Back To Sea?

Confirmation came when, testifying before the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee during Senate Estimates on June 2, Chief of Defence Force General David Hurley said the concept of a potential fixed-wing capability from the LHDs was being studied.

“There has been a White Paper evolving for a while,” GEN Hurley said in response to a remark by opposition Defence spokesman, Senator Stephen Conroy that the Prime Minister’s office had leaked the story to The Australian. “The Prime Minister has a view about a capability that he thinks might be relevant to the ADF, he has asked us to look at that. We have a process in place at the moment that will allow us to have a look at that and, depending where we come out on that process, we would then go into all of those technical decisions about the nature of ship and force structure implications for the ADF. ”

Issues

Australian Aviation previously explored the F-35B/LHD idea in our May 2013 issue. While we drew no real conclusions at that time, the arguments generally came down on the negative side based on cost and the modifications that would be required to the LHDs. But now that the idea seems to be gaining some momentum with some heavyweight political backing, it is appropriate to re-visit the issues with some deeper analysis.

Certainly events in our wider region in recent times such as growing tensions in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and in Thailand give weight to providing the ADF the capability to strategically project a combined amphibious and air combat force.

The politics surrounding the LHDs is intriguing, especially in light of the PM’s and Minister’s comments. When ordered, the Canberra class vessels were ‘sold’ as being able to embark, transport and deploy an embarked amphibious force, and to carry out or support humanitarian missions in our wider region. The bolstering of the ADF’s amphibious capabilities and its ability to carry out large-scale humanitarian missions were easy to sell at the time with the Timor Leste and Solomon Islands assistance operations, and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami still fresh in the public’s mind.

Whether the resumption of Navy fixed-wing aviation operations – a capability lost with the decommissioning of the light carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1982 – was a factor in the selection of the Canberra class vessels is not known. But parallels can be drawn with the UK’s Invincible class ‘through deck cruisers’ of the 1970s and ’80s and, more recently, Japan’s new 20,000 tonne Hyuga and 27,000 tonne

The Prime Minister has a view about a capability that he thinks might be relevant to the ADF. GEN HURLEY

Izumo class ‘destroyers’. Despite being initially categorised as surface combatants, the Invincibles went on to embark Harriers and Sea Harriers for most of their service careers and proved their worth in the Falklands and other operations, while the Japanese vessels are clearly more than just helicopter capable.

But in lieu of the Force Posture Review (FPR) and 2014 Defence White Paper (DWP) being finalised, there are currently no guiding policy documents or stated strategic imperatives to pursue the option of acquiring F-35Bs, and so any reporting on the possibility can only be regarded as speculative.

What is the mission?

The first question Defence planners will need to ask themselves and those in the government driving the concept is, ‘What mission do we envisage an F-35B-equipped LHD will perform?’ Does the government want the LHDs to be able to project a real high-end fixed-wing capability into contested situations, or is the capability more likely to be used politically as a ‘flag waver’ designed to project influence over smaller powers in our region.

In the past, the deterrence ‘trident’ of RAN Oberon and Collins class submarines, Army SAS and commando regiments, and the RAAF’s F-111 strategic strike fleet quietly but surely underpinned many of Australia’s geopolitical policies in the region. Indeed, the submarines and special forces continue to do so today.

But despite offering longer reach and superior precision strike capabilities than those fielded on the F-111, the RAAF’s current andfuture fleet of tanker and AEW&C-supported Hornets, Super Hornets, Growlers and F-35As just doesn’t make the same political statement as the big swing-wing bomber once did.

At more than 27,000 tonnes and over 200m in length, the Canberra class LHDs are big ships – just one of them displaces more than the combined weight of HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible – the British carriers which were used so effectively in the 1982 Falklands campaign. So if used effectively, an Australian-flagged LHD embarking a mix of F-35Bs and amphibious or helicopter-borne special forces parked on the horizon near a potential failed state can wield significant geopolitical influence.

Amphibious mission trade-off

It is now incumbent on the government to decide and to properly define the priority for these very capable vessels. That is, if it decides to go down this path, how much of the Canberra class’s considerable amphibious capability is it prepared to trade-off in order to accommodate a fixed-wing capability.

