Defence Update
Jindalee and Airborne Early Warning Get Go Ahead
Australia is virtually certain to acquire complementary systems to provide airborne early warning (AEW) and improved air and sea approach surveillance to upgrade the air defence of the north. This will include work to convert the present experimental Jindalee over-the-horizon/radar (OTHA) near Alice Springs to operational status.
The announcement of new initiatives aimed at significantly enhancing Australia’s defence capability was made by the Defence Minister, Mr Kim Beazley, on December 10, 1985. This was quickly followed by notification worldwide to interested companies of a Request for Proposal to be submitted by May 28 this year for data on the supply and support of aircraft, dirigibles and tethered balloon-borne radars.
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The AFP for the supply of Airborne Surveillance Warning and Control systems for the RAAF says, in its preamble, that Australia seeks to acquire and maintain an appropriate capability for surveillance of Australia’s sovereign airspace and approaches at alt levels in order to ensure early warning of any air/seaborne intrusion and to effect control of the countermeasures taken in response. Given existing and planned assets such as over-the-horizon radar (OTHA) and ground-borne radar (GBA) it is recognised that other elements of a National Air Defence and Control System (NADACS) might provide important complementary surveillance, tactical warning and, in some cases, control of interceptor aircraft.
The AFP sets out that such elements range through AEW aircraft, dirigibles (ie: airships) and tethered balloon-borne radars. Being airborne these elements provide superior coverage against low-flying aircraft and surface targets in comparison with ground-based microwave radars and in some case provide mobility which enhances the detection capability, flexibility and survivability of the system.
The proposals also are to provide costing data. Respondents will be able to offer alternative solutions if they desire. The information also is to cover the present availability status of systems together with estimated acquisition and life cycle costs of aircraft, or equivalent, avionics systems, components and spares.
After evaluation of responses, and subject to Government approval of the project, the options wilt be reduced to a short list of companies who will be invited to tender for the provision of the required systems. Respondents are invited to indicate if there is an optimum time for contract award which would permit significant cost savings to the Commonwealth in a consequence of planned production of other confirmed aircraft orders, and expected time intervals between contract signatures and aircraft delivery should be stated.
The Australian Government requires significant involvement of the Australian Industry in the development of the airborne surveillance, warning and control systems, particularly those subsystems that would be unique to the RAAF; in the development of the system software and in the integration of the role equipment into the aircraft. This is considered important in order to develop the skills and technological expertise of the industry to enable it to support the system during its service life. The quality of the proposal for All (Australian Industry Involvement) will be a major consideration in the acquisition strategy; however, any financial premium for All proposals will also be a consideration, the RFP outlines. It sets out detailed evaluation criteria, the operational setting, aircraft and system characteristics and technical aspects.
As background, the RAAF gives as its likely requirement four ASWAC aircraft but this could vary under an alternative solution proposed in respect of less mobile alternative systems to complement OTHA or aircraft of higher or lower capability levels.
The RAAF envisages the ASWAC aircraft will form an independent squadron with a home base in northern Australia. The squadron’s role could include surveillance, early warning, threat identification and definition, using passive and active sensor systems to provide detection at all levels: AEW and air defence support of maritime forces; monitoring the disposition and strength of an air or surface threat exposing feints and decoys; coordination and control of air combat action at maximum ranges, affording an in-depth defence cover; reducing risks to and attrition of alt friendly elements through the timely warning of enemy action; providing airspace and recovery control as necessary; long-range strategic maritime strike support; surface and coastal surveillance, support of ground forces; and nonmilitary support of Government departments such as Transport, Customs, Health, Immigration and Primary Industry.
The RAAF believes a squadron of four aircraft would fly 2400 hours a year, with the aircraft capable of deploying to and from bare-base locations with minimal support and undertaking multiple tasks simultaneously by different aircraft deployed to two different locations in the area of interest. The general operational capability required by the Department of Defence is to complement OTHR and other existing assets is largely dictated by environmental and geographic considerations particularly those related to _northern Australia and its approaches. The RFP says: “The various aircraft which could enhance OTHA in surveillance, or provide the capability to provide for warning of intrusions or control of intercepting assets should be assessed against those considerations. The overall capability sought would provide coverage of northern Australia and its approaches and would be most important in relation to the approaches to existing or planned military installations and major population centres”.
