Growler inbound?

No doubt the next hurdle in any Australian Growler decision is where the reported $300 million required to upgrade at least six of the RAAF’s F/A-18F+s will come from. Will there be a 2011/12 underspend big enough to accommodate it? If not, will supplementary funding be available in a year where the government is determined to return to surplus? Or, will the ADF be asked to sacrifice something else in the DCP in order to accommodate the Growler?

Late March’s announcement of the purchase of a sixth C-17 for the RAAF and the second hand MV Skandi Bergen Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) vessel to the tune of about $450 million left many wondering whether there would be any underspend money left for the Growler. But in response to a March 31 article in The Canberra Times, Defence noted “The decision to acquire these capabilities was not related to any budget ‘underspend’.”

Indeed, Defence insiders have noted that, as the Growler submission was driven in part from Parliament House rather than solely from Air Force Headquarters or Capability Development Group – barring any last minute budget crises – it is very likely to get up.

The force multiplier effect a small fleet of Growlers could have on the ADF cannot be understated. Apart from the electronic jamming and suppression of enemy air defence missions commonly associated with an AEA platform, the capability can also be used to dramatically increase the electronic situational awareness for an attacking or defensive air combat, surface vessel, or amphibious force. It also has applications in supporting land forces by providing an electronic shield to convoys or dismounted troops to prevent the detonation of roadside bombs or the use of mobile phone-based warning networks, or can provide electronic support to high value assets such as AEW&C and tankers.

AEA platforms can also be used in a battle of wills against a belligerent adversary by subtly degrading communications and utility networks without them knowing, perhaps allowing for the insertion and extraction of special forces or small amphibious parties.

Despite being keen to sell the Growler to Australia, ironically for Boeing and the US Navy, any such sale may actually prove to be the final death knell for any possible sale of more Super Hornets to the RAAF. With the force multiplier effect the Growler will bring it will further bolster the combat capability of the RAAF’s ageing F/A-18A/B classic Hornet and relatively small F/A-18F Super Hornet fleets sufficiently to see them through to the introduction of the delayed F-35.

The effect a fast jet-based AEA capability can have on a relatively small combat force such as Australia’s should allay any concerns Defence Minister Stephen Smith has about any more capability gaps opening up later this decade as the classic Hornet force starts to wind down.

But developing and supporting a small capability of very specialist air combat platforms won’t be accomplished overnight and will be a challenge to maintain, so it is likely any RAAF Growler operation will likely be run as a ‘Whidbey Island West’ operation – in reference to the US Navy’s EA-18G base near Seattle, with considerable reach-back into the US Navy, Boeing and other industry suppliers for the small fleet. Additionally, many of the initial cadre of RAAF Super Hornet pilots and ACOs have forged and m

aintained strong relationships with the US Navy Growler community as they were either being trained, or in some cases, were trainers at the same time at NAS Lemoore in California.