The complacency traps

But being a Monday quarterback is no use unless you intend to learn from the mistakes of others – and start identifying and analysing the critical control points (CCPs) in your flying before you get to them.

That way, you can develop a systemised, repeatable, robust approach to managing yourself and your aircraft.

The critical control point concept comes from food quality systems (Hazard Analysis CCP) that seek to identify those points in the production chain where humans can or will intervene to either create a hazard – or potentially get things back on track.

In aerial application, there are about five major critical control points: Pre-planning – gathering the intelligence from clients through a system that addresses consistent concerns and issues. Which chemical, what rate, where are the hazards: people, powerlines, bees, waterways? What coverage of which target is required? Planning – what droplet size to select? What equipment to use to achieve which spray quality? Logistics including job sequencing, strip conditions, fuel, and loading support. How many loads? What spray pattern and swath width to use? Where will I put the ‘AB’ line? Where are the powerlines and hazards? Aerial survey – confirm the target treatment area. Where are the hazards? Where is the sun? What are the power poles and arms telling me about other wires? Are there any other hazards I wasn’t expecting? Monitoring during the job – where’s the wind? How is the equipment performing? Is the pump pressure OK? Are any nozzles blocking? Which run will I finish on for the next load? How’s the fuel? Is anything not adding up? The run-in for each swath – where’s the wind? Where are the wires? Am I online with two ambers on the GPS light bar? Is there anything different or of concern? The electronic, paper and human systems the aerial application industry has developed address all of these issues in a coherent manner.

It’s obvious there are other risks and hazards – takeoff and landing for two. But in aerial application it is expected that the pilot will be up to handling these often challenging flight stages through appropriate training, supervision and checking. And of course each of these phases have their own CCPs and systems.

It is a given that you must fly well because of the other demands on cognitive attention.

Importantly, where the opportunity exists for positive human intervention to maintain quality or safety, it is obvious that the pilot must have the self-discipline to apply that system and act as required. There is no point having a checklist or a system if you are just going through the motions.

With repetition comes the risk of boredom and a lack of attention to actually testing what you are meant to be testing. Complacency can also play a role – especially with high time pilots who have often mastered the rudiments of the task.

ATSB produced an excellent publication last year in cooperation with AAAA – Aerial Application 2014-15 Year in Review. Another edition covering the last 12 months is currently under development.

That analysis identified that the median age of the pilot in reported accidents and incidents was around 40 and that their median experience was around 4,000 hours. An interesting side note is that in many incidents the pilot had less than 500 hours on type.

While this is bleak reading if you are a middle-aged pilot on a new type, this information is a powerful reminder that previous experience is not a good predictor of future safety.

It is also an excellent stimulus – regardless of your hours – to recommit to applying a critical control point approach to making your flying safer.

In the same vein, the recent election result provides strong evidence that the ‘small target’ theory of politics is simply a lost opportunity. To learn from their mistakes, political parties across the spectrum will need to re-engage with industry, the community and the many different demographics of the electorate to rekindle the hard grind of policy development.

At least we know there is a critical control point for all politicians every three years.

Previous experience is not a good predictor of future safety.