While Australian-specific concepts of operation have not yet been formulated, shipbuilder Navantia’s brochure for Spain’s L61 King Juan Carlos I (JC1) – upon which NUSHIPs Canberra and Adelaide are based – gives us some guidance.

For a marine infantry force landing and sustained amphibious operation, the JC1 will typically embark 12 to 16 MRH 90-sized helicopters plus at least four dozen light and medium vehicles on the hangar deck and upper garage, and about 30 heavy and armoured vehicles, four LCM-1E landing craft, and a dozen smaller watercraft such as RHIBs on the dock and lower garage deck.

If configured for the transportation of forces to an area of operations to be offloaded at a dockside, the JC1 would typically embark up to 10 CH-47 heavylift helicopters and about 60 light and medium vehicles on the hanger deck and upper garage, and up to 50 heavy or armoured vehicles on the dock and lower garage deck. For humanitarian assistance missions, the JC1 can carry up to 140 shipping containers on the upper and lower garage decks, while retaining a helo capability of about eight to 12 MRH 90 medium, or six to eight CH-47 heavylift helicopters.

It is assumed operations utilising the three above configurations will likely be conducted either in relatively benign areas of operations, or in contested operations if organic or partner nation anti-air and anti-submarine coverage is available.

If configured for pure aircraft carrier operations, the JC1 is shown embarking 12 medium sized helicopters and 10 to 12 AV-8B Harrier IIs. Even though the F-35B weighs about twice that of an AV-8B, the JC1’s decks were designed and built with the possibility of Spain acquiring F-35Bs in the future. Space should also not be an issue, as both aircraft share a similar hangar and flightdeck footprint, although the F-35B’s embarked maintenance and support footprint is yet to be fully tested at sea.

With Spain’s decommissioning of the Principe de Asturias in 2013 due to budget cuts, the JC1 has had to assume at least part of the aircraft carrier role. The Spanish categorise the ship as a ‘Buque de Proyección Estratégica’ (Strategic Projection Vessel), and they currently operate a mix ofSea King, Tiger, and Chinook helicopters as well as the Harriers from it.

Naturally, the JC1 – and by inference the Canberra class – is able to mix and match elements of all of these capabilities where practical due to the vessels’ large size and inherent flexibility. But it goes without saying that some of each capability would be traded-off in order to accommodate another.

Where a mix of fixed-wing and amphibious capabilities may be required is if amphibious operations are to be conducted in an opposed landing against an adversary with air combat and close air support capabilities. While naval air power will never be a substitute for heavy and sustained land-based air power operations, its ability to dampen ‘spot fires’ or respond to rapidly evolving scenarios is unquestioned, especially when operating far away from home or ‘host nation’ bases.

Imagine a scenario where Australia is required to deploy 10 to 12 land-based air combat jets into an area of operations. Such a deployment would likely be dependent on sustained organic or coalition tanker support, as well as host nation basing and all the political sensitivities that go with that. Conversely, the deployment of an LHD with a dozen F-35Bs embarked – despite the STOVL version’s shortcomings compared to the RAAF’s more capable F-35A – requires no host nation basing and little or no tanker support, makes a similar political statement, and arguably provides greater operational flexibility.

Technical issues

Whereas the JC1 has been built to operate fixed-wing aircraft from day one, Canberra and Adelaide have both been ‘built for, not with’ some of the key ingredients necessary to conduct sustained fixed-wing operations. Some of the designed-in features of the JC1 and Canberra class vessels such as the bow ski-jump ramp, aircraft elevators and aircraft hangar have been designed to accommodate the F-35B from the outset. But the RAN’s LHDs have not been equipped with a heat-resistant deck coating required for sustained operations with F-35Bs and other types such as the V-22 Osprey which can ablate and corrode deck surfaces with their hot downward exhausts.

