Sydney Misses Out on a CBD Heliport

In virtually every sense, it’s now “back to square one” and, as will be seen, Tyler’s pessimism appears justified.

There is a chronology:

Early 1960s – Sydney’s Lord Mayor requests the then DCA, with TAA, to select a “downtown heliport for Sydney”. The Domain Car Park roof is selected, but the project lapses for lack of funds.

Early 1970s – A Commonwealth/State committee recommends a site at Dawes Point and/or a pontoon in Farm Cove. A DCA representative dissents from one site on operational grounds. The committee report is later “buried”.

1974 – Premier Tom Lewis revives the Commonwealth/State committee, which again recommends a pontoon in Farm Cove. Before work starts, the Wran government is elected and vetoes the site.

1978-79 – A new Commonwealth/State committee examines five sites, all dismissed, or opposed. The committee report, never released, recommends a pontoon off Mrs Macquarie’s Chair. During this period the late Joe Scruse Sr., whose Scruse-Air operated a scheduled Reg 203 helicopter commuter service between Gosford and Sydney KSA, makes representations for a CBD terminal. After consultation with the then Department of Transport (DoT), Premier Wran announces, on January 21, 1979, that 39 Darling Harbour will be the CBD heliport.

1979-85 – Tenders are called, and the successful tenderer, Brookvale Investments, a subsidiary of the Sydney Channel 10 TV station licensee, spends over $100,000 on site development. Shortly after award of the tender, Brookvale Investments’ parent is taken over by News Limited. Subsequently development consent, with conditions, is issued by Sydney City Council, and application for a heliport licence is made to DoT.

Those who have read Tyler’s 1985 “sorry saga” will know that, shortly before the heliport was to be officially opened, DoT’s central office overruled its regional office and, although the heliport was opened, RPT and night operations were excluded. That drama is recounted in Dick Smith’s Two Years in the Aviation Hall of Doom, published in December 1984 and, less colourfully, by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure, in No Port in a Storm – its November 1985 report on what it called the “Darling Harbour Fiasco”.

Back to our chronology:

1980-85 – Heliport is managed by Channel 10 helicopter section, until early 1984, when management passes to Heli-Aust, a Bankstown based charter company. Heli-Aust, in turn, is taken over by NT based Heli-Muster in mid 1985, which then operates joyflights from heliport using Bell 47s.

Perhaps due to further representations by Scruse-Air, whose need for a CBD terminal remained unsatisfied, a working party was commissioned, in April 1983, to examine seven alternative sites, these were:

Berths 2/3 Walsh Bay

Berths 3/4 Darling Harbour

Berths 8 Pyrmont

Berths 15 Pyrmont

Berths 39 Darling Harbour

Domain Car Park Roof

Woolloomooloo Bay

On release of the working party report, in March 1984, the Department of Aviation had excluded 39 Darling Harbour, citing inadequate flight paths, and the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC) had rejected the Domain on environmental grounds. In order of site preference, the recommendations then were:

Berth 15 Pyrmont

Berth 8 Pyrmont

Berth 2/3 Walsh Bay

Woolloomooloo Bay

Berths 3/4 Darling Harbour

The Minister for the Environment signed State Environmental Planning Policy 13, designating the Pyrmont area as the site of the heliport, during this period and, in February 1985, proposals were invited for the requisite studies and preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

In May that year the successful consultant reported that noise tests, using Bell 206 JetRanger and AS 355 Squirrel helos, indicated 15 Pyrmont could not be used, noise levels exceeding SPCC permissible levels at the adjacent RAN Research Laboratory, and the passenger terminal at 13 Pyrmont. To continue:

August 1985 – Heliport at 39 Darling Harbour closes, and a temporary heliport at 22/23 Pyrmont opens. The 39 Darling Harbour site is subsequently subsumed into the Sydney Convention Centre.

January 1986 – NSW Government proposes construction of a permanent heliport at 22/23 Pyrmont, having noted the noise difficulties at 15 Pyrmont, and possible clashes with tall ships at National Maritime Museum, if 8 Pyrmont is used. However, regulations changed – two flightpaths were no longer required – restoring 8 Pyrmont as a possible site.

Meanwhile, Leichhardt Council took action, in the NSW Land and Environment Court to argue that 22/23 Pyrmont should be closed as, even though it was operating as a temporary site, approval by the MSB should have been preceded by preparation, and consideration, of an EIS. Justice Cripps agreed but, citing the need for a CBD heliport, allowed the heliport to remain open pending preparation and submission of the requisite EIS. Premier Unsworth took office at the time, and ignored the conclusions of the resultant EIS which, essentially, were that the heliport could be operated in conformity with SPCC guidelines. The Liberal National coalition, in response, promised to produce a CBD heliport, if elected.

In July 1986 the temporary heliport closed, since when Sydney has been without an operational CBD heliport.