The various aircraft that could be proposed (aeroplanes, dirigibles and tethered BBRs) have different mobility characteristics, response times, surge capacity, and sustainability and are affected by weather to various degrees. Manning and support requirements will also differ. Air targets of possible interest include low-flying light aircraft, surveillance/ reconnaissance aircraft and fighter/attack aircraft flying high/low profiles. Sea targets of possible interest including wooden-hulled vessels, merchant ships and conventional naval vessels.
The RAAF is looking for a requirement in which aircraft would be able to cover 2500 nautical miles in a 10-hour mission and have a capacity of providing 24 hour coverage on station 200 nm from an operating base for short periods (ie, 3 days). The aircraft should have a fast reaction capability and a dash capability to allow investigation of targets detected by other sensors. The aircraft should be capable of detecting targets over land and water by day and night at any altitude up to 100,000 ft, determining their altitude and of effecting control of intercepting aircraft. Perceived RAAF requirements in radar detection ranges are: light flying bomber type aircraft -250nm; low flying fighter type aircraft -200nm; cruise missile -140nm; surface shipping -200nm.
The aircraft should have passive detection capability for electromagnetic and infrared emission. The system should possess communications and data handling/transfer equipment necessary to allow integration with ground and maritime systems and other participating elements, and be capable of accommodating four control stations, with some capacity for expansion.
Mr Beazley said recently preliminary work to convert the Jindalee OTHA to an operational system would start this year. The total cost of converting the present experimental facility to an operational system is expected to be about $40 million. The Jindalee system when fully developed should be able to detect most potential intruders well before they reach the Australian mainland – both in the air and on the sea.
Jindalee had demonstrated it was feasible to bounce radio waves off the ionosphere onto air and sea targets thousands of kilometres from Australian shores and then locate the targets by sophisticated computer analysis of the resulting faint radar echoes. He said it has been demonstrated that an operational OTHA system suitable for the Australian environment could be developed at a reasonable cost. Over-the-horizon radar had the great advantage over conventional radars of not being limited in range by the curvature of the earth, thus enabling the detection of low-flying aircraft and also ships more than 1,000krn from Australia’s coast.
Jindalee has been developed by Australian scientists at the Defence Science and Technology Organisation’s (DSTO) Electronics Research Laboratory at Salisbury, near Adelaide. The United States and the USSR had developed similar radars but they differed from the Australian system, Mr Beazley said. “So far as it is known, neither country has matched Australia’s radar in some important aspects of technology, including some of the unique computer processing techniques developed by Australian scientists,” he said. ”The experimental Jindalee system has been so successful that I have approved preliminary work to convert it to an operational system. The Defence Department also has begun a study of how this important technological development should be exploited in the future. This will determine how the conversion to an operational system will proceed, including how it will be integrated into the Defence Force’s command and control systems. ”
Mr Beazley said the study also would report on future developments, such as the establishment of additional radars to provide fuller coverage of Australia’s northern approaches and potential civilian applications in the areas of drug smuggling, illegal immigration and even weather forecasting. The study is being carried out by a team comprising DSTO scientists and engineers and RAAF and RAN personnel. It is due for completion in the first half of 1986 and when the results are available, he will seek Cabinet approval to move to a fully operational system.
Mr Beazley said that while Jindalee was a unique Australian response to an Australian defence problem, he expected that other systems incorporating airborne microwave radars, such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, which exploit overseas technology, could assist in solving other aspects of the airspace surveillance, control and interception requirement. In particular, AEW&C aircraft could be used to search for, and identify, targets at long range and then direct aircraft or ships to intercept and, if necessary, engage the target. They had particular use against low-flying intruders (compared with conventional ground radars) and in battle control of aircraft.
