Defence Update
Ran and Army Push for Helicopter Carrier
An interesting facet in the current Defence debate over whether changed circumstances dictate a need to review the Australian Defence Force’s Force Structure provisions – spelt out in the 1986 Dibb Report on Capabilities in the 1987 Defence White Paper-is that the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian army appear to share the view that there is a fairly urgent requirement for some sort of helicopter/troop carrier.
On the face of it, it seems that the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral Michael Hudson, may be keener to acquire such a capability than even being allowed to order two extra Type 471 Collins class submarines on top of the six already ordered.
This content is available exclusively to Australian Aviation members.
A monthly membership is only $5.99 or save with our annual plans.
- Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
- Access to In Focus reports every month on our website
- Unlimited access to all Australian Aviation digital content
- Access to the Australian Aviation app
- Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
- Access to In Focus reports every month on our website
- Access to our Behind the Lens photo galleries and other exclusive content
- Daily news updates via our email bulletin
- Unlimited access to all Australian Aviation digital content
- Access to the Australian Aviation app
- Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
- Access to In Focus reports every month on our website
- Access to our Behind the Lens photo galleries and other exclusive content
- Daily news updates via our email bulletin
At a recent briefing for defence correspondents, Hudson suggested that such a ship could operate six to eight helicopters (presumably, but not necessarily, of Black Hawk type troop carrying capability) and up to a battalion of troops. (Given that a full sized battalion group could number 800- 1,000, but that a ship would typically only be capable of coping with considerably less than that, a figure of about 300 troops seems more feasible, in our view).
Key points made by the theCNSwere that a case would have to be made that the helicopter/troop carrier capability would have to be seen as necessary for the defence of Australia, rather than for incursions into the South West Pacific to support either an overstretched friendly island nation, or even to extract Australian nationals caught in unexpected crisis situations.
It was not always possible to insert Australian troops at a variety of places around the Australian coastline by normal airlift or ground transport, Hudson ventured. In the Canberra Times of March 28 Australia’s senior naval officer suggested there was “a strong consensus” that Australia should look “very closely” at acquiring a helicopter support ship. He added that the ADF was really looking hard at its ability to move the Army from one point to another over long distances.
In December 1988 the Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, said in a paper delivered to the ‘Australia and the World’ Bicentennial Conference at the Australian National University that a study of this capability was being undertaken.
The idea of acquiring such a ship has been strongly advocated by the former Opposition Spokesman on Defence, Mr Peter White, a former infantry battalion CO. In his recent book, ‘A CoastToo Long’, Dr Ross Babbage, formerly Deputy Head of the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, wrote: “The first potentially important capability not presently supported in the Defence program is a basic helicopter support ship. The need is not for an aircraft carrier in the traditional sense but rather for a simple (possibly converted commercial) ship with a large flight deck and substantial hangar space.
“The primary role for such a vessel would be to carry at least a dozen Army Black Hawk helicopters and up to several hundred troops. A relatively fast ship of this kind could be used to land the primary forces needed to evacuate Australian citizens in a regional area. It would be especially useful in the many regions where airfields are absent and coral reefs and shoals prevent beach access to landing craft. ” One of the political sensitivities in all of this is that under the former Defence Minister, Mr Kim Beazley, the justification for the acquisition of new equipment was that it is needed to defend Australia and its territories. Australian Labor Party policy in fact shies away from any intention of having a capability to insert troops in the South West Pacific and South East Asian regions. Nevertheless, Australian Defence Force personnel have been placed on alert three times in recent years because of potentially hostile events in the SW Pacific. And in spite of contrary assurances, it has never been satisfactorily explained how Australian nationals caught up in Fiji during the civil strife there might have been extracted had there been opposing fire.
The new Defence Minister, Senator Robert Ray, therefore may be forced into some form of a political balancing act, weighing criticism that the acquisition of a helicopter support ship increases Australia’s ability to project power against the uncertainties in the Pacific, and the possibility that one day Australia might just have to respond to invitations for military assistance. However, it may be argued that an increase in Australia’s capability to project power regionally needs air power superiority, naval gunfire support and troop insertion, elements which the ADF already has in various forms.
If the Navy and Army succeed in having procurement priorities altered to accommodate a helicopter support platform, the question is whether a merchant ship, ideally with a flat-top over much of its length, would be suitable, or whether a purpose designed naval vessel is the better long-term option.
