Profile – Tupolev Tu-4 Bull

The production B-29 had a maximum speed of 357mph (575kph) at 30,000ft (9,144m), a service ceiling of 36,000ft (10,937m) and a range, while carrying a 10,000lb (4,540kg) bomb load, of 3,250 miles (5,230km). It could carry an internal bomb load of up to 20,000lbs (9,080kg) and for armament it had four GE twin . 5 inch machine gun turrets above and below which were sighted from the nose or from a waist sighting station and a manual Bell tail turret armed with one 20mm cannon and twin . 5 inch machine guns.

The Matterhorn Plan

When the first production models of the B-29 began to roll off the assembly line in July, 1943, the deployment of the huge new bomber was still not clearly decided. Its use in the European theatre of operations was becoming less likely because the Bomber Offensive against Nazi Germany appeared, at the time, to be approaching its climax with the large force of B-17s and B-24s already allocated, combined with the Lancasters and Halifaxes of RAF Bomber Command, seemed adequate to successfully complete the task. It was anticipated that Germany would probably fall in the northern autumn of 1944 but by that time only four B-29 groups could be ready. After the Germans surrendered, all efforts would then be directed towards the Pacific area against the Japanese.

In mid-1943, the war against Japan was still largely defensive in nature. The enemy had been stopped at Midway and the Solomons and were being thrown out of the Western Aleutians. Unfortunately, the British campaign in northern Burma was not successful and in China, the Japanese were consolidating and extending their territory.

As time went on, the situation in China began to deteriorate even further and at a series of conferences it was decided that, because of the urgent need to encourage the Chungking Government, the B-29s would have to appear in China. Various contingency plans were drawn up but finally it was decided that the B-29s would be based in the Calcutta area of India and shuttled forward to advance bases in China where they would off load their excess fuel, load up with bombs and fly out on missions over Japan. This rear base idea had the advantage of providing a secure area for the bombers as well as easing the multitude of maintenance problems. The Chengtu area was chosen as the China springboard. From there, the Superfortresses were to carry out attacks on the Japanese steel industries upon which the military and shipping strength of the enemy forces depended.

This plan, entitled the ‘Early Sustained Bombing of Japan’ was finally turned over to the US Joint Planning Staff and given the code name of ‘Matterhorn’.

On November 10, 1943, President Roosevelt informed Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the plan and both leaders pledged their cooperation. On November 29, Roosevelt informed Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Dictator and Supreme Commander and inquired as to the possibility of basing a four-engined bomber force in some of the Soviet maritime provinces in order to attack Japan as soon as the USSR commenced hostilities against the Japanese. The Russian response was months in coming, probably because of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact which had been signed on April 13, 1941. Even after Stalin did finally indicate a positive response to the American President’s request, he kept finding reasons for delay so that the plan to base B-29s in Russian territory was never implemented.

Russia’s interest in the 8-29 though would later manifest itself in a different way.

The First Attack

In the early morning of Monday, June 5, 1944, one hundred Superfortresses were scheduled to take off on their first mission against an enemy target. The flight was planned as a shakedown run, a 2,000 mile (3,200km) round trip from their home bases in India to Bangkok and back. By 6. 30am, 98 of the bombers were airborne. One plane had aborted on the ground because of mechanical failure but a second aircraft had crashed during takeoff and exploded into flames, killing the crew.

They finally attacked the target in misty conditions. Flak was heavy but inaccurate and, in all, only nine Japanese fighters attempted to stop them. The American gunners claimed one probable and two damaged. Only one B-29 was damaged but prior to the attack, 23 of the bombers had aborted for one reason or another. But the problems were not over yet. On the return trip weather conditions worsened and five of the B-29s ran out of fuel.

It was hardly an impressive start particularly when it was later discovered that the bombing results were not good. But a start it was, and from then on the multitude of teething troubles which continued to plague the new plane began to be finally corrected under combat conditions The first Superfortress to arrive over the target on that day had been No 42-6365, which was also known as the ‘General H H Arnold Special’.

