Tim Johnson

Getting the Boeing 737 MAX back in the air is a task that is nothing short of monumental. Any aircraft is complex to certify, but with the scrutiny of the entire world — and the entire world’s aviation safety regulators — on the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration as lead certifying authority, the stakes are

The final report on the Lion Air 610 crash of 29 October 2018 makes for sobering reading. The crew on the previous flight, Lion Air 43, managed to overcome erroneous MCAS activation and land safely after cutting off the automatic trimming system. This content is available exclusively to Australian Aviation members. Login Become a Member

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When the final history of the Boeing 737 MAX is written, one of the most vital topics for scrutiny — and likely one of the greatest lessons learned — will be how and why the industry reacted in the way that it did during the four months between the 29 October 2018 crash of Lion

And why is Boeing’s Maneuvring Characteristics Augmentation System a problem? Boeing had a problem with the 737 MAX, and it was not a new problem. Rather, it was one of several awkward characteristics that dogged the manufacturer since the 1960s, when the 737 originally entered service, and which has confronted engineers working on revised generations

The morning of 29 October 2018 dawned bright in Jakarta. As the sun rose over Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft operating Lion Air flight 610 taxied for takeoff. In the flight deck of PK-LQP that morning were captain Bhavye Suneja and his first officer Harvino. With over 6,000 hours in the