Win-wins do exist

While it started as a vehicle to bring together a lot of disparate regulations, exemptions and orders, it was underpinned by a strong commitment to ‘simple rules for simple operations’ which took account of risk, the capacity of the industry and international harmonisation, especially with the US FAA Part 137 (13 pages) and the NZ CAA Part 137 (about 25 pages).

Use of the term ‘aerial application’ was an intentional strategy to remove decades of CASA hair-splitting in the classification of operations, where the same aircraft, the same pilot, similar equipment and techniques could do spraying or fertiliser, but not firebombing, oilspill or mosquito control. Part 137 fixed that overnight.

“Development of Part 137 was characterised by cooperation and mutual respect.”

Another underpinning aim was to provide a ‘one-stop shop’ for aerial application operations, so that Part 137 would be well placed to inform both pilots and business owners how to operate in this environment, including flight and duty times and a range of provisions that were intended to act as sector specific ‘exemptions’ against the anticipated CASR Part 91.

It was considered a significant advantage to keep the regulation as short as possible and expressed in terms that were relatively easy to understand. The later nonsensical drafting style adopted by CASA in dysfunctional Parts such as 61 was yet to come into vogue, and consequently Part 137 is both intelligent and intelligible.

While there is always a need for refinement, improvement and review or any regulation, Part 137 certainly passed the 80:20 rule of being mostly right.

The Part 137 Post Implementation Review was never conducted and in many ways that has been positive for the sector – allowing people to get a sound understanding of the regulation over the years. Some tinkering undertaken in recent years due to the knock-on effects of Part 61 and done without consultation with the sector led to ‘unforeseen consequences’ that resulted in further exemptions.

There are certainly some very positive initiatives that could be included in a revised Part 137, not the least being the inclusion of rotary wing aerial application operations. This would provide massive relief from the confused mess of bad classification of operations, rules strewn throughout the orders, regulations and exemptions that is the current system – where significant and inexplicable differences exist between fixed wing and rotary aerial application operations.

For example, someone in CASA simply took the decision in Form 1214 Part B – with no obvious head of power, consultation or reason – to reclassify aerial work operations from the 8 categories in CAR 206 to 43 separate categories – each requiring specific details in ops manuals and CASA permissions.

If CASA had pathways into their organisation to encourage discussions with industry on sensible rules and an engaged middle management that oversaw decisions to get an agreed strategic outcome, it would be possible to both improve clarity and safety and reduce red tape.

The development of Part 137, while sound, could be improved upon. The use of the CASA / AAAA sector risk profile for aerial application would be a good starting point, especially if combined with the DAS Directive relating to risk management and cost considerations.

However, the basics are still missing. The operational and standards silo of CASA still struggles with the concept of cooperation and ‘win-win’. It is still rooted in the culture of ‘we know better than you’ and the ‘Big R regulator’. This must change to drive safety.

CASA’s biggest challenge in the long-term remains recruitment. Yes, induction and training are important (see the previous ICAO audit result), but getting people with the right outlook and the right attitude in the first place will be critical to turning CASA around.

The lessons of the success of Part 137 are strong if regulatory reform is to be completed by the end of 2018 as Mr Carmody hopes.

Genuine engagement and discussion around risk and its management, recognition that industry does actually understand and want safe operations, and an acceptance that safety is generated every day in the field would be a good start.

As would a restructure of CASA that puts people with that underpinning culture into the regulatory reform control seat.