The ‘Special’

This particular B-29 had received its name in January, 1944, while it was still on the assembly line of the Boeing factory in Wichita, Kansas. General ‘Hap’ Arnold, a long-time advocate of the principle of strategic bombing, had visited the plant and was being shown around by Boeing representatives when he stopped in front of one of the aircraft on the line and pointed to it designating it as his ‘special aircraft.

By Armistice day, 1944, the ‘Special’ had flown ten combat missions and on this day it prepared to take off on its eleventh. It also turned out to be its last.

The Final Mission

The target was the aircraft assembly industry at Amura. During takeoff, two planes crashed on the rain-soaked Chinese airfields. Weather conditions were not good with strong winds and it was extremely overcast. Two days earlier a typhoon had been identified south of Japan but American forecasters anticipated that it would move away south-east of the target. Then belatedly, with all of the B-29s already airborne, they changed their predictions and decided that it would badly affect weather over the target area. A radio signal ordered the force to divert to secondary targets but not all of the bombers received the message. Thirty five of the Superforts attacked the secondary targets at Shanghai and Nanking: while over Amura, shortly after daybreak, 29 planes, including the ‘Special’, attempted to bomb through heavy overcast and violent turbulence which at times threatened to tear the wings off the planes. Only five were able to make a formation attack.

The ‘Special’ first ran into difficulties when it was realised that the radar equipment was not functioning. After flying for thirty minutes without being able to pick up images of Amura on the scope, the captain, Weston H Price decided to turn for home without dropping the bombs.

Meanwhile, other B-29s had run into heavy fighter opposition. One was hit and fell in flames over the target. Others suffered heavy battle damage and many turned homeward with holed wings and fuselages, while others were nursed along on three engines. A total of five Superfortresses failed to return and one of these was the “Special”.

On the way back, the ‘Special’ had broken out of the overcast to find that, because of the estimated 155 miles per hour (250km/ hr) headwind, it was 900 miles (1,450km) short of its expected position, 100 miles (160km) north of course and somewhere just off the southern tip of Korea. There was no chance of reaching home. With the fuel supply dwindling, Price had no choice but to head for the nearest friendly territory. A course was plotted for Vladivostok.

After a tense flight, the huge bomber arrived over Vladivostok Bay transmitting the international radio signal which meant ‘friend”.

The Russian response was warm but not friendly. Flak began bursting around the American plane and Russian fighters, Yak-9s, were seen clawing for altitude. After a few moments, when the flak barrage had ceased, the Yaks took up positions to port, starboard and in front of the ‘Special”. Then, under the close escort, Price was guided down to the main airfield on the outskirts of the town.

After landing, the airmen were treated like prisoners rather than allies and whisked off to the V-VS Headquarters for interrogation. They were never to see their plane again.

American eyes were to see the ‘Special on only one more occasion.

The ‘Ding Hao’

Ten days later, the ‘Special’ was still on the ground at Vladivostok airfield, when, on November 21,. another Superfor- tress appeared overhead. It was No. 42-6358, otherwise known as the ‘Ding Hao’, with Captain William A Mickish at the controls. The phrase ‘Ding Hao’ was a friendly call used by the Chinese to greet the American airmen and Mickish had adopted it for his aircraft. This plane had been part of a force of 109 Superforts which had staged another attack on Amura and one of the eight which had failed to return to their Chinese bases. Mickish, like Price before him, had been obliged to head for Soviet territory and so-called safety. He brought the ‘Ding Hao’ over at 5,000ft (1,525m) and, with the weather rapidly closing in, he was looking for somewhere to land. One of his men reported another B-29 (the ‘Special”) on the ground so he decided that this would be the best place to come down. He lowered the undercarriage but suddenly found his plane being subjected to ground fire and hostile action by 6 Yak- 9s which had appeared from nowhere. A burst was directed across the bomber’s nose and then the fighters took up close escort positions around the American plane as it finally landed. Then, like Price and his crew before them, Mickish and the crew of the ‘Ding Hao’ were obliged to hand over their weapons and undergo a severe interrogation. Next, after receiving heavy clothing and being assigned an interpreter, the Americans found themselves being transported inland by train.

