Defence and the deterrent concept

Critics of defence spending, even at current low levels, raise the question of who are we defending ourselves from and also question whether Australia is defensible.

It is in these areas that the deterrent concept of defence spending, equipment purchase and force structure becomes important.

To take one extreme, if Australia had no allies, armed forces or national will to resist, any nation that wanted our resources or our territory could simply move in and take them.

Fortunately, in today’s international climate, robbery of this sort is discouraged and is unlikely to happen. But the deterrent force of world opinion is not very strong (as witness lack of effectiveness of the widespread condemnation of Cuban-Soviet intervention in Africa).

A much more effective method of deterring a potential aggressor is by achieving a certain level of armed forces equipped to certain standards and with certain capabilities so that a would-be aggressor then realises that it would have to field a bigger force to overwhelm us. In Australia’s case, with our long-distance air-strike capability in the F-111 force, any regional aggressor also knows that we can retaliate against targets in his home country, which is an added deterrent.

Furthermore in Australia’s case, any act of aggression against our territory must require a major effort on or over water. An invasion, for instance – or even a limited lodgment – would require a regular armada of warships and troop and supply carriers that would have to have strong air protection. Consequently, if we have a land force in being of X strength that can be deployed to a given area of our territory to meet an invasion, an aggressor faces the need to assemble a force somewhat greater and expose it to retaliatory action as it crosses the seas towards our shores. It is then open to attack from our submarines, our surface vessels, our aircraft carrier and strike aircraft. All these in turn mean that the basic ante in terms of men and ships has to be multiplied if an invasion is to be mounted.

It is for this reason that so much emphasis is being placed in our present defence debate on naval and air forces, even to the extent where some officers argue that ground forces – an Army – is superfluous. But in the poker game of strategy, our land forces are the basic chip that eventually has to be match­ed if the game is to be won and all the bidding goes up from this.

In many ways the Army is a fairly flexible force. It is man­power intensive as against the tendency to equipment inten­siveness in the RAAF and RAN. Consequently it can be ex­panded at a much greater rate than the other forces. It would probably take about three years, for instance, to double the size of the RAAF (and an immense cost in terms of equip­ment, trainers and training). Similarly the increasing call for technical proficiencies on the part of seagoing Naval officers puts a similar constraint on expanding this service rapidly.

But many of the Army’s weapons, organisation and for­mations can be mastered within months and in almost every instance proficiency can be achieved within a year. So that by a process of either mobilisation or voluntary recruitment (depending on the need) the basic strength of the Army can be built up quickly.

This means that responding to a threat situation can take the form of increasing the size and capability of the Army as an early step. This then has the effect of making an aggressor commit an even greater force if he is to stage an invasion or make even a limited lodgment. And as it increases in size, the resources committed and the vulnerability of the target make the cost of attempting to rob us of territory or resources less worthwhile in the aggressor’s eyes.

But in order that an Army can be expanded, certain skills have to be maintained and exercised. One of these, which has attracted some criticism, is armour. The purchase of Leopard tanks has been branded as unnecessary as they are unlikely ever to be employed on Australia territory. The Army’s argu­ment is that a capability in armour is one that Australia re­quires, along with other military skills such as anti-aircraft, communications, artillery and so on.

The argument says that if it becomes necessary to expand the Army, it is best done by making use of skills and technologies that already exist. To introduce a new skill, for instance, would require a much longer lead time for force ex­pansion.

Consequently the Australian Army can be seen to have two components – a ready force and a core force. Ideally the ready force should be of brigade strength, self-contained and able to move quickly to an area of threat around Australia. While this is happening, the core force would be expanded so that within the response time to an emerging threat, ground forces of sufficient size to counter it would be available.

Both these components are required for the deterrent effect. A quick response capability deters raids and adven­tures. An ability to expand deter longer-term threats.

In Australia in years to come, we can expect to see the ex­pansion capability improved by increasing the skills of the Army Reserve to provide the basis of the first expansion. Sup­porters of a strong Army Reserve make the point that it offers an admirable and cost-effective way of maintaining a substan­tial force in being. Certainly there is a recognisable deterrent value not only in the size of the force but the demonstration through it that there is a national will to resist any aggressive adventures.

In the international moves and countermoves that we call diplomacy, actions taken with the Reserve Forces can have considerable impact. For instance, mobilisation of certain areas of the Navy or Air Force Reserves at a time of crisis can signal a determination by this country that it is prepared to take several steps, which could include retaliatory sea or air strikes. Mobilisation of the Army Reserve is a gesture which clearly shows the nation’s determination to defend itself. These demonstrations themselves may have the effect of eas­ing pressure on Australia so that an emerging threat may withdraw.

We would have been tested and not found wanting.

Australia is not a country that would welcome war. But ironically its best method of insuring against it is to pay for the equipment and men who would be prepared to fight. It is clearly a national premium that we must pay.

Article written by John Stackhouse