maximum continuous speed of 25 knots and a range of 4000- 5000nm (7400-9265km) at 18 knots. The ship’s complement of 780 men includes the air group.

The role of the SCS in the Spanish Navy will be to act as a command and control centre for a small task force. Missile defences will thus be provided by perhaps five frigates, hence the SCS’s own defensive armament is limited to four Spanish-designed Meroka close point-defence 20mm guns. Each gun has 12 barrels, arranged in two groups of six to provide a barrage of rounds against incoming missiles.

The Italcantieri Type 1092 carrier is proceeding somewhat in advance of the SCS, with commissioning scheduled for 1984. The first example, to be named Giuseppe Garibaldi, is being built as an ASW helicopter carrier for the Italian Navy. Export versions are planned to carry a mix of Harriers and Sea Kings (around 17 in total), and will have a ski jump at the bow, a revised deck planform, and larger aircraft lifts.

In relation to the SCS, the Type 1092 will be a marginally smaller ship, with a full load displacement of only 13,250 tons. The overall length is 180. 2m, the beam is 30. 4m and the maximum draught 6. 7m. The flight deck is to be 173. 8m long.

Drawings so far published relate to the Italian Navy version, with a nonangled deck that is quite narrow at the bow, being designed solely to provide six helicopter spots. Lifts are located at either end of the island. Hangar drawings show 12 Sea Kings or 10 Harriers and one Sea King below deck.

The Italian vessel is comparatively highly powered, having four Fiat-GE LM2500 gas turbines. These give a combined total of 80,000s hp (maximum continuous), and drive the ship through two propellors. Maximum speed is estimated at 29. 5 knots. The range is quoted as 7000nm(13,000km) at 20 knots. The ship’s complement takes the form of 105 officers, 324 petty officers, and 396 ratings, giving a total of 825 men.

Unlike the SCS, the Type 1092 is intended to be able to operate independently of escorts and has therefore been given a far more comprehensive defence system. The standard design incorporates four Teseo surface-surface missile (Otomat) launchers, two Albatross surface-air missile (Aspide) launchers for point defence, three Breda 40/70 twin-barrel guns, two 105mm chaff launchers, and six Mk 32 anti-submarine torpedo tubes. This armament is clearly far in excess of RAN needs, hence the crew could be significantly reduced on an Australian version, perhaps to as few as 550 men.

Vickers 16,000 ton Invincible class having been rejected in the initial RAN analysis, the company subsequently proposed for export the 13,200 ton VVAC (Vickers Versatile Aircraft Carrier), a model of which was shown at RNEE (Portsmouth) last year.

Intended to be significantly less expensive than its RN stablemate, the V-VAC would be built to merchant ship standards and would use modular construction to achieve greater flexibility of role. The hangar would accommodate a mix of up to 16 Sea Harriers and Sea Kings. The ship’s complement would normally be 550, rising to a maximum of 760.

The V-VAC design has an overall length of 184m, a beam of 30m, and a draught of 6m. The flight deck, which incorporates a 15-degree ski jump, is parallel to the ship centre line but offset to the port, giving it an angled deck appearance. To increase aircraft capacity for wartime, an additional module can be added at the stern, this module also incorporates a second aircraft lift.

Possibly in response to RAN demands, the V-VAC would be powered by four Pielstick diesel (totalling 48,000hp) driving two screws. Maximum speed is quoted as 2 6 knots, and the ship could cruise at 18 knots on two engines for a range of 10,000nm (18,500km). Armament is limited to three General Dynamics Phalanx 2E guns, again conforming to RAN requirements.

The Ingalls Shipbuilding division of Litton Industries, located at Pascagoula, Mississippi, has been responsible for a range of aircraft-capable ships, culminating in the 39,300-ton Tarawaclass LHA amphibious assault ship, which can land a complete Marine battalion landing force by means of helicopters and small landing craft. However, the ship under examination by the RAN is believed to be a modified Lwo Jima-class LPH, of which Ingalls has constructed 12, the last being completed in 1970. Displacing approximately 18,000 tons, the LPH has an overall length of 180m, a beam of 25. 6m, and a draught of 7. 93m. Two deck-edge lifts are provided. A typical aircraft complement in US Navy service is 20-24 CH-46s, four CH-53s, four UH-1s, and four AVBA Harriers.

Unlike the SGS and the Type 1092, the LPH has oil-fired boilers, with steam turbines driving a single screw and producing a speed of little more than 20 knots. The ship’s normal complement is 652 men, but there is space for 1724 Marines of the battalion landing team and for their guns and vehicles. The defensive system is composed of four three-inch (76mm) guns and two BPDMS (Basic Point Defence Missile Systems) with Sea Sparrow missiles.

The RAN has awarded study contracts each worth $150,000 to Bazan, ltalcantieri, and Ingalls to make detailed submissions on replacing the Melbourne. Information on the modified designs proposed by Spain, Italy and the US has not been released for publication, hence at this stage, it is only possible to comment on the suitability of the SGS, Type 1092 and LPH as bases for development.

The Spanish SGS is the only one of the three designed from the outset to operate V/STOL aircraft, but it is also the least advanced in timescale. Its armament corresponds to RAN ideas (ie the Spanish equivalent of CIWS), but the ship is somewhat underpowered, uses turbine fuel rather than diesel oil, and has only half the required range.

The ltalcantieri Type 1092 has a slightly smaller displacement yet twice the power, has two screws instead of one, and handsomely exceeds RAN speed demands and has almost the required range. On the other hand it burns turbine fuel (as does the SGS), has an excessively good defensive system, and would need a steeper ski-jump to operate V/STOL aircraft.

The basic LPH has a somewhat heavier displacement and is a much older (fully proven) design. It burns diesel oil but would need a ski jump to be added to the flight deck, and its defensive system to be completely revised. The Vickers V-VAC appears to be designed specifically to meet RAN needs, aside from being built to merchant ship standards, yet is excluded from the present series of funded studies, possibly because the RAN has no wish to be used as a guinea pig for any major new ship design, although early commitment to either the Spanish or Italian vessels would carry much the same risk.

To summarise, the RAN is now in the kind of dilemma traditionally associated with the RAAF, i. e. , wanting the very latest and best equipment, without the attendant risk of project failure and without funding R&D. Probably only the Ingalls LPH would meet the established 1985 in-service timescale, but this is a slow, old single-screw design. Only the V-VAC would meet the RAN performance requirements in full, and equipment specifications without changes, but can the service afford a gamble solo on a vessel of dubious combat-worthiness? Between these extremes lie the SGS and Type 1092, the former closer to RAN operational concepts, the latter more advanced in performance and timescale. Which path the RAN would prefer is impossible to say.

Whether the RAN gets new carriers at all appears to rest mainly on how credible is US protection for Indian Ocean shipping lanes, whether the service can communicate the special advantages of the carrier in a COIN scenario, and whether spending on carriers can be proved to result in more jobs in Australia than any of the alternatives. The next few months should decide all of these issues.