They met up with the crew of the “Special” at Khabarovosk where the latter were being held in an unoccupied hospital building. Together, they were all moved by train to an internment camp at Tashkent in Turkestan where they were surprised to discover over a hundred other Americans. Among them were two other B-29 crews.

The Prisoners

The first to arrive at the camp had been Captain Howard Jarrell and his crew who had disappeared during the raid on Anshan on July 29. They had been the first to partake of Russian ‘hospitality’ and their story was similar to those of the others, except that the Yak-9s had guided them to a small airfield near Tavrichanka on the northern tip of Vladivostok Bay. Although the field was small. Jarrell had no choice but to land. He brought the big wounded bomber down as slowly as possible and it came to a halt only yards from where the end of the runway fell away into the sea. In a matter of minutes, the American airmen had been whisked away for interrogation and eventual internment.

The second B-29 crew was commanded by Major Richard M McGlinn. His plane, 42-93829, was one of the fourteen which failed to reach home from the August 20 attack on Yawata. There had been a wild fight over the target. One B-29 had been destroyed by flak and Japanese fighters had accounted for three others, one of them by deliberate ramming. Again, following emergency procedure, McGlinn had turned his B-29 towards Soviet territory but unlike the others he did not land in one piece. The whole crew was obliged to bail out before the aircraft crashed, a complete write-off, into the foothills of the Sikhote Alin mountain range, east of Khabarovosk. After wandering lost in a forest for several days, they were finally rescued and soon found themselves in the Tashkent camp.

Technically, the Russians were acting within their rights in holding the US airmen and their aircraft because of their 1941 pact with Japan. The conditions of the agreement would have been infringed if they had simply allowed the Americans to come and go unmolested. But, in a clandestine operation worked out jointly by an American military mission to Moscow and the NKVD (Russian Secret Police now known as the KGB), the captive crews gained freedom in an arranged ‘escape’ across the Iranian border in December, 1944.

The End of Matterhorn

Also in December, the 20th Bomber Command tried out new tactics. On the 18th, eighty four B-29s carried out the first mass firebomb raid against an Asian city. The target was Hankow and the Superfortress attack was immediately followed by another by bombers and fighters of the US 14th Air Force. Incendiaries started huge fires along the entire length of the city’s three mile (5km) long Yangzte waterfront which burned for three days. Before they were extinguished, the docks, warehouse areas and adjacent sections of the town were gutted. This raid clearly indicated what could be done to the Japanese cities which, in the words of Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, were ‘congested and easily located, their structures paper and wood or other in-flammable substitutes. ‘ But the firebomb raids on Japan were not destined to come through the forward Chinese bases. In fact, the Matterhorn raids were being phased out. American victories in the Marianas not only meant a breach in the Japanese defence network, they also meant that the USAAF could have bomber bases only 1,500 miles (2,400km) from Tokyo with none of the supply problems associated with China and India.

Even before Saipan and Tinian had been secured, engineers were surveying sites for the construction of five B-29 airfields. The first Superfortresses of the new 21st Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on October 12, 1944, and the first raid was undertaken on November 24. By the end of the year, a total of eight raids had been carried out.

It was now only a matter of time before the 20th Bomber Command was transferred to the Pacific to strengthen the final onslaught on the Japanese home islands. The 20th’s last raid from China took place on March 29/30, 1945, a low-level night incendiary attack on the main oil fuel depot at Singapore. With that, the 20th’s forty-ninth mission, Matterhorn ended.

