Multi-domain integration

Minister Payne argued that with its modernised inventory, Air Force will introduce and develop capabilities that will enhance its ability to work jointly with its sister services, in many cases before the systems they will network with enter service with Army and Navy. The work being undertaken by Air Force to explore the “art of the possible” and reduce risk through experimentation means that the benefits of a joint force will be more rapidly realised once the networked systems committed to in the 2016 Defence White Paper enter Army and Navy service.

Also at that conference, USAF General Lori Robinson argued that the need for game-changing technologies to match the rapid pace of change, and also to dominate in the air, makes it an imperative to leverage space and cyber.

While some of these game-changing technologies may be kinetic (unmanned aerial systems, lasers, and hypersonic weapons), space and cyber are definitely the non-kinetic part of the equation. They are intrinsically linked and together impact hugely on kinetic operations. For example, the counter-air capability of the future will depend on cyberspace terrain, space architecture and integrated air and missile defence, together with traditional counter-air capabilities. Indeed, cyber defence is already fundamental to mission assurance generally.

Cyber is an ever-increasing contested and congested environment. Network resiliency and redundancy become a sine qua non for effective military operations. Offensive, defensive, protection and maintenance actions from, and of, our networks are crucial.

GPS, space-based imagery and intelligence, and communications all come from space and are integral to fifth-generation capability. More data, information and speed are all overloading our space systems. Global Hawk uses five times the bandwidth than did all US forces in Gulf War I. This raises serious questions. How do we operate C4ISR/cyber/space in a denied environment, not just a contested one? How do we create local networks in an information-denied environment? Many assumptions about cyber and electronic warfare have yet to be tested in real-world situations. Defence forces are moving EW and cyberspace operations ever-closer, as the two disciplines become increasingly intertwined. However, the focus has been on integrating only some cyber, signal and electronic warfare operations, and the challenge is far greater than that. If we are to maximise this opportunity, we must find a way to synchronise operations, effects, and personnel.

The growing relationship between cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence and communications needs to be explored more comprehensively, noting that the evolving functionality and performance of military capabilities is being defined as much by software as by hardware. The challenge of protecting and countering complex systems-of-systems requires the development of new concepts that will leverage all four domains of cyber, EW, SIGINT and communications. And those concepts will then need to be translated into practical operational and tactical – that is, warfighting – terms.

Finally, it has become critically important to think about defending platforms and systems in every domain in which elements of the Australian Defence Force operate. The RAAF, for example, operates in the air, space, cyber, land and maritime environments. But this is not just about Air Force: every ADF mission is interlinked.

The real power of multi-domain integration lies in the potential to create effects anywhere in the battlespace by drawing on a multitude of contributors at the right time and place. But those contributions must be assured.

We need to recognise this increased interdependence as we pursue greater interoperability across all domains of warfare. Space and cyber – the non-kinetic parts of the equation – have to be leveraged more to support not only the extension of traditional capabilities but also the introduction of new game-changing kinetic capabilities.

There can be no question that developments in artificial intelligence and robotics, arsenal planes filled with airborne weapons, unmanned underwater systems, swarming autonomous vehicles, electromagnetic rail guns, and directed-energy weapons such as lasers and microwave energy will pave the way for a continued capability edge for US and allied forces. However, that edge must recognise the importance of cyber and space.

The recent appointment by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull of a minister assisting for cyber security is a step in the right direction. Much more, however, remains to be done.