Joining the club?

First cab off the rank was the Chengdu J-20 which was revealed in early 2011. At least two J-20s – seemingly close to an F-111 in dimensions – have been conduct-ing flight tests from Chengdu’s flight test centre. Indeed, after a prolonged grounding of one of the two prototypes, this aircraft re-emerged in late October with what ap-pears to be a re-profiled nose designed to carry an advanced AESA-style radar.

In the main, analysts seem to share the opinion that the J-20 is a large tactical strike aircraft, with a design featuring large internal weapons bays and apparently opti-mised for the <1,000km radius maritime or land strike mission. On face value, the J-20 features shaping commonly associated with fifth generation designs, with an F-22-like forward fuselage with radar-dissipating chines, a flat underside and other discrete features such as flush ‘saw-tooth’ panel edges. But, like Russia’s Sukhoi PAK-FA (T-50), the J-20’s canard fore-planes and conventional engine nozzles will likely detract from any goals of being classed as very low observable (VLO) like the F-22, B-2 and F-35.

Where the analysts diverge in their opinions on the J-20 is how far down the development curve the aircraft may be. Yet to be revealed – at least in the public domain – is any detail of the J-20’s surface-fit and finish, or whether it even has radar absorbent material (RAM) coatings. It is not yet clear whether the two J-20s flying are actual ‘YF’-style prototypes, or merely ‘X-plane’ concept demonstrators.

Seemingly in line with US efforts to build complementary ‘hi-lo’ fifth generation air combat capabilities, China has more recently revealed a smaller aircraft which appears aimed more towards the air-superi-ority mission. What we now probably know as the Shenyang J-31 apparently first broke cover in June when a partially disassembled but otherwise thinly disguised F-35-like aircraft shape was moved by road across China on the back of a truck in broad daylight, and was – fortuitously or other-wise – spotted and openly photographed by Chinese ‘spotters’ who just happened to be at the same rest stop as the truck and its mysterious cargo.

Many observers initially dismissed this apparently carelessly disguised shape as an attempt at disinformation, while others thought it may be a full-scale mockup or an ‘iron-bird’ model designed for ground handling or electro-magnetic testing. Some of the less-reserved analysts even suggested the aircraft may be a prototype being shipped to Shenyang’s development centre in Xi’an. Either way, the release of the images was very neatly timed to coincide with political unease among some JSF partner nations over that aircraft’s projected acquisition and sustainment costs, as well as ongoing F-35 development issues which some claim are taking too long to resolve and continue to add to the program’s cost.

But barely three months later in Septem-ber, new and remarkably clear images of a new fighter parked on the ramp at Xi’an appeared showing an aircraft that looked remarkably similar to a twin-engined F-35C. The aircraft – initially dubbed J-21 but soon amended to J-31 in line with its nose serial number prefix ‘31’ – strongly resembles the model of an ‘F-60’ displayed at China Aviation Museum in September 2011. China designates its aircraft with a ‘J’ prefix for domestic fighters, and as ’F’ for export versions. Interestingly, like the reveal of the larger J-20 18 months before to co-incide with previous US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ visit to China, so too photos of the J-31 appeared just a few days before current Secretary Leon Panetta was due to visit the Middle Kingdom.

Finally, claims that the J-31 was more than just a ruse were vindicated in early November when video and photos ap-peared online of the aircraft initially performing high speed taxi runs, and then a 10-minute test flight in company with a pair of J-11s.

Apart from having two engines – thought to be Russian Klimov RD-93s based on the engines used by the Sino/ Pakistani J-17/FC-1 – the J-31’s physi-cal similarities to the F-35 and F-22 are uncanny. The diverterless (DSI) engine intakes, high set wing and horizontal stabilisers look like they were lifted straight from the F-35, while the vertical stabilisers, upward sloping forward fuselage underside and canopy profile are more reminiscent of the F-22. Differences to the US fifth gen fighters include the more conventional fourth-generation style engine nozzles, and what appears to be a large single centre-line internal weapons bay. The wingspan appears similar to that of the US Navy’s F-35C version, albeit with a greater leading edge sweep.

What remains unclear is whether the J-31’s wings have folding mechanisms – the aircraft on the truck in June had a much shorter wingspan – and why the aircraft features a twin nose wheel and a tail hook. These cues lead some to surmise that the J-31, or a follow-on version of it, may be destined for operations from China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which was commissioned in September after nearly two decades of being laid up and quietly upgraded. The Liaoning was previously the incomplete Ukrainian car-rier Varyag, sister ship to Russia’s Admiral Kusnetsov, which was acquired by China in the 1990s ostensibly for use as a floating hotel/casino! It likely will be a long road for China from the initial emergence of these aircraft to being able to field them in operationally significant numbers. One only has to look at the prolonged gestation periods of the F-22 and F-35 to realise that, if a nation with the technical and intellectual re-sources of the US needs 15 or more years to achieve an operational fifth generation capability, China is unlikely to be able to emulate such a feat anytime this decade. But that said, China is unencumbered by political sensitivities and graft, and has virtually unlimited human resources and millions of engineering graduates annually to draw its expertise from.