The Matterhorn plan could not really be classified as a success. From the first attack against Bangkok on May 27, 1944, to the last against Singapore, the 20th Bomber Command averaged only two sorties per plane per month. In all, the B-29s had flown a total of 3,058 sorties from India and China and dropped 11,477 tons (11,706 tonnes) of bombs on enemy targets. Only a mere 800 tons (813 tonnes) of these had been dropped on Japan itself but, on the other hand, valuable experience had been gained and lessons learned. New tactics such as the firebomb attacks had been tried and by the beginning of 1945, most of the teething troubles, which had continued to plague the Superfortresses for so long, had been ironed out. Boeing’s revolutionary new strategic bomber had at last been tempered and toughened in combat and now it was ready to deliver the final blows.

Early Russian Heavies

But meanwhile, what of the three bombers which had fallen into Russian hands? The Soviets could not help but be impressed by them, there was nothing anywhere near comparable in their air force or for that matter the air force of any nation of that ora. It was technically the equivalent of a B-52 boing ‘given’ to the Soviets a decade later! Ironically, the large four-engined strategic bomber concept had actually originated in Russia. The world’s first four engined aircraft the Russki Vitiaz (Russian Knight), had been designed by Igor Sikorski and it first flew on May 13, 1913. It featured the relatively modern refinement of a totally enclosed cabin for its crew. Following on this successful effort, Igor Sikorski (who changed the ‘i’ in his name on later emigration to the USA), built a larger machine powered by four 100hp German Argus engines at the Russo-Baltic Waggon Factory (RVBZ). The new plane received the name of Ilya Mourometz after a hero of Russian folklore who was supposed to have ridden a winged horse. On February 12, 1914, this machine set a new world record by climbing to 6,560ft (2,000m) and flying over Moscow for 5 hours at a speed of 62 miles per hour (100km/hr) while carrying sixteen passengers and a dog! An order for ten planes was placed soon afterwards but with the outbreak of war in August, orders for a further 32 were received. Before the Russian Revolution in 1917, a total of 73 had been built.

These huge aircraft, with a wing span similar to that of the Avro Lancaster of World War 2, were not all identical. Some featured open balcony noses while others had fully glazed nose positions. A variety of motors were also used including Sunbeam, Argus and Renault types. Powered by four 220hp Renault engines, the Ilya Mourometz had a maximum speed of 85 miles per hour (136km/hr) at 6,500ft (1,980m). It could climb to that altitude in 25 minutes and had an absolute service ceiling of 10,500ft (3,200m). Armament ranged from two machine guns to seven on the later models. The 1916 types were the first aircraft in the world to be fitted with a tail gun position. About 1,120lb (510kg) of bombs could be carried. For their day, these aircraft were technically far superior to any rival bomber.

On December 10, 1914, the new ‘Squadron of Flying Ships’ – Eskadra Vozdusknykh Korablei (EVK) was formed. The EVK became the elite of the Imperial Russian Air Service and as more machines became available, other squadrons were formed. Regular raids were made in daylight on targets in Poland and East Prussia.

To the enemy they seemed indestructible. During Russia’s involvement in the war they made 422 raids and dropped over 2,300 bombs. One bomber, the IM-XVI, was destroyed in combat when it was attacked by seven fighters on September 12, 1916, but three of the attackers were shot down and a fourth crippled before it fell. All told, the destruction of 40 German fighters was claimed. Two other machines were lost through accidents. IM-XIV spun into the ground on May 14, 1916, and the other was the victim of sabotage when the wing struts collapsed after they had been almost sawn through causing it to break up in mid-air on April 28, 1917.

By 1917, five squadrons were in existence but most of the aircraft were broken up after the Russian surrender. After the Communist Revolution only about a dozen remained and these were used as trainers and transports for the newly formed Red Air Force, one of the very first home designed aircraft to be employed.

