Aircraft of the ADF — N9 Bell Iroquois

The UH-1C differed from the earlier Bravo by having a modified rotor and increased fuel capacity. The UH-1C was powered, like late model Bravos, by the 1100shp (820kW) Lycoming T53-L-11 turboshaft engine. Although slightly longer than the UH-1B, there were no other external differences. Some 767 Charlie models were produced, with deliveries commencing in September 1965.

The naval Iroquois were all flown by 723 Squadron from HMAS Albatross in the training, utility, search and rescue (SAR) and communications roles. Training of RAN helo pilots was conducted by 9 Squadron RAAF, and after that unit’s departure for Vietnam in 1966, the training task passed to 5 Squadron.

The RAN’s commitment to support US helicopter operations in Vietnam was further evidence that the Iroquois procurement had been the right choice. Following training with 5 Squadron RAAF at Fairbairn and then 723 Squadron at Albatross, from 1967 Navy crews flew with the RAN helicopter Flight in Vietnam. The first RAN personnel left Sydney that October, with the Australian contingent comprising 46 men – eight pilots, four observers, four aircrewmen, six support staff and 24 technical groundcrew.

The RAN Helicopter Flight was integrated with the 135th Assault Helicopter Company, initially based near the Australian Task Force area at Vung Tau. The unit, which was equipped with later model US Army UH-1H ‘slicks’ as well as UH-1C gunships, subsequently moved to Camp Blackhorse, and then Camp Bearcat, all in Bien Hoa Province.

The unit became known as EMU – the Experimental Military Unit – and flew the Hueys on combat assaults, resupply missions, medevacs and long range reconnaissance patrols. The last RAN contingent was withdrawn late in 1971. All told, four RAN contingents served with the US Army, flying under hazardous combat conditions. Five Australian naval aviators were killed in combat. The full story of this operation is told in our book Target Charlie.

In addition, RAN pilots also flew in Vietnam with No 9 Squadron RAAF. These pilots, like those of the RNZAF, were on secondment flying RAAF Hueys in support of the Australian Task Force at Nui Dat.

After supporting the Vietnam commitment, 723 Squadron’s prime role again became that of a second-line utility helicopter unit. The Iroquois was supplemented by its Bell stablemate, the 206B Kiowa, in HT-723 service from 1974, with both types fulfilling a training role until the Huey’s eventual withdrawal from service in 1987.

The remaining four machines were paid off after a final flypast over Canberra on September 2, 1987. Due to helicopter shortages, the Hueys were returned to operation with HT-723 in early 1988, with three remaining in service until withdrawn once more on May 31, 1989. In 1990, N9-882 was despatched to HMAS Nirimba as a training aid, N9-3102 was allotted to the Australian Naval Aviation Museum (ANAM), and both N9-3101 and N9-3104 were offered for disposal through Aussales. This disposal did not eventuate, and the machines were retained initially as instructional airframes.

But that was not quite the end of the RAN’s association with the Iroquois. Having operated the UH-1B and UH-1C, the UH-1H almost entered RAN service.

With both the Iroquois and Wessex withdrawn from the utility role, the RAN found itself short of a helicopter with a useful lift capability. The transfer of the battlefield helicopter role from the RAAF to the army in 1989 (which involved the surviving 25 RAAF Iroquois in addition to the new Black Hawk) prompted the RAN to act. In 1990 attempts were made to obtain up to eight of these UH-1Hs for service at Albatross. This attempt was fruitless, and today the Sea King provides the heavier lift capability for the RAN.

In 1994, N9-3102 was disposed of by the ANAM and was subsequently mounted on display on a pole at Heathcote, on the outskirts of Sydney. ANAM has retained N9-882 on static display, while N9-3104 flies with the RAN Historic Flight as VH-NVV. N9-3101 remains in storage at Albatross.

The Iroquois is unusual in that not only has it provided such long service to the Australian military, it is one of the few aircraft to have been operated by all three branches of the ADF.

The Huey That Returned From the Dead …

The following story is a description by former naval pilot Jack Mayfield of his crash in Iroquois N9-3104 ‘898’ at Nowra on 29 March 1971.

This story is the classic case of the two staff pilots going flying with the aim of practising emergency procedures and, due to a combination of errors and incorrect assumptions by both pilots, a real emergency eventuates as John recounts.

“Before joining 723 Squadron, I had been a Wessex pilot on 725 and 817 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Squadrons. After several years of flying around in the dark at 125ft and 90kt (165km/h) chasing the elusive submarine (sometimes disguised as an oil pipeline!) and being only one of two Wessex pilots on the squadron who had not had an engine failure in the Wessex (some lucky fellows had had two engine failures!), I was very keen to transfer to the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) training unit at 723 Squadron.

“While being relatively experienced as a Wessex pilot, I had not flown the ‘Huey’ before so, like a few other pilots, I needed to undergo a conversion onto the helicopter. On completion of our course we were to join a small group of aircrew and maintainers that would replace the current personnel on RANHFV who were shortly due to return from Vietnam. After years of flying the Wessex over water, flying the Iroquois amid trees and other obstacles was a new and challenging experience.

“On March 29 1971, I walked out to aircraft 898 with my instructor, who was the aircraft captain for the flight and we were to practise emergency procedures. At that stage I had about 15 hours Iroquois experience and my instructor had about 35 hours. After briefing and preflighting the aircraft we strapped in and the first part of the flight proceeded uneventfully as we climbed to about 1000ft to the south of Albatross beyond the area of the Bomb Dump.

