A380 beginnings

The concept was a three-decker with economy passengers on the top deck, business class on the main deck and first class on the lower deck, which would be equipped with beds and suites.

In November that year, Airbus Industrie surveyed 12 major airlines to gauge reaction to another super jumbo concept, this time from Airbus partner Aerospatiale.

The ASX-700 design would seat 600 passengers in a three-class layout. At the time, Jean-Jacques Huber, manager future studies at Aerospatiale’s Aircraft Division, said at a media briefing that “with a huge customer base for the 747, the only way we can compete is to offer a transport with significantly more capacity. ” Airbus’s then VP marketing, David Jennings, said the survey of the airlines found there “certainly will be a requirement for an aircraft substantially bigger than the Boeing 747-400. ” He said that “airlines were generally very clear about the characteristics of the aeroplane. ” At the time, Deutsche Airbus (renamed from Deutsche Aerospace) EVP, Uwe Ganzer, told media that, while there was a shopping list of new technology for the super-jet, it would not include an all carbon fibre wing or fuselage.

He explained that he would prefer “that such technologies be used first on smaller aircraft to reduce risks relating to cost and complexity. ” The ASX700 was to have a wider cabin (6. 76m) than the 747 (6. 10ms) on the main deck and, being a circular design, had an upper deck similar in cross section to a 767 with 2-3-2 seating.

Around the same time, Boeing held a symposium in Hawaii to reveal its 747-X program, and early in 1992 announced that it had formed a customer advisory group to garner more input for what it believed should be a 650-seater.

Boeing’s VP and GM of its Everett Division, Jim Johnson, told your writer in December 1991 that “there was a lot of customer interest in a large airplane” and that airlines wanted Boeing to “do it sooner than later. ” Boeing had a number of concepts to offer. There were two derivatives but range was a major problem, being only between 70 and 80 per cent of the 747- 400’s – hardly suitable for key airlines such as Singapore Airlines, Qantas and Cathay Pacific. Boeing was missing the mark! Boeing also had the all-new ASX700 that interested airlines. The proposed aircraft bears a remarkable resemblance to the A380. It was to be a circular fuselage seating 612, with 500 tonne gross weight, and a range similar to the 747-400’s.

Key Asian airlines said at the time that “they wanted range” and that the new aircraft was the only one of interest. In 1992 Airbus launched a competition between its partners – Deutsche Airbus, British Aerospace and Aerospatiale – to design what it termed an Ultra High Capacity Aircraft (UHCA).

Airbus itself also started an in-house study, with Airbus’ director of planning noting that “80 per cent of the seat miles produced by the worldwide fleet of 747s were devoted to long-range, high density routes”, with 50 city pairs justifying a 600-seater.

At the same time, MDC entered the fray with its double-deck MD-12 which was to evolve from a partnership with Asia led by Taiwan.

Early in 1993 the first reports of possible collaboration between Airbus and Boeing on the super jumbo emerged. Although collaboration was the aim, Boeing’s initial contact was with Airbus partners Deutsche Airbus (DASA) and British Aerospace.

Analysts all agreed that the market could not support two designs and the development price tag seemed to be beyond one single manufacturer. Boeing’s view at the time was that it could not deal with Airbus as it was a marketing entity and that it did not control “physical or financial assets. ” However, the reality may have been that Boeing wanted to drive a wedge between the French and German Airbus partners.

Airbus managing director, Jean Pierson, was having none of that and dismissed speculation that the “Airbus system” had failed, saying that any of the consortium’s partners was dealing with Boeing on behalf of Airbus.

Larry Clarkson, Boeing’s then corporate VP of planning and international development, told media that Boeing wanted to strike a deal with DASA and British Aerospace. “They have both told us they are free to do whatever they want to do beyond their Airbus commitments – from the A319 to the A340. ” However, what eventuated was the same dilemma that MDC had faced in 1988 with the AM-300. How would Boeing do a deal with Airbus partners on one aircraft while competing on all other models? Boeing also sounded out MDC as well as its traditional Japanese partners.

Nonetheless, Boeing and the Airbus partners signed a collaborative agreement to examine a 1000-passenger Very Large Commercial Transport (VLCT) in early 1993, while Airbus itself pursued its own more modest UHCA studies that focused on ovoid, circular, clover-leaf and horizontal double bubble cross-sections.

By late 1993 Airbus had “settled on” a horizontal double bubble twin tail A3XX concept that would seat 600. Airbus SVP engineering and flight, Bernard Ziegler, told media that the A3XX would not conflict with the VLCT work, but Airbus, after years of on-again-off-again talks with MDC, was leery of any US collaborative efforts.

Leading the charge for a higher capacity aircraft was British Airways (BA) and that airline’s fleet manager – corporate strategy told media that “by the year 2000, the 747 will be too small on routes where frequency increases were not possible. ” In fact, well before 2000, airlines such as BA, Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific were operating 747s between London and Asia just 30 minutes apart.

Within six months, after consultation with its industrial shareholders, Airbus announced what would become the A380.

It claimed that it could not wait till the outcome of the VLCT study which was due in 1995. In reality, it knew that any arrangement with Boeing would be fraught with difficulties, not the least of which was Boeing’s tenuous willingness to proceed at all.

Airbus’s Brown put the situation into perspective when he said that “Boeing was conducting its own stretch 747 studies while participating in the VLCT evaluation. ” At the time, Airbus envisaged a service entry date of 2003.

The 1000 passenger VLCT was proving to be “a monster” and not just in size.

Where the 747 requires just 1 megawatt of power to operate all its flight controls it emerged that the VLCT would need 12.

If that was not enough of a challenge, just the fuel load of the VLCT would top the takeoff weight of the 747. Studies looked at JATO rockets to assist the takeoff or even inflight refuelling to mitigate the fuel weight problem.