In the 1920s, while air war theorists of the time talked of an ‘aerial battleship’, a long-range giant bomber with numerous machine gun positions for defence, the idea was translated into fact by the Russians. This took the form of the ANT-6 of 1929, which was created by Andres N Tupolev, a leading designer who had produced his first heavy bomber, the ANT-4 (TB-1) in 1927. The ANT-6 (TB-3) was the logical development of the earlier plane with the same basic all-metal construction and clean lines but with four engines instead of two and it could carry twice the bomb load, about 2,200lb (998kg). I. gradually more powerful versions, this plane remained the main V-VS (Soviet Air Force) heavy bomber right through the 1930s. In fact, the V-VS during this time was the only air force in the world to possess a strategic bomber potential. Towards 1940, the ANT-6 was increasingly used as a transport or paratroop aircraft with the capacity to carry 4,400lbs (1,996kg) of cargo or 30 troops. The last version had 1,250hp M-34RN engines which gave it a maximum speed of about 200 miles per hour (322km/hr) and a range of 1,100 miles (1,770km). In the immediate pre-war days, modified ANT-6s were successfully used for Arctic exploration. The last bomber version was designated TB-5 and featured such improvements as a more streamlined fuselage and a redesigned undercarriage but these planes were obsolescent by the time of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June, 1941.

Decline During the War Years

The only Russian designed strategic bomber to serve during World War 2 was the Pe-8. Known at first as the ANT-42, it was later given the V-VS designation of TB-7 and then, at a later date, it was changed again to Pe-8 in recognition of the work of Vladimir Petlyakov who headed Tupolev’s design team and was directly responsible for much of the work on the machine. The prototype first flew on December 27, 1936 and production aircraft first entered V-VS service in 1940 at which time it was powered by four Mikulin AM-35A engines which gave it a maximum speed of 270 miles per hour (435km/hr) and an operational ceiling of 31,988ft. It could carry up to 8,800lb (3,990kg) of bombs and was armed with a 20mm Sh VAK cannon in its tail and dorsal turrets, a 12-7mm BS machine gun in the rear of each inboard engine nacelle and twin Sh KAS machine guns in the nose turret.

In all, a total of only 79 Pe-8s were produced but in March, 1942, this type was used to form the nucleus of the Soviet Long Range Aviation (ADD).

The V-VS strategic air offensive against Germany began in July, 1942, when fifteen Pe-8s bombed Konigsberg. More raids followed on Berlin, Stettin and other targets but these were small scale and not really of significance. The Russian effort remained small in comparison with the strategic attacks mounted by the RAF and USAAF. Its main use was for propaganda purposes, enabling Stalin to state that the air offensive against the German homeland was not an exclusively Anglo-American venture.

Probably the most memorable flight by a Pe-8 was that started on May 19, 1942, when one flown by Colonel Endel Puusepp flew from Moscow over the battle front to Dundee in Scotland carrying Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. This plane had actually been in action the day before and still bore hastily patched scars from near miss flak bursts. After talks with Churchill, Molotov flew off in the same plane to Washington via Goose Bay and Montreal. When the meetings with President Roosevelt were concluded, he and the Pe-8 returned to Moscow via the same route thus Completing the longest journey made by a Soviet aircraft during the war.

Meanwhile, Russian wartime emphasis had concentrated heavily on the production of tactical bombers, assault aircraft and fighters, so that Soviet designers had little chance to study long- range bomber projects. By 1944, the obsolescent Pe-8 remained the only long-range bomber in service and, together with the twin engine Tu-2, it formed the main equipment of the ADD.

In Russian eyes, a real need now arose to match the strategic bombing capabilities of the British and Americans as soon as possible and as World War 2 drew to a close that need became more and more urgent. But they were a long way behind and, even if work began immediately, there would be an inevitable time lag before a completely new large bomber could be produced.

Then suddenly, literally from out of the blue, an answer fell into their hands in the shape of three fully intact examples of the most advanced strategic bomber in the world, the B-29 Superfortress – Jarrell’s 42-6256, the ‘General H H Arnold Special’ and the ‘Ding Hao’.