“It was a very pleasant day and everything seemed to be going well when my instructor said “Practice engine failure” and immediately lowered the collective lever and wound off the throttle. Practice engine failures are not usually a problem for a helicopter pilot as they are practised regularly during training and one becomes very experienced at manoeuvring the aircraft into small and confined spaces, usually directly below the aircraft.

“As the collective lever went down and my interest, concentration and pulse rate increased to meet this new challenge, I lowered the nose to maintain a 65kt (120km/h) airspeed and automatically began searching for a landing spot below. I assessed that I could make the Southern Helicopter Pad at the end of the airfield where we could safely do an engine-off landing, if necessary. However, the usual procedure was to carry out an autorotation whereby the helicopter was flown to just short of the landing point at which point the throttle was quickly wound on again and the collective lever raised to bring the helicopter to a hover over the landing spot.

“Descending rapidly from 1000ft I turned towards my intended landing spot and put out my ‘practice’ emergency call. At that point, the usual engine-off sequence to which I had become accustomed started to look very different. In my peripheral vision, I noticed that my instructor had reached down and it looked as if he had turned off the engine governor switch. He said nothing but, as I was sure that he had removed the engine governor, I realised that I would not be able to wind on the throttle quickly as we approached the landing zone (the usual recovery procedure for practice engine failures other than full engine-off landings) or else the engine would over-fuel and stall. With the governor engaged, the throttle could be wound on and off quickly without stalling the engine as the governor controlled fuel input into the engine.

“By this stage I had established a 65kt (120km/h) glide that would take us to the intended landing spot which was still some way off beyond the wood bush area and adjoining Bomb Dump. About that time, I began to slowly increase the throttle from the idle position so as not to over-fuel the engine. After a very short time, I began increasing the throttle at a quicker rate so that it would be fully engaged before we reached ground level.

“Suddenly I heard what sounded like a burst from a machine gun. The engine had stalled. The throttle would not respond to any movement. During these few moments of panic I yelled out to my instructor that the engine had stalled and we both momentarily shifted our focus from the intended landing spot to the engine instruments. Big mistake. The nose of the aircraft rose just enough to slow below 65kt and when I next looked for the landing area it was clear that we were not going to make it.

“Now we were committed to a real engine-off landing in the trees and bushes short of the Bomb Dump. After a quick “Mayday” call, we hit very hard on the side of a bushy, lightly treed gully and the aircraft rolled over on its side. The tail boom was broken in half and fuel was pulsating from the broken tail boom over the rest of the helicopter. As I was on the high side of the aircraft, I unstrapped and assisted my instructor out of the aircraft and we were both in shock and recovering from what had been a very hard landing. In fact, the landing had been so hard that both of us had been forced through our seats and ended up sitting on the floor of the aircraft. Also, the lead weight ballast (to simulate a rear crew member) strapped to the floor of the rear cabin had smashed through the cabin floor and had buried itself in the dirt underneath the helicopter. The aircraft was a wreck.

“The next thing I recall was the search and rescue helicopter (piloted by Bob Tingey) landing nearby and we were shuffled into the cabin and flown back to 723 Squadron. As we walked up from the aircraft I noticed the ambulance, which was outside the squadron, depart slowly back to the sickbay area. We walked into the crew room and were given a cup of coffee. The CO (John Clark) was quite chatty but did not seem to be unduly dismayed by our ordeal.

“Bob Tingey came into the back of the crew room and was signing off his flight details when the CO said, “Bob, grab the maintenance chief and a couple of maintainers to fix 898 and then fly it back.” Bob spun around on his heels and said, “No one’s going to be flying 898 again. It’s a write-off!” The CO’s face took on a look of amazement and he said, “You mean the aircraft crashed and it didn’t do an engine-off landing?” Bob Tingey replied, “Yes that’s right, the aircraft crashed into the bush behind the Bomb Dump. It’s a write-off!”

“The next thing the CO was on the phone to the sickbay and the ambulance was recalled. Within minutes it had returned to the squadron and we were bundled into the back and raced off to the sickbay at breakneck speed. In the meantime, the CO made inquiries of the air traffic control tower as to why the crash alarm had not been sounded. The answer given was that while 898 had registered a “Mayday” call, it was assumed that the helicopter would have done an engine-off landing in some field as was the usual procedure with helicopters. It seems that the air traffic controllers had become so used to helicopters doing practice engine-off landings that they assumed that this one would be no different, so why alert anyone unnecessarily by sounding the crash alarm.

“Fortunately it all ended OK for my instructor and myself in that we did not suffer any major injuries apart from minor concussion and shock and some bruising to our bodies and pride. But on reflection the incident threw up some important points that all pilots (whether experienced or not) should always remember: (1) Always carry out a thorough briefing and never assume that other crew members are thinking what you are thinking. If in doubt, you should ask questions immediately to resolve any doubts. (2) Never depart from the briefing. The removal of the engine governor was not discussed in the briefing. At the subsequent board of inquiry it was discovered that other flights to practise emergency procedures had also incorporated removal of the engine governor upon entering autorotation. (3) If you try to trick someone you will eventually succeed and the consequences of your actions could be catastrophic.”