“You’ll remember the quality…”

At the same time, a balance must be reached. Here, the experiences of the Japanese, British and German air services during World War 2 are instructive.

Pilot training in the Japanese Naval Air Force and the Japanese Army Air Force was dominated by deeply conservative cultural forces derived largely from the Samurai ethos. Consequently, although Japan’s ruling elite accepted the need for technological modernisation, they were largely incapable of understanding the need for social and intellectual modernisation. In general they refused to challenge authority and traditional practices, instead celebrating such alleged virtues as unquestioning obedience to orders and an unyielding belief in narrow elitism as opposed to broad professionalism. Pilot training was characterised by the pursuit of ‘the invincibility of a refined technique’.

At the start of the war Japanese pilots arrived at operational units with about 800 hours’ flight experience compared to 200 for their Western counterparts. Early combat seemed to validate Japan’s elitist approach as their highly-skilled pilots swept their opponents aside. However, simple arithmetic made it obvious that for a given amount of resources, the JNAF and JAAF would be able to train far fewer pilots than their enemies (albeit to a higher standard). And when the number of those elite pilots began to decrease, as it inexorably did once the war settled into a grim battle of attrition, the system could not produce replacements fast enough.

The ultimate cost of this approach came on August 6, 1945. When the United States Army Air Forces B-29 Enola Gay dropped its atomic bomb over Hiroshima, not a single Japanese fighter rose in defense of the homeland.

The contrast with the training philosophy of British Commonwealth air forces could not have been more pronounced. At the beginning of World War 2 the United Kingdom and the Dominions (including Australia) introduced a vast aircrew system, spread over several continents, known as the Empire Air Training Scheme. Central to EATS was the philosophy of establishing a production line that would ensure a predictable supply of very large numbers of very good (as opposed to elite) pilots. This approach proved critical to the ability to sustain combat pressure and made a significant contribution to the allies’ eventual victory.

While the German experience was different again, the issue of striking the proper balance between quality and numbers was central. In this case, the availability of flying instructors became the critical factor.

At the start of the war the Luftwaffe’s approach was similar to the Commonwealth’s. A comprehensive, quality-controlled training system ensured a reliable supply of large numbers of very capable pilots to operational squadrons. Until about the beginning of 1944, the Luftwaffe was a very good air force. However, as things began to unravel for the Nazis, the training system was ruined by short-term decision making.

By mid-1944 the allied bombing campaign was seriously damaging the German war economy. In a panicky attempt to reverse the fortunes of the war in the air, Luftwaffe commanders transferred experienced flying instructors from the training schools to the frontline. This may have had short-term benefits, but in the long-term it was self-defeating. A training system that cannot regenerate itself is doomed to failure, which is precisely what happened. A cycle was established in which irreplaceable experienced instructors were killed in operations, as a consequence the quality of the flying schools plummeted. The Luftwaffe entered a downwards spiral from which it could not recover. By early 1945, the allies enjoyed near-supremacy in the skies over Europe.

These were of course dramatic events in an epic struggle, a setting that can in no way be applied to the comparatively mundane implementation of Project AIR 5428. Nevertheless, the allegory is valid.

The outcome of AIR 5428 will shape the RAAF’s single most important training responsibility for the next two decades. In truth, the decision will be more important to the future of Australian air power than such high profile equipment programs as the F-35 and the Growler.