China also has a formidable cyber capability and whether institutionalised or otherwise, some experts believe Chinese hackers may have accessed the computer files of the US defence industry to the extent where enough knowledge has been gleaned to expedite the development of a fifth generation Chinese air combat capability.

Operationally Significant?

But the ability to design, build and fly small numbers of essentially hand-built development aircraft with low observable shaping is a much different proposition to being able to mass-produce such aircraft with the quality, consistency, fine toler-ances and maintainability to be operation-ally relevant.

Similarly, ‘fifth generation’ – regardless of the marketing origins of this term – is so much more than just shaping. It’s also engine technology, software, weapons, communications and the ability to be interoperable with other assets such as conventional fighters, AEW&C, EW platforms, surface vessels, and even troops on the ground.

One area where China is thought to currently fall short of the West is in en-gine technology. With the NAPO Saturn AL-31 engine from the Su-27 believed to be powering the J-20 prototypes, along with the J-31’s Klimov RD-93s, there appears to be a high reliance by China on engines of Russian origin. And with Russian engines reported to have far lower rates of reliability or ‘time on wing’ com-pared to their western equivalents, China appears to have some way to go to match Western fourth and fifth generation rivals in this regard.

Other key fifth generation technologies where China reportedly comes up short against Western advances is in radar and communications. While some observers point out that what these systems lack in processing power and reliability they can make up for in aperture size and transmit-ting power, outright power isn’t always an advantage when trying to operate in non-permissive environments when your foe has more reliable and ‘subtle’ low-probably-of-intercept (LPI) systems.

But China’s ability to develop multiple advanced combat aircraft concurrently should not be underestimated. Besides the J-20 and J-31, also in the development pipeline are various enhancements of the older but still highly capable Su-27/Su-30 family. From the original Su-27SK which was bought from Russia in the 1990s, Shenyang has also built the J-11 from knock-down kits supplied by Sukhoi. The locally assembled J-11 in turn led to the J-11B which was designed to incorporate a much higher degree of locally sourced materials, and the two-seat J-11BS trainer.

Meanwhile, China acquired a number of Sukhoi Su-30MKKs in the early 2000s, before supplies of these aircraft from Russia were halted due to the appearance of the unlicensed J-11B clone. But China was already developing its own version of the Su-30, the J-16 which is based on the J-11BS airframe and is a medium range strike aircraft in the F-15E class, and which is believed to be in low-rate production.

Aspirations Afloat

Also being developed are single and two-seat versions of a carrier-borne fighter, the J-15 ‘Flying Shark’. The J-15 is a locally developed version of the Sukhoi Su-33, an example of which China is believed to have acquired from the Ukraine in the early 2000s, and is reported to have an AESA radar, an advanced EW system and a high percentage of composite construction. Most recently J-15s have been involved in touch-and-go trials aboard the Liaoning, although it is unclear whether a full-stop arrested landing has been performed yet.

China’s quest to be become a ‘blue-wa-ter’ naval power is an interesting strategic development, with the Liaoning’s recent commissioning seen by many as a prelude to more carriers to bolster its political and economic aspirations in regions such as Taiwan, the South China Sea and other disputed island groups, and to enable it to project air power further afield. More significantly over the longer term, the Liaoning will likely be the first element of a long – and likely painful – learning curve for a country wanting to join the non- STOVL (short takeoff/vertical landing – ie Harrier, F-35B) carrier aviation club, currently the domain of just a handful of nations such as the US (10 vessels), France (1), Russia (1) and Brazil (1). Indeed, reports in 2010 suggested three large car-riers of about 60,000 tonnes were under construction for launch later this decade.

While the Liaoning on its own will pro-vide little strategic capability – especially without integration with other traditional elements of a modern carrier taskforce such as cruisers, air defence destroyers, submarines and replenishment vessels – it is still a major flag-waving asset in the sense that it has the ability to intimidate potential lesser-powered foes by just being in a region of potential conflict.

Meanwhile, it will be interesting to see what impact the appearance of the J-20 and J-31 will have on Western defence plan-ning. While it appears to have hardened the resolve of some to proceed full steam ahead with the F-35, others appear to be waver-ing and instead advocate measures such as re-starting F-22 production while looking to bring forward the next generation of combat aircraft.