Aussies In The Gulf

The Embarkation

The embarkation of the Ships Flights was a tremendous undertaking, particularly that of the Seahawk. The Seahawk had not yet officially been accepted for operational service by the RAN-in fact a squadron did not even exist. Original plans had HS 816 Squadron reforming in October 1991. A flying unit known as the Seahawk Introduction and Transition Unit (SITU) was formed in 1988. This unit is tasked to introduce the aircraft into service, train core personnel for HS 816, and develop Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti Surface Warfare (ASUW) tactics. SITU has been performing those tasks since it received the first S-70B-2 Seahawk in October 1989. Who would have thought that less that twelve months later they would be conducting their first operational deployment!

During the weekend prior to the embarkation, the three AS350B Squirrels allocated to the Task Group lost their ‘Blue and White Taxi Cab livery and adopted a low visibility blue and grey scheme. All aircraft in the Task Group were then fitted with cabin mounted 7. 62mm machine guns and the aircrew trained in their use. Overnight, items of equipment that had been on the wish list for years such as Night Vision Goggles (NVGS) and Helicopter Emergency Escape Devices (HEEDS) appeared on the flight line. It was a very hectic three days for all personnel, both at work and at home. As well as putting in long hours at their respective units they also had to reorganise finances, update wills and complete all of those odd jobs around the home, as well as saying farewell to family and friends. On top of all that we had to face the uncertainty of what the future would hold for us once we arrived in the Area of Operations (AO).

Having two different aircraft types on the one small frigate is not the ideal situation; more personnel and stores must be embarked than would normally be the case. The ideal solution. would have been to embark two Seahawks for the deployment, however there were not enough Seahawks, maintainers or aircrew available at the time. Whilst the Squirrel is not as capable as the Seahawk, it has proven to be quite useful for short range surface surveillance and as a light utility workhorse for the transfer of passengers and light stores around the Task Group. Another side benefit of the Squirrel is that it has a relatively low Radar Cross Section (RCS), due to its small size and the extensive use of composite materials in its structure. This along with the low cost of the airframe, when compared to the Seahawk, make it useful as a probe in a hostile environment.

The composition of the fights vary between aircraft types. The Seahawk Flights are comprised of six aircrew officers (two pilots and four observers) and nine maintainers (one Chief Petty Officer, two Petty Officers and six Junior Sailors). The Squirrel Flights are comprised of two aircrew officers (one pilot and one observer) and four maintainers (one Chief Petty Officer and three Junior Sailors). A breakdown of the Flights is as follows: A. HMAS ADELAIDE

Seahawk Flight: Aircraft – N24-005 (874), Flight Commander- Lodr Leigh Costain (pilot); Squirrel Flight: Aircraft – N22-015 (862), Flight Commander-Lt Darryn Jose (observer). B. HMAS DARWIN

Seahawk Flight: Aircraft-N24-008 (877), Flight Commander- Lcdr Paul Folkes (observer); Squirrel Flight: Aircraft -N22-014, Flight Commander-Lt Michael Rock (observer). C. HMAS SUCCESS

Squirrel Flight: Aircraft – N22-017, Flight Commander – Lcdr Andrew Whittaker (pilot).

The Workup and Transit to the AO

The Task Group sailed from Sydney on Tuesday 14 August 1990, whilst the ships’ flights embarked off of Jervis Bay on the NSW south coast later that day. The next three weeks were spent transiting to the Gulf of Oman via Perth. During the first weeks of the work up, a lot of time was devoted to refining basic skills such as day and night Deck Landing Practice (DLP), Recovery Assist, Securing and Traverse (RAST), training for pilots and Landing Signals Officers (LSOs). Later the training progressed to utility operations such as winching and Vertical Replenishment (Ver- trep) and then on to developing tactics for ASUW operations.

The tactics that were developed were largely arrived at by a system of trial and error. The flight crew would develop experimental tactics on paper and then trial them in flight. This was a task that was to have been done ashore by the SITU over the next twelve months! Upon the arrival of the Task Group in the Gulf of Oman (GOO), the flights had developed their skills and tactics to a standard suitable to conduct operations in support of United Nations Security Council Sanction 661.

The workup was just not for the embarked flights. All aspects of warfare and damage control were exercised onboard the three ships of the Task Group. Numerous nuclear, biological and chemical defence exercises were conducted, as well as those for conventional fire and damage control. By the time the Task Group reached Diego Garcia on 31 August 1990, the Sea Training Group had declared that the Task Group had reached the Optimum Level of Operational Capability (OLOC)

Many hours were also spent in the first weeks of the workup with the RAAF and Fleet Support conducting maritime strikes. F-111, F-18 and Learjet aircraft were often operating as far west as Cocos Island. The RAAF also provided C-130 Hercules and Falcon 50 aircraft for the transport of personnel and stores to Diego Garcia and to countries close to the operating area. The support provided to the RAN by the RAAF and other agencies was first class. Petty inter service rivalries, which seem to dog peace time exercises, were cast aside and a top effort was put in by all concerned. Perhaps the event that brought this to the fore was when the pilots and navigators of 1 Squadron (F-111) hired a boat and followed the Task Group out of HMAS Sterling, waving placards and wishing us good luck.

Finally on 3 September the Australian Task Group had arrived in the AO and commenced patrolling the Gulf of Oman in conjunction with the USN and other navies.