“The effectiveness of AEW&C systems can be enhanced by a wide area surveillance system such as OTHA which can provide very long-range warning of the approach of a threat,” the Minister outlined. “I envisage Jindalee and appropriate airborne surveillance systems being integrated into a broader national system which will gather information and channel it into our command centres where it will assist command decisions on the deployment of such assets as the new Hornet fighters, F-111s, our guided missile frigates and destroyers and the submarine force. ”
The RFP has been issued worldwide. While most responses are expected in the form of radar and communications equipment in conventional aircraft, consideration also is permitted of less conventional systems such as airships and tethered balloons. Mr Beazley noted that existing aircraft systems ranged from the highly capable USAF and NATO E-3A system based on the Boeing 707; and USN Hawkeye AEW aircraft through to a number of smaller aircraft options of much lower cost and capability. Lockheed also was developing a system based on the P-3 Orion, which is in service with the RAAF in the maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare role.
Mr Beazley said the information obtained on capabilities and costs would assist the Government in corning to informed judgements on the most appropriate capabilities to be acquired. If the Government gave the go-ahead, a shortlist of companies would be invited to tender. If necessary, the tender process would include funded studies to further define systems that are not yet operational.
The Minister believes Australian Industry is well placed to make a major contribution to establishing an integrated surveillance and control system. The skill base of technologies already being used on projects such as the Orion P-3C, the F-18A Hornet and the corning Navy Seahawk helicopters should provide a springboard that includes the electronics and computer software industries. Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd (AWA) and Computer Sciences of Australia Pty Ltd (CSA) already have been closely involved in support of Jindalee.
Further details of the AEW and Control and surveillance initiatives have been given by the Chief of Air Force Materiel, Air Vice Marshal Alan Heggen, and Dr Don Synnot from the Defence Science Research Centre at Salisbury. AVM Heggen said the provision of capabilities to look beyond our territorial limits and provide some form of distant early warning was an enormous task for a country of our land era but with a small population. The difficulty was to precisely identify, classify and locate intruders in time to direct air defence assets such as fighters or missiles against such threats. A chain of ground microwave radar stations around the coast was not only uneconomic but would not provide early warning for fighters that might operate well away from the coast if provided with in-flight refuelling. AVM Heggen said the solution was to put the radar aloft in an air vehicle and this was the basis of the RAAF’s interest in AEW and the need to establish an air defence system where and when required. This meant mobility. The RAAF was a strong supporter of OTHA and Jindalee and saw this and AEW&C as two complementary systems, which, within the constraints of resources, should enable the capabilities of the F-18 to be better exploited.
Dr Synnot said a modification probably would be required to enable the RAAF to use Jindalee as an operational system. According to officials, one operational set of the converted experimental Jindalee system should be available in 1987-88.
What will need to be determined is whether perhaps two more sets should be installed to give what could be a total cover of northern Australia and perhaps whether eventually some southern cover might be needed. As it is now, the basic radar cover is limited to 60-70 miles.
The RAAF’s three fighter squadrons will become operational on Hornets progressively in 1987, 1988 and 1989, but the AEW&C capability will not be available, if approved, until 1990- 91. It is envisaged that Jindalee would be a 24-hour system, ranging out several thousand kilometres. The actual range is classified and is said simply to exceed 1000km from the coast. ASWAC would give Jindalee precision as the Jindalee system does not define height.
The area that the Jindalee system covers also is classified, but is believed to range out over the north-west waters from the Australian coast. Additional systems should see coverage from the wide-ranging steering arcs from say south of North-West Cape near Exmouth, WA, to Cape York Peninsula and down the Queensland coast. The present system has a listening aerial of 2. 8km and can be ‘steered’ electronically to vary its direction. The complementary systems range from the Balloon-Borne Radar through which a tethered aerostat or balloon could carry a microwave radar to increase low altitude detection from 20nm to 100nm if tethered at an altitude of 10,000 ft, airships which have mobility and greater height finding capability than the BBR, and conventional aircraft.
Much will depend on the proposals offered. But at this stage, some advisers consider airships would be highly vulnerable to military action. As for conventional aircraft, the favourite on practical and economic grounds still appears to be the Lockheed P-3 Orion fitted with AEW&C. However, Boeing, whose E-3A Sentry would be regarded as too expensive, may offer a cheaper 737 option. Grumman is expected to offer an E-2C Hawkeye with more powerful engines which would give the required 10-hour endurance. Other possibilities also are certain to emerge in the months ahead. D
(Max Hawkins Is the Editor of Defence Industry Newsletter. )
embodies a level of technology superior to either its American or Soviet
Counterparts. (DoD)
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