Matterhorn’s Legacy

The Soviets decided to make replicas of the B-29 in every detail. By doing this they would at least have a plane which would be the equal of anything the Western Allies had in their arsenal and at the same time there would be huge benefits for their aircraft industry. To do it, two of their confiscated American-built ‘prototypes’ had to be dismembered and every part copied. The third was used for flight testing. This formidable task was given to Andrei Tupolev and the job of copying the Wright Cyclone R- 3350 engines went to the bureau headed by AD Schvetsov. Stalin himself gave the project the highest priority.

A wide cross-section of industry and numerous research institutes became involved in the programme and a virtual revolution in engineering standards and production techniques was required because of the highly sophisticated American equipment. The work was complex and problems frequently occurred particularly in connection with the electronics associated with the remote-control gun turrets. Despite everything. construction of the Russian model, which was designated Tu-4, commenced in March, 1945, and the first three prototypes were ready for flight testing at the beginning of 1947.

What had actually happened to the ‘Special’ and the other Superfortresses was, of course, unknown to the Americans but they received a hint when, on November 11, 1946, the Berlin newspaper ‘Der Kurier stated that the Soviet Union was manufacturing a copy of the B-29 in factories located in the Urals. Discounted at first, this report, was later given credence when it was uncovered that Soviet agents had attempted, earlier in 1946, to buy B-29 tyres, wheels and brake assemblies in the USA. Even so, the Americans were not especially worried because they believed that the engineering feats involved in copying this plane were well outside the capabilities of Russian technology. This opinion had to be completely revised after August 3, 1947, because during the Soviet Aviation Day display over Tushinn, Moscow, there appeared irrefutable evidence that the Russians had done exactly that.

On August 3, three four-engined heavy ‘bombers roared across Tushino at low level and observers quickly identified the unmistakable cylindrical shapes of B-29s. Many Westerners believed them to be, not Russian built machines, but the same Superfortresses which had been commandeered back in 1944- after all, there were only three planes in the formation-but then a fourth plane was seen. This was a 72-passenger transport called the Tupolev Tu-70. It looked very much like a modified B-29! It was not long before photographs of the Tu-70 were placed in front of Boeing designers for study. The fuselage had obviously been redesigned, it was larger and sat higher on the wing, but there were able to recognise more than twenty major parts which had obviously been copied from the B-29 including the wings, nacelles, cooling air intake, main landing gear and propellers. Its tail surfaces were also obvious copies, evidenced by a patch which had been installed on the vertical tail of one of the American planes after a minor change had been required, which had also been reproduced! Also during 1946-7, the Soviet Air Force was substantially reorganised into five commands – The Fighter Aviation of the Air Defence Forces (IA-PVO); the Frontal Aviation (FA); the Naval Aviation (A-VMF); the Aviation of the Airborne Troops (A-VDV) and the Long Range Aviation (DA). The latter was built around the new Tu-4 bombers which were coming into service. The three ‘B-29s’ seen at Tushino that August had actually been the first three pre-production models out of a batch of 20 while at the same time production of the series was well under way. First deliveries to V-VS units had already taken place.

The first full DA divisiya, consisting of 3 polki with a 3 ten- aircraft espadrille, to be fully equipped with Tu-4s, attained operational status by mid-1949 and by the end of that year about 300 were in service. A small number were used for long-range maritime patrol work with the A-VMF.

Powered by four ASR-73TK engines, the Tu-4 was reported to have achieved a maximum speed of 261mph (420kph) at sea level and 354mph (570kph) at 32,800ft (10,000m) with a bomb load of 11,023b (5,000kg). At a cruising speed of 224mph (360kph) at 9,850ft (3,000m) the range was 3,100mls (5,000km). With auxiliary fuel tanks in the weapons bay and a 6,614lb (3,000kg) bomb load the range could be extended to 4,100 miles (6,600km). It has to be remembered at this stage that Russia had also just obtained its first atomic bombs.

