Tiger Tales

“We’re very focused on delivering the best possible capability to Army that we can,” MAJGEN Mathewson said. “Therefore we need to upgrade the system and deliver the product as best we can over that 15 year period. And it could be longer, if we select to upgrade Tiger, and we’re working particularly with the French and also with the Germans and the Spanish to see what opportunities there are to work together to develop the Tiger for the next generation. ” A slide supporting MAJGEN Mathewson’s presentation showed that under current planning the Tiger would be upgraded under the ‘LAND 9000 Capability Assurance Program – Tiger’ project, and that its eventual replacement or a more substantial upgrade would be considered under the new ‘LAND 4503 ARH Tiger Upgrade/Replacement’ project.

“The intention is that will we look at upgrading Tiger and look at what that can deliver in terms of capability, and compete that with what a new contemporary attack helicopter offers,” MAJGEN Mathewson said, saying he expected the competition “to take place some time in the years 2021-22-23, around that timeframe, for an investment that will take place around 2025-26. ” The Head Helicopter Systems Division cautioned that the assessment wouldn’t necessarily result in the Tiger’s replacement.

“But it’s also important to remember that from a taxpayer’s perspective we’ve invested $2 billion in Tiger and it is operating quite effectively so we would have to deliver quite a profound effect I think [to replace Tiger] … but that [assessment] will be undertaken in the competition. ” MAJGEN Matthewson was speaking at Land Forces less than week after a new Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) review into the Tiger program recommended Defence assesses whether upgrading the Tiger under the LAND 9000 Capability Assurance Program would provide value for money if the aircraft is slated for replacement mid next decade.

One of two findings of the ANAO report was: “That Defence assesses, and advises government, on the value-for-money in investing further in the Tiger aircraft fleet for only a short period of improved performance, against other alternatives. This assessment should take into account the associated technical risks of upgrading an aircraft which has not fully delivered the level of capability originally expected by government. ” The report found that the Tiger continues to suffer from lower than expected serviceability rates, that it faces growing obsolescence issues, and that the declaration of final operational capability (FOC) in April this year “was seven years later than planned, and was accompanied by nine operational caveats”.

“In effect, an upgrade is scheduled for consideration less than 12 months after the Tiger achieved final operational capability. Defence should conduct a thorough analysis of the value-for-money of investing further in the Tiger, pending the introduction of a replacement capability. ” In response to the ANAO recommendation, which it accepted, Defence said it would “assess the best value for money and most effective capability for both the Tiger Capability Assurance Program and Tiger replacement. Recommendations on the timings for both programs will be considered at Gate Zero”.

Gate Zero approval – the first major approval milestone for a defence acquisition program – for the Tiger Capability Assurance Program upgrade is scheduled for early 2017 the ANAO report said.

MAJGEN Mathewson told Land Forces the ANAO report was a “fairly brutal appraisal” of the Tiger ARH.

“The transition to Tiger has taken a lot longer than we would have hoped,” he noted.

Interestingly, the ANAO report reveals a 2013 report by Defence’s Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation (RPDE) organisation found that upgrading the Tiger was a “high-risk activity” and that replacement alternatives should be considered.

“Alternate platform options should be considered. One option is the [Apache], although it is acknowledged that there may be other cost-competitive platforms,” the ANAO quotes the RPDE report as saying.

The ANAO report then notes that in 2013 the then Defence Materiel Organisation advised the then Minister of Defence that while “no in-depth analysis of the costs of acquiring the Apache had been undertaken since the initial tender process for AIR 87 Phase 2 in 2001; [and that] the figures identified in the 2013 [RPDE] report were ‘not considered reliable’; … that further analysis would be undertaken to develop options in the lead up to Gate Zero for the Tiger mid-life upgrade. ” Improving Tiger availability may also affect the assessment of whether to upgrade or replace the Tiger, as Airbus Group Australia Pacific says that thanks to the efforts of a dedicated task force, support arrangements for the helicopter no longer significantly impede availability and serviceability rates.

In its response to an extract of the ANAO report (included in the report as an appendix), Airbus Group Australia Pacific says that it “generally agrees” that program milestone delays were caused by the “immaturity of the Tiger during the acquisition phase”, but says support arrangements have been “extensively remediated”.

“Airbus Helicopters and all of the industry partners that support the Tiger have been strongly engaged over the last two years in a dedicated program to resolve all known issues with the support and operation of the aircraft,” wrote Airbus Group Australia Pacific’s vice president government helicopters, Jock Crocombe.

“Under a dedicated task force the support arrangements have been extensively remediated with the result that support issues do not significantly contribute to lack of available aircraft. ” The ANAO report noted that the Tiger has “consistently underperformed” against availability and rate of effort targets, that “on average”, only 3. 5 aircraft of the operational fleet of 16 in service with 1 Aviation Regiment in Darwin were considered serviceable at 10am on any given day in 2015, and that the “Tiger fleet is unlikely to exceed 74 per cent of its original target for rate of effort”.

Wrote Crocombe in the July 4 dated letter: “Multiple statements throughout the extract state that on average during 2015 only 3. 5 aircraft were considered serviceable. The recorded data on the Defence Restricted Network states 5. 4 aircraft [were available] for 2015 and 6. 8 aircraft so far in 2016. ” Further, the “determination of serviceability where a measure is taken at 10am on any given day is not a good metric as it is not adjusted if no aircraft were required on the day, or if the aircraft became serviceable and flew later in the day. ” The letter also notes that Tiger serviceability at the Army Aviation Training Centre, Oakey, which is not mentioned in the report “was 72. 92 per cent in 2015 and so far in 2016 it is 73. 87 per cent.

“The requirements are different between the operational unit and the Training Centre, but Airbus Group Australia Pacific considers it important to provide the full picture of serviceability. ” Crocombe also wrote that the “ARH Tiger is well on the way to achieving the $20k per flight hour target in FY17/18 in accordance with the CEO DMO requirement”.

At Land Forces MAJGEN Mathewson said Tiger operating costs had “come down quite significantly”.

“We’re not flying as much as we’d like with Tiger due to a bunch of complex issues. Darwin is a difficult place to operate in, it’s a difficult climate with the wet season,” MAJGEN Mathewson noted.

“Airbus and the companies that support Airbus like Thales and the Safran Group have worked very hard to reduce the cost of ownership because they recognise there is a risk that they will not win the upgrade/replacement. ”

The ANAO report was a “fairly brutal appraisal” of the Tiger ARH.