A spray-on treatment called Thermion which is comprised of ceramic and aluminium elements was designed by UK engineers about a decade ago to provide a wear-resistant surface which doubles as corrosion protection of the flightdeck as well as land-based landing pads, and was reportedly trialled successfully on the USS Wasp during F-35B sea trials. Defence insiders suggest Canberra is slated to conduct cross-deckingexercises with USMC V-22s quite early in its service life, after which time the suitability of the existing flightdeck to withstand exhaust temperatures will be assessed.

Indeed, during the June 2 Senate Estimates, Chief of Navy VADM Ray Griggs remarked: “There has been some work already done… during the 2008-09 force structure review white paper process, to understand what the implications would be. It largely revolves around ablative coating on the flightdeck because of the heat generated from the F-35B. ” The LHD’s deck lighting will also need to be upgraded to highlight the ski jump and runway for takeoffs, and to guide taxiing pilots to flightdeck parking positions. The vessels would also require the installation of a HIHAT island-mounted landing-aid lighting system which provides an indication of hover height and relative ship movement to a STOVL aircraft’s pilot in the side hover position.

Compared to helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft require greater fidelity of a vessel’s electronic landing aid systems, so the Canberra class LHDs would require the addition of a three-dimensional search radar, the installation of aircraft precision approach sensors such as the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS), and the integration of these sensors into the vessel’s combat system. JPALS is an all-weather system which uses real-time GPS differential corrections which are transmitted to an aircraft over secure comms and shows an ILS-style display.

To accommodate the additional sensors, it may also be necessary to

This would give the ADF a decade to fully learn how to operate these large vessels.

re-position other sensors in order to avoid electro-magnetic interference. But this is a relatively common modification made to ships as they receive new capabilities – for example the Anzac frigate ASMD upgrade currently underway – and the engineering is well understood.

Training & support

From the point of view of the ADF’s ‘raise, train, and sustain’ concept of supporting capabilities, the F-35A and B models share a high percentage of their structure design and materials and most of their key systems, and from all reports they have similar handling characteristics in conventional flight regimes. This means the maintenance, logistics and initial training requirements for the two sub-types would be broadly similar. But the F-35B will also require a specialist flight training system for STOVL and deck operations, land-based training facilities such as a ski-jump and dedicated simulator, and specialist maintenance training, logistics and other support facilities to sustain ship-borne operations.

The ability to support the F-35B at sea is still an element of the capability that hasn’t been tested fully, but it is unlikely maintenance and support functions can be carried out within those spaces currently allocated for far less complex helicopters. Similarly, space for crew briefing rooms, and secure spaces for data and information assurance, and for low-observable coatings maintenance would need to be found.

Fuel and weapons storage

There has been some speculation that the Canberra class has a lack of aviation jet fuel and weapons storage compared to its Spanish JC1 parent design. The F-35B has about four times the fuel capacity of an MRH 90 and needs to be refuelled just as often during sustained air operations, so the LHD is going to require underway replenishment far more often, or additional fuel and other aircraft fluids storage will need to be found.

The RAN’s problems with underway replenishment are currently being partially addressed by the government’s recent announcement that designs from Navantia and Korea’s Daewoo have been shortlisted to replace the ageing HMAS Success and the interim HMAS Sirius by the early 2020s. Both designs are far more capable than the ships they will replace, although with only two vessels – one based on each coast – it will be difficult to cover all bases in an area of operations, especially a thirsty LHD with a fixed-wing component aboard.

With the JC1 as an operational template, modifications to the LHDs may be costly but would likely not be difficult, and could be performed to coincide with the vessels’ first major refits in the mid to late 2020s. This would give the ADF a decade to fully learn how to operate these large vessels and to develop some concepts of operations through cross-decking opportunities before fully committing to its own fixed-wing element, and would be timed neatly for the planned AIR 6000 Phase 2C aircraft acquisition.

In the meantime, Defence will be busy developing the concept to better inform the force posture and white paper processes. “We are starting at what are the requirements, that is, how do we adapt the ship and what does a ship that launches vertical takeoff aircraft look like,” GEN Hurley told Senate Estimates. “There are two parts to the Prime Minister’s request: One is to drive it back to see how would this fit into the force structure of the future, how would it meet the needs of the future and so forth, and then we would do the prioritisation, stack it up against other needs … into the future. ”