Know your passengers

These are significant weaknesses in Australia’s domestic air travel system. Even many motels and hotels in Australia ask for photo identification when a customer checks in.

A terrorist could book a flight in a false name and any person could use that ticket to undertake the flight. The offences that render that activity illegal are only minor offences and do not present a deterrent. And a terrorist intending on travelling on the flight for any reason would not be deterred by the offences anyway, regardless of how serious they were.

There is a large number of people in Australia who support Islamic State and Al Qaeda. ASIO, the Australian Federal Police and state and territory police forces do not have the resources to monitor them all using physical and/or electronic surveillance. And those measures can be easily defeated, resulting at times in the location of the suspect being unknown to authorities. If recent attacks in the UK are any guide, the attackers were known to authorities but they did not have the resources to monitor them. Intelligence was lacking.

And in countering the actions of terrorists three things must be known by the intelligence and law enforcement authorities at all times. They are location, location and location. Where has the suspect been previously? Where is he/she now? And from the information obtained from answering those questions, where is he/she likely to go next? Only the receipt of timely intelligence provides those answers.

Counter-terrorism measures at Australian airports are designed to identify a potential terrorist by detecting anything a person might be carrying that could cause harm to people, the airport or to an aircraft. The screening is not designed to alert authorities to the movement of a person who might pose a risk to the airport, people or to aircraft. And even with current measures in place, it is possible for a potential attacker to arm themselves at an Australian airport, once they have cleared security screening, by obtaining metal knives and forks from an airport lounge or from a supporter who works in any of the cafes located at Australian airports.

Other than presentation of a credit card to pay for membership, a person is not required to identify themselves when applying to become a member of an airline-operated lounge. While the implements available in lounges and cafes are relatively blunt, they can still inflict significant injury or death if used with sufficient force on a person’s head, neck and other soft tissue of a person’s body. The terrorists wouldn’t be able to get access to the cockpit, but that would not be their objective. Why would a terrorist/s attack people on the streets of an Australian city with knives, when they could achieve better results, from their perspective, by attacking fellow passengers at 30,000 feet in a pressurised aircraft? Travelling in small groups, they could cause significant harm to other passengers before they were stopped by other passengers and/ or crew, if they are stopped at all.

So how does Australia harden our domestic airlines from being used by potential terrorists? First, Australia needs to implement a “Know Your Passenger” system for our domestic airline system. This could operate in a manner similar to the Know Your Customer framework currently in place to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Any person who books a flight would be required to submit various forms of identification to prove who they are. Unlike other institutions such as a bank, an airline operating in Australia does not undertake electronic verification of a traveller. Online verification can occur by requiring a person who is booking a flight to quote one form of acceptable identification, similar to the primary identification documents required when opening a bank account. For example, an Australian passport or driver’s licence. Those who do not have either document can quote a Medicare card number. The information on any of those documents can easily be checked online by any airline that has acquired access to the information. Foreign travellers could be asked to quote a visa reference. And if they do not have a visa at the time of making the booking, then it is to be quoted prior to any flight being undertaken or the booking is cancelled. That reference could be checked against Commonwealth government records.

For this process to occur governments must share passport, Medicare and drivers licence identification data where relevant with all airlines and aircraft charter companies. New Zealand citizens would be required to quote similar identification documentation to Australian citizens and residents. The New Zealand government would be required to share primary identification data with Australia, as a condition of allowing its citizens to travel to our country visa free.

These are significant weaknesses in Australia’s domestic air travel system.

Passengers would then be required to identify themselves again during the boarding process by presenting acceptable photo identification only. While requiring a passenger to present their identification when presenting their boarding pass might appear to delay the boarding process, the reality is it wouldn’t. As anyone who has ever travelled economy class will testify, often after presenting your boarding pass and heading to the aircraft, you are delayed in a long line waiting for others to board and take their seats. But any potential delay can be avoided by the identification inspection being undertaken with airline staff checking the identity of travellers standing in line prior to presenting their boarding passes. This process is already undertaken by many airlines when passengers are queueing to board an international flight.

No one should be allowed to travel on a flight unless they have been identified. Know Your Passenger identification requirements would prevent any person seeking to travel on a name that is false or using someone else’s name. While it would not deter a potential terror suspect from travelling, it would alert authorities to the presence of that suspect or suspects at an Australian airport, provided the data was linked to our intelligence and law enforcement networks.

Currently, Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies monitor the movement of people arriving and departing Australia by placing a person on “alert” using the PACE system. This system is maintained and monitored by Australian Border Force. While it was designed to enhance our ability at the international border to detect persons of interest, it could be extended to the airline booking process for domestic flights. Australian terror suspects could be uploaded into the extended domestic PACE and if linked to the booking system operated by domestic airlines, any known terror suspect would be detected when their details are entered at the time a booking is made and again when they check in and board their flight.

Authorities would then have real time intelligence on the location of a terror suspect and their intended travel to another location in Australia. A decision would then need to be made by ASIO and the police in conjunction with the airline on whether that suspect would be allowed to travel. And if so, under what conditions.

Like financial institutions, airlines would baulk at the cost involved in implementing the proposed Know Your Traveller system. And if the airline doesn’t want to implement the system or the Federal government does not, they might find the insurance companies who ultimately cover much of the risk of air travel, institutional investors and large institutional shareholders in an airline, might impose it upon them anyway. Those institutions understand risk management better than most and would see it as a commonsense move to protect their investment and financial interests.

No system is totally effective and the system proposed would only detect known suspected terrorists and supporters. But as a traveller, I would be more assured of my safety if the intelligence and law enforcement community were aware of a potential terror suspect boarding my flight and was prevented from doing so. And all Australians would support any inconvenience caused by the implementation of new measures.

Chris Douglas’s Malkara Consulting specialises in the provision of training and advice in relation to financial crime including terrorist financing. Douglas served with the Australian Army and the Australian Federal Police, serving in uniform policing at Sydney Airport. Amongst his command appointments, he was responsible for managing the AFP team at Perth International Airport.