Added to that, BA, the main driver for the giant jet at the time, had an extraordinary wish list that included: No noise/vibration in the cockpit or cabin; baggage and cargo offload better than the 747; no major maintenance for 10 years; maximum refuel time of 30 minutes; and, no corrosion inspection for life. BA predicted that by 2010 there would be a need for 350 1000-passenger jets.

By mid 1995 the VLCT was suspended after the partners decided that there was insufficient market interest in such an aircraft.

Initially, the partners had envisaged a market for 1000 VLCTs by 2020, but members became concerned over growing market fragmentation, some saying that the market estimate may be “substantially over optimistic. ” Boeing nonetheless was looking at various stretched 747s under what it termed a New Large Aircraft (NLA) program. Boeing was now talking to airlines about a far more ambitious 747 upgrade with a new wing. The 747-500X would have a modest 8. 5m stretch with seating up to 487 in a tri-class configuration and a range of 8150nm. The 747-600X would have a 14. 3m stretch with seating for 546 in three classes with a 7200nm range. Both models would incorporate many systems from the 777.

But the more ambitious design came at a cost which was now estimated at between US$5 and $7 billion for development, versus Airbus’s 1996 claim that it could build the A3XX for $8 billion.

Plus there were also problems in another direction with reduced commonality with the 747-400 as more 777-styled architecture was included at the request of some airlines.

However, orders for more 747-400s from BA and United Airlines in 1996 carried options to swap to the new models, and the then high-flying Malaysia Airlines said it wanted to swap six 747-400 orders for 747-600Xs.

At the 1996 Farnborough Airshow, Boeing revealed the 747-700X which was a -600X with a wider fuselage to accommodate up to 650 passengers.

This was seen by most analysts at the show as Boeing’s spoiler to Airbus’s increased activity on the A3XX. Boeing’s pitch to airlines was “buy the 747- 500X/600X and then upgrade to the 747-700X in 2007. ” At first, it seemed as if the airlines were buying when Boeing announced that another Asian carrier, Thai International, wanted 12 747-600Xs. The momentum appeared to be with Boeing.

At the same time Boeing’s then president of the Commercial Airplane Group, Ron Woodard, told this writer at the airshow that the “Airbus A3XX was financial suicide. ” He also questioned how, if it was going to cost Boeing US$5 billion to develop the 747-500X/600X, could Airbus build the A3XX for just US$8 billion. Woodard claimed that the cost of the A3XX would be closer to between US$12 and $15 billion.

While Airbus was talking to Lockheed about possible involvement in the A380, Boeing moved swiftly to block any Airbus/ MDC tie-up in early December 1996 when it reached agreement with MDC for collaboration on the 747-500X/600X after MDC scrapped its MD-12 plans. Weeks later, a full merger was announced between the two aerospace giants.

But then Boeing froze and cancelled the program in mid-January 1997, citing spiralling costs and a weak business case.

Some insiders at Boeing claim that Boeing’s then CEO, Phil Condit, drew back from committing Boeing to the new designs, despite solid interest. But Boeing had badly misjudged Airbus’s fierce determination to launch the A3XX. According to BusinessWeek in 2004, in late 1996 Condit told Boeing’s top European salesman, Rudy Hillinga, that “Airbus would never launch the A380. ” BusinessWeek claimed that, according to Hillinga, Condit said: “I’ll give you my personal guarantee that this time around, Airbus will not succeed. ” Thus work on a response to the A380 faded off Boeing’s radar and the aerospace giant became consumed with the MDC

Boeing’s then president of the Commercial Airplane Group Ron Woodard said that the “Airbus A3XX was financial suicide.

”merger and production problems. At the same time, the Asian currency crisis struck, devastating key airlines in the region which shelved any plans for orders for the A3XX or derivatives of the 747.

Airbus also reassessed its launch goals in the wake of the Asian economic problems, stating that it hoped to get the A3XX off the computer screen by late 1999 with commitments from three airlines for 60 aircraft. However, a few months into 1999, Airbus decided to let that date slip by a year to give key launch airlines in Asia time to recover from the effects of the currency crisis.

At the 1999 Paris Airshow, Boeing unveiled its 747X development for 2006 delivery to counter the A3XX. The program evolved over the next 12 months into a three model offering.

Base aircraft was the 413 tonne 747- 400X with a range of 7690nm. The 430- seat 747X was a modest 3m stretch and the 504-seat 747X Stretch was 10m longer than the 747-400. Both models had a new wing that enabled ranges of 8975nm and 7800nm respectively.

The numbers looked good, but some at Boeing claimed that Condit pulled back yet again from launching a new aircraft. It is known that Cathay Pacific was extremely interested.

There were no cold feet over in Toulouse.

Airbus had picked its mark with Emirates, which had big plans for global domination but no passenger 747s. Emirates indicated it would buy A3XXs after the Airbus Supervisory Board authorised the sales team, headed by the tenacious John Leahy, to seek firm expressions of interest in early 2000.

In May 2000, Emirates announced that it would order five A3XXs and take five options.

At the 2000 Farnborough Airshow, Emirates signed up for, and paid deposits on, seven A3XXs including two freighters, Air France signed a Letter of Intent for 10 A3XXs plus 15 options and IFLC placed an order for five.

In late September, the floodgates opened when Singapore Airlines ordered 10 A3XXs and optioned 15. Qantas followed on November 29, when it broke decades of tradition of ordering only Boeing jets and ordered 12 A3XXs and 13 A330s.

With the Qantas order, Airbus launched the A3XX as the A380 on December 19 2000 with a total of 50 orders and 42 options from six customers – Virgin Atlantic ordering six firm and six options in early December.

Now all that remained was to build, certify and deliver the beast!