This plane received the NATO code name of ‘Bull and it gave the V-VS true strategic bombing capability for the first time. The potential threat of this was painfully apparent to the Americans. Tu-4s possessed the range necessary to strike at Chicago, Los Angeles or New York on a one-way ‘suicide’ mission. The air defences of the North American continent had to consequently be rearranged to meet such an eventuality even if it was only a remote possibility.

The Coming of the ‘Bear’

During the Korean War, the Americans employed their B-29 Superfortresses on daylight bombing missions, but in 1951, the nature of war in the air had changed with the employment of jet aircraft. After a series of furious engagements with Russian built MIG-15s, the B-29s had to be withdrawn from daylight operations. In one particular fight on October 23, 1951, three B- 29s and one escorting F-84 Thunderjet had been shot down but, as well as that, every plane in the bomber force had suffered major damage. It was obvious to observers on both sides that propeller driven bombers like the B-29 (or the Tu-4) could no longer expect to survive in a sky dominated by jet fighters.

In 1952, the Russian design bureaux of Tupolev and Myasishchev were each selected to design a new and fast strategic bomber capable of attacking targets in North America from across the North Pole. The most successful design was produced by the Tupolev team in the shape of the Tu-95, an air- craft which married the structural techniques involved in produc ing the Tu-4, and its later derivatives, to four huge turboprop engines mounted on swept wings.

The first derivative of the Tu-4 had been the Tu-70, the aircraft which had startled the Boeing designers back in 1947. It had initially been built to meet an Aeroflot specification but no orders were received for production aircraft. Tupolev then converted this design to a military transport freighter, designated Tu-75, but further development was not carried out.

In the area of strategic bomber design, the next derivative was, the Tu-80, a refinement of the Tu-4 and essentially similar to it except for a lengthened fuselage nose, enlarged vertical tail surface and other features to give it greater range. Two prototypes were completed but the design progressed no further than the evaluation stage.

By mid-1949, Tupolev’s bureau was busy developing what was to be the largest aircraft built in the Soviet Union up to that time, the Tu-85, which was really a scaled-up Tu-80. The Tu-85 began its flight test programme early in 1951 but by now the lessons of the Korean War were beginning to filter through and the decision was taken to abandon further development of this propeller driven bomber in order to concentrate on more advan- ced turbojet and turboprop powered designs. These, then, were the derivatives which led from the Tu-4 to the Tu-95, the new turboprop strategic bomber.

The Tu-95 incorporated a fuselage similar in structure to the abandoned Tu-85. Flight testing began in the summer of 1954 and seven pre-production aircraft made an appearance over Tushino on July 3, 1955. It entered service with the DA in the latter half of 1956 and remained the backbone of the Russian strategic bomber force for well over a decade. This plane was given the service designation of Tu-20 and was known to the west as the Bear (profiled in depth on p104, Nov 87 AA).

Powered by four 14,795 esp Kuznetsov NK-12N single shaft turboprops, the Bear attained a maximum speed of 540mph (870kph), a service ceiling of about 44,000ft (13,400m) and a range, with a 25,000lb (11,340kg) bomb load, of 7,800 miles (12,550km). Armament varied depending upon the particular version of the plane but usually it consisted of twin 23mm cannon in a radar directed tail turret and in dorsal and ventral barbettes. Tupolev also made use of identical systems and airframe structures, technology derived from B-29 ancestry, in the smaller twinjet Tu-16 Badger. Meanwhile, further development of the huge swept-wing concept led to the Tu-114 Cleat civil airliner and the Tu-126, fitted with a 36ft (11m) early warning radar scanner mounted above the fuselage, used as an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and code named Moss.

All of these aircraft have one thing in common- they share an ancestry which can be traced directly to those three B-29s which landed at Vladivostok back in 1944. These were the seeds from which the Soviet strategic bomber force grew. Like a bastard child which grew up and returned to taunt its parents so the unwanted legacy of the Matterhorn plan matured and returned to plague its originators.