Unmanned Uncertainty

The RAAF has accumulated substantial expertise in two years of Heron operations. Aircrew have rapidly developed technical and operational proficiencies in operating the platform and sensors while intelligence personnel have built expertise in the near-real time exploitation of information flowing from the aircraft.

Yet these teams have been cobbled together from across the ADF due to the capability’s temporary nature. Many have gained some experience in Heron operations but personnel with deep technical and operational understanding of RPA operations must be very thin on the ground — and even this reservoir of expertise will evaporate swiftly if RPA operations cease with our withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The question of the RAAF’s unmanned future is particularly concerning, as the RAAF has a chequered history in embracing new aircraft types. The rushed acquisition and deployment of Iroquois helicopters and Caribou tactical transports to Vietnam are prime examples.

This historical reminder is timely, as the overwhelming focus of contemporary government and public attention is on the future of the RAAF air combat fleet. The RPAs have proven their worth in multiple theatres and operational scenarios over the past 15 years yet still struggle for oxygen in Australia’s public defence debate.

The Defence Department has had projects to acquire large RPAs on its books for some time but repeated delays now see 2022-23 as the earliest proposed in-service date. The most recent delay, in 2009, was made to avoid a scheduling clash with the introduction of the P-8A Poseidon.

The current RPA project – Air 7000 Phase 1B – is focused on maritime surveillance and essentially seen as an adjunct to the manned P-8A in replacing the AP-3C fleet. This mirrors the US Navy’s P-3 replacement strategy of acquiring the P-8A and the MQ-4C RPA, based on the Global Hawk airframe.
The most recent White Paper specifically said Australia would acquire up to seven high-altitude, long-endurance RPAs for maritime surveillance, effectively limiting the choice to the MQ-4C.

It will be highly effective in the ocean-spanning surveillance roles for which it’s optimised but there are three key reasons why the White Paper’s overly prescriptive focus on the platform is unhelpful:

Firstly: operations over the past decade have demonstrated the ADF needs an overland ISR capability for which a maritime-optimised, high-altitude RPA is not well suited.

Secondly: Australia will have limited influence over the US Navy-controlled MQ-4C program to address its specific maritime surveillance roles.

Thirdly: the MQ-4C’s probable cost will limit the airframes that can be acquired.

The RAAF’s role in border security operations — a major commitment for the current AP-3C fleet — and the cluttered archipelagic waters in the near region demand mission requirements that a high-altitude RPA will struggle to meet. The US Navy will redress these shortfalls with over 100 P-8s but on present indications the RAAF will have only eight of the manned platforms.

Further, the MQ-4C is not yet in service and the overland Global Hawk operated by the USAF has performed well below expectations, driving the USAF to prematurely retire its entire fleet of Block 30 Global Hawks. In the Block 30’s place will be the venerable U-2 spy plane, which continues to be more effective and economical even as it approaches its 60th birthday.

No RPA in service or under development can effectively perform overland and overwater missions during a single sortie. But a family of RPAs can deliver capability in both environments without breaking the bank.

The family based on the medium-altitude Predator B airframe — the maritime Guardian and the overland Reaper — is one example potentially effective and economical for Australian service. The US Department of Homeland Security already operates overland and overwater variants of the Predator B in their respective roles.

Certainly, a smaller RPA will not deliver MQ-4C levels of maritime surveillance but a less expensive RPA may allow acquisition of extra P-8 airframes, resulting a more robust and flexible maritime capability overall. The Predator B option also is attractive as a near-term Heron replacement —the USAF and RAF have well-established Reaper operations in Afghanistan that Australia could plug into.

The Williams Foundation believes Heron should be used as a springboard to a robust unmanned capability and that Defence needs to take a fresh look at the schedule and requirements of its RPA program.

A high-altitude RPA will not meet Australia’s overland ISR requirements, will not be ideal for Australia’s specific maritime surveillance needs and will be too expensive to take a family of systems approach.

Contrast this with a family of systems based on a medium-altitude RPA — a more economical, versatile way of addressing Australia’s unique needs and of sustaining the hard-won RPA expertise gained in the skies over Afghanistan.