Operations in the Goo

The area of operations for the RAN was the Gulf of Oman, as far north as the Straits of Hormuz. The primary role of the helicopters in the Task Group was to conduct surface surveillance (or ASUW). This was accomplished primarily by radar in the Sea- hawk and visually in the Squirrel. During the first two months of operations in the GOO, flying operations were conducted 18 hours per day, day and night. Generally the Seahawks would operate at long range, between 100 to 150nm.

Whilst conducting operations in the Gulf of Oman many problems were encountered that are not normally found in Australia. The Task Group arrived in the GOO at the end of summer, temperatures were constantly in the high 30s with visibility reduced. to 6-10kms in the perennial salt and dust haze. The heat posed few difficulties for the Seahawk flightcrew since the aircraft is air conditioned, but this is not the case with the Squirrel and great care was taken to avoid heat stress. Reduced visibility also made the visual identification of contacts difficult and gave the impression that one was flying in a ‘goldfish bowl, particularly at night.

Day operations in the Seahawk are relatively simple and straight forward. Contacts are normally located by the Senso on radar. The Tacco then decides in which order to identify them and manages the navigation system, the pilot then flies the aircraft to achieve the task. After the contacts are identified they are then relayed back to the Task Group by the crew via the secure Datalink. In this way, up to 25 contacts can be identified by name and port of registration during a three hour sortie.

Operations at night are not quite so simple. All flying is conducted on instruments down to an altitude as low as 125 feet, on Radar Altimeter. The Tacco uses NVGs to identify the vessel by type (sometimes by name if the right light conditions exist). The Seahawk also has full NVG compatible cockpit lighting. This means that the ‘blooming’ of the NVG picture that occurs in a normally lit cockpit, such as that found in the Squirrel, does not occur.

The aircraft is then manoeuvred up the ship’s wake at 125ft with the searchlight being used to obtain the name and port of registration of the vessel. The vessels identified in this way are then compared with known intelligence. If required the vessel is challenged on VHF channel 16 and if the situation demands it, the ship is boarded.

The boarding of vessels suspected of breaking UN Security Council Sanction 661 were fairly rare events in the GOO. The Task Group having been involved in a total of six boardings of Contacts of Interest (COI) so far. The boardings were generally conducted using the vessels of at least two nations of the Multi National Naval Force (MNNF). The COI was normally challenged. by the senior ship on VHF channel 16 and asked to stop for boarding. If the vessel’s master did not comply with the request, a gradual application of force was applied, within the constraints of the Rules of Engagement allowed by the Australian Government. Aggressive manoeuvring was normally attempted first. This required nerves of steel on the part of the warship captain. If this failed, shots were fired across the vessel’s bows, starting with small calibre machine guns and escalating to the ships main armament. If those were unsuccessful, shots would then be fired into structures on the ship such as the funnel. The firing of the main armament across the bows proved to be sufficient motivation to stop the most plucky of COIS.

The boarding party was then inserted using the Seahawk helicopter. Initially the winch was used, but it was intended to use ‘Fast Roping’ techniques in later deployments. This would allow a much quicker insertion and reduce the time that the helicopter and boarding party are exposed to possible hostile fire. A normal search takes up to six hours. If the vessel was given the ‘all clear’ it was allowed to proceed, however if it was found to be carrying contraband, it was impounded and then taken to a friendly port.

The measures taken by the Multi National Naval Force (MINNF) in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman appear to have stopped shipping companies and their vessels trading with Iraq. The lev- els of shipping using the region went down by 50% from that prior to the invasion. This, along with better flying conditions with the onset of winter, made the task of patrolling the area far easier in the latter months of 1990 and the flying rate was thus much lower than when operations were commenced in the AO during September.

Operations with the MNNF has provided the RAN with a unique opportunity to work closely with the navies of nations outside of the Asian region. Regularly we operate with the navies of the USA, UK, USSR, France, Netherlands, Spain and even Argentina (the Poms and the Argies have not come the blows yet!). This provides a unique opportunity for the flight crews to ‘cross deck’ with other ships’ fights. A few cans of Fosters or Powers beer has become the favorite bargaining tool for the trading of ‘ball caps’ and other goods, especially on the ‘dry’ USN vessels.

Lessons Learnt

Operations in the Gulf of Oman have been the first test for the RAN’s latest air asset, the Sikorsky Seahawk, and probably close to the last deployment for the AS350B Squirrel that it replaces. The operations conducted thus far have proven the versatility and capability of the Seahawk over its contemporaries. It has proven to be remarkably robust, easy to maintain and a very forgiving airframe.

Whilst it is an outstanding aircraft, the Seahawk requires the fitting of several items of equipment to enable the aircraft to perform its roles more efficiently and offer the aircrew a greater degree of self protection. The RAN is considering the fitment of Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) and Forward Looking Infra-red (FLIR) equipment. This would greatly improve the ability of the aircraft to identify contacts at night or in reduced visibility. At time of writing the Gulf Crisis has been just that, a crisis, no shots having been fired in anger. If open hostilities do break out the Seahawk and Squirrel would be vulnerable to many modern surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems whilst conducting the primary mission of surface surveillance. The RAN is considering the fitment of Missile Plume Detectors and Chaff/Flare Dispensers to the aircraft. This will prove some warning of the launch and protection against surface-to-air missiles. The fitment of this equipment would greatly reduce the physical danger to the aircrew and the potential loss of an irreplaceable $40m asset.