For years now the RAN has been looking at the opportunities of buying or leasing a merchant ship which could be converted for troop carrying and helicopter support. Original thinking was that a vessel was needed to operate the now landed based Sea King helicopters so that their real role of anti submarine warfare could be more properly exercised. Little has come of that prospect.
As former RAN Commander Peter Shevlin, Director of the Navy’s Joint Warfare Policy in 1969-81, noted in the Australian Business magazine recently, the need for a ship with amphibious, personnel and helicopter potential as well as heavy lift capability, was confirmed in Defence studies in the early 1970s. One proposal was to build two Landing Ships Heavy (LCHs) for amphibious, heavy lift and helicopter operations, each of 5,800 tonnes. They would be capable of carrying 350-450 troops and a squadron of battle tanks or their equivalents and be able to operate three troop carrying helicopters.
The Defence Committee and the Government in 1976 opted for only one ship, which became the amphibious heavy lift ship HMAS Tobruk. Built by Carrington Slipways at Tomago near Newcastle, she was commissioned in 1981. Realistically, in Australia’s geographic and strategic situation, reasonable reaction to potentially hostile events would suggest there remains a need for two such ships. The now fostered helicopter support ship thus emerges as meeting the requirement.
The fleet replenishment ship/oiler, HMAS Success, built at Cockatoo Island, originally was to be the first of two such ships. Costly time delays and a soaring price put an end to a second ship. Last year the need for a second replenishment ship for the west coast (under the two ocean Navy philosophy) was fulfilled with the acquisition of a British tanker, which has been named HMAS Westralia. An option for acquisition of a commercial ship for conversion to a helicopter support carrier could be the offshore patrol helicopter carrier (OPHC) designed and developed by Bremer Vulkan of West Germany. The price would be between $250-300m, or much the same as a second tier ship such as the Anzac Meko 200 frigate presently on order.
Bremer Vulkan have developed several variants of their OPHC design. Reports suggest the Royal Thai Navy is actively considering buying such a vessel which would be capable of operating 6-10 EH101/Sea King/Black Hawk helicopters. There would be a need for modifications of some helicopters, especially the Black Hawk which is not customarily operated from a sea platform. The existing Bremer Vulkan OPHCs exhibit the following characteristics – length: 130-140 metres; draught: 5-6 metres; displacement: 6,000-8,000 tonnes; propulsion: four diesel engines; max speed: 25 knots; endurance: 12,000 nautical miles at 12kts; ship’s complement: 129 plus 36 for Air Wing Operations (six helicopters) and 34 for Air Wing Maintenance. It is estimated the Task Group Command would require 13 personnel, and troop lift numbers would be 250-300. Bremer Vulkan claims a seas keeping ability to sustain helicopter operations in up to Sea State 6 and excellent manoeuvrability through twin controllable pitch propellers and rudders and a bow thruster. A variety of sensor and weapon fits are also available which would have commonality and interoperability with RAN requirements.
In Australia, Carrington have offered a Surveillance and Army Support ship which would comprise the Tobruk hull, but with a conventional stem instead of bow doors and ramps and a ‘sided’ superstructure to provide a full length flight deck. Carrington have retained the stern ramp and a vehicle deck hangar strong enough to carry a squadron of tanks. The ship was designed to operate six Sea King or four Chinook helicopters. In 1983 prices, the sailaway cost would have been about $200m. A stretched version of the original design would push the Carrington proposal for a ship of 137 metres length and a displacement of 7,800 tonnes. It would carry six Sea King/Black Hawk sized helicopters and landing craft. The cost in 1987 dollars was$300m.
Shevlin said that the design of a joint operations helicopter carrier was presented to the Chief of the Defence Force and the three Service Chiefs for evaluation in July 1987. Now it seems current thinking is considering dusting off various earlier and current proposals.
Shevlin argues that Australia’s Defence Force has been waiting nearly 20 years for a replacement troop transport for HMAS Sydney, which originally was a light aircraft carrier. He contends that it is time the RAN and Army had a joint operations ship.
Want to see more stories from trusted news sources?
Make Australian Aviation a preferred news source on Google.
Click here to add Australian Aviation as a preferred news source.