In the succeeding years, various other options were considered and discarded, including a site at Garden Island Dockyard, and a “helistop” (i.e. no engine shutdown during embarkation and disembarkation) at 14 Pyrmont. A 1988 proposal for a floating “helideck” to be moved around Sydney Harbour looked to be viable, however strenuous residential opposition along with various other pressures, resulted in the MSB refusing approval, not least because of noise objections raised by the SPCC.

In 1990 the HAA proposed reopening 22/23 Pyrmont, submitting a planning consultant’s advice that the site would meet all statutory requirements. Residents of Balmain objected strongly, and the Greiner government withdrew from the proposal.

Further discussions in 1990 between government and the HAA led to a view that both 8 and 22/23 Pyrmont met the relevant environmental and operational criteria. The following year the MSB, as owner of the land, was directed to call tenders for the development of 8 Pyrmont, and to use Australian Standard 2363 as the noise impact precondition for the development.

In late 1991, HAA’s subsidiary Sydney Community Helipark Pty Limited won the tender and, in early 1992, engaged environmental consultants to prepare an EIS. The EIS, completed in October that year, and submitted to the MSB, concluded that up to 50 Bell 206 movements per day would meet Environment Protection Authority (successor to the SPCC) criteria.

In November and December 1992 resident groups and some local councils objected to the heliport. In March 1993, Ms Sandra Nori, opposition State member for Port Jackson, with the support of nonaligned independent MPs, successfully moved referral of the matter to a Commission of Inquiry.

The Commission sat for three weeks, with an independent acoustic consultant because of the highly technical nature of expert submissions, in April/May 1993. Its recommendation, in July 1993, was for approval of the site for up to 48 Bell 206 movements, or the equivalent, per day.

Far from that being the end of the matter, Ms Nori then successfully moved in Caucus for a private member’s Bill blocking development within one kilometre of the site. Opposition leader Bob Carr, even though he was the minister who had signed the instrument designating the Pyrmont area (including Wharf 8) as the CBD heliport site nine years before, was bound by party solidarity to support Ms Nori’s Bill.

With the support of two independents, Ms Nori’s Bill was passed in the Legislative Assembly and went to the upper house where, with the aid of the Reverend Fred Nile’s Call to Australia Party, the Fahey government succeeded in deferring the Bill for six months. Such was the state of play when writs were issued for the March 1995 NSW election.

An early ALP election promise was that the Pyrmont heliport would be scrapped if there was no contract in place. Mr Carr’s advice, after the election, is that no contract exists – which the HAA reserves the right to dispute.

Readers could be forgiven if, in all this, they hear echoes of the tortuous evolutions leading to selection of Badgerys Creek. The two issues are almost contemporaneous, and again, the major factor has been a lack of resolve on the part of governments, demonstrated by the plethora of committees, working parties, enquiries, and the like. It must also be said that the absence, at times, of a coherent voice from the helicopter industry has not helped matters.

Nevertheless, governments have had more than ample warning to consider cities’ heliport needs. As far back as 1956, with the arrival of Australia’s first civil helicopter, the publication Town Planning and Local Government Guide was urging local councils to, “prepare for the future use of helicopters within their areas…”. Almost every year since, the Guide has drawn attention to further implications of helicopter use, advice which continues to be ignored. The North West sector development will house 250,000 people – almost the population of Canberra – yet no provision’s been made for helicopter movements, despite the distance from KSA, Badgerys, and Bankstown, making such a transport mode virtually inevitable.

The failure to establish heliports in the Sydney region, and not just in the CBD, has led to more construction of private helipads, both official and unofficial, which create real, or perceived, nuisances. An immediate effect of the CBD heliport decision is that moves to raise the minimum height on R409, from 500 to 1000 feet, will probably not go ahead, and pilots will see no reason to abide by the unofficial “fly neighbourly” regime which had been in place. More tangibly, HAA chairman John Webster is cancelling his company Heli-Scenic’s option on a MD 600N Notar saying, “confirmation was predicated on reasonably early establishment of a CBD heliport. As an association chairman, as a businessman trying to make a living, and as a voter, I resent that this industry is being killed for a handful of votes.”

For now, some elements of the helicopter industry, especially those who had held on in the hope that Pyrmont would generate profitable operations, are questioning the worth of staying in. At least one HAA member has written to Premier Carr suggesting that unless government is genuinely intent on quickly finding an alternative site, he should admit that there is no prospect of a CBD heliport, and let the industry get on with something else.

Even if the Carr government, with the HAA, proceeds with a search, a realistic view of the history, and all the studies to date, suggests it’s unlikely to be successful, given the fierce competition for any suitable spaces that such a search might identify. So, for the present, Sydney misses out again.

The one glimmer, in all this, is that Sydney is committed to a CBD heliport for the 2000 Olympics.

Peter Cush is a Sydney writer who gratefully acknowledges Sydney helo pilot, and lawyer, Dan Tyler’s major contribution in compiling this article.