Who’s At The Lookout

One area of grave concern is Australia’s total lack of mobile medium and deep sea anti-submarine warfare support within the RAN. The retirement of HMAS Melbourne and the decision of the politicians not to replace her has seen to that, and that decision’s implications have had an effect on much more than “just” the Navy. For once, the RAN and RAAF agree. This lack of ASW cap. ability is critical, and a solution must be found. The retirement of the Melbourne, the sale of her A-4 Skyhawks to New Zealand, the loss of the S-2 Trackers, and the enforced grounding of the Sea King anti-submarine helicopters as a result have left the following major problems for the two services: * The lack of mobile deep-sea ASW capability, as mentioned earlier, a role that cannot be totally assumed by any land-based aircraft, even one as capable as the RAAF’s Orions. * The lack of an inexpensive and effective aircraft (the Skyhawk) well suited to the fleet support role due to its ability to operate from Nowra with useful endurance.

*A $100 million proven and effective asset (the Sea Kings) at worst sitting at Nowra doing nothing, at best “listening for fish”, as one interested party put it.

*The RAAF’s already stretched Mirage resources are being used to support the Fleet despite severe operational limits due to that aircraft’s inability to operate from Nowra with worthwhile endurance. The expensive exercise of sending them down from RAAF Williamtown with a still limited endurance is the option, as Mirages, unlike Skyhawks, have no “buddy” refuelling capability.

*The need (in the near future) for the RAAF to use their new F-18 Hornets to practise aerial refuelling techniques, when the Skyhawks could have performed that and other roles as well as supporting the Fleet.

*The fact that there is no sign of relief for the medium and deep sea ASW problem at least until the Sikorsky S-70B Seahawks come into service on the decks of our FFG7 frigates. . . in 1989. Even then the gap will be far from filled.

At the moment, fleet support is being provided by Mirages of the enlarged (due to the incorporation of the Mirage OCU activities and ex-Navy Macchis) 77 Squadron at Williamtown. One-third of 77’s activities are now in support of the Fleet, operating with long-range tanks and usually at low altitudes with the resultant high fuel consumption and added stress on the ageing Mirage airframes. The need to get the Mirages the nearly 300 kilometres back to Williamtown restricts their on-task time to about 40 minutes.

Similarly, Nowra’s relatively short 6800 ft strip severely restricts a Mirage’s take-off weight (and thus its ability to carry external fuel or stores), especially on a warm day. In this condition the aircraft’s on-task time is again around the 40 minutes mark.

February this year saw an experiment in Mirage operations from Nowra when 75 Squadron was normally based in Darwin. operated for a two-week period using small external tanks. The RAAF installed crash barriers (due to the short runway) and had to bring in their own support men and equipment as the RAN facilities had run down to almost nothing. The results of the experiment will be known soon.

The whole ASW helicopter situation requires careful dissection. Firstly, the Sea Kings, $100 million worth of first-class equipment being wasted at the moment due to the lack of a suitable vessel on which to carry them. With the hope of a dedicated aircraft carrier now obviously completely lost to the Navy, attention has turned to the conversion of bulk ships for use in the medium and deep sea ASW role. A study has been conducted on this with the “Australian Venture” as the ship in question, but nothing has been released on the study’s conclusions or recommendations other than to mothball the concept till an identifiable threat is apparent! Meanwhile, the Sea Kinge – the newest of which are less than two years old – just sit there, unable to perform their primary ASW role or the secondary but vitally important roles of long distance targeting information and guidance for the Ikara missiles fitted to several current ships.

Even the belated decision to order the Seahawks to equip the FFG frigates – although generally welcome – could have some hiccups in its reasoning. The idea is to constantly provide the following capabilities (as outlined in “The Navy” magazine): blockading enemy submarines into their bases (to be carried out by the RAN submarine fleet); deep reconnaissance and submarine destruction (provided to a limited extent by the Orions); middle distance work involving search and destruction of enemy submarines, a task formerly carried out by Melbourne’s Grumman Trackers and a role which will fall to the Seahawks; airborne direction of ship-borne submarine destruction capability (another Seahawk role); shallow water location and destruction of submarines and provision of operational command and control.

The key word here is “constant”. It’s no use having the cap-ability five days a week with half a day on Wednesdays and the weekends off! The only way this capability can be provided is with more FFGs (six are coming), more Seahawks (at the moment only eight are on order) and to get the Sea Kings out to sea where they belong.

The Sea Kings are too large to operate from an FFG, but the problem is that each of these ships is designed to carry two helicopters, while at the moment there will be sufficient helicopters for only four ships, making no allowance for aircraft in reserve, committed to training, out of service for whatever reason and attrition. One solution, of course, is to carry only one Seahawk per ship in peacetime (the Navy’s intended deployment) and two in time of war. But where are the extra aircraft going to come from? And what about that constant capability required.

Undoubtedly, the Seahawk is an extremely capable helicopter, larger than its main rival for the RAN order, the Westland Lynx 3, and also capable of longer endurance missions with a bigger payload. On the other hand it is very much more expensive than the battle-proven Lynx and the question must be asked: would the Navy have been better off with more of the British helicopters for the same or less money? In March 1983 the following options were available to the Government: * Acquire eight Seahawks for four FFGs at a cost of $368 million. Later acquire four more Seahawks for the two later FFGs.

* Acquire 10 Lynx 3s now and four more later at a total cost of $245 million.

* Acquire 14 Lynx 3s for the FFGs and send the Sea Kings to sea on a bulk ship such as the “Australian Venture” for a total cost including the purchase of the “Australian Venture” and upgrading the Sea Kings to the latest standard (as supplied to the Indian Navy) of $331 million.

Perhaps in view of the realistic needs of the Navy (and the RAAF, who are involved in the problem whether they like it or not) an option other than the one taken would have been more viable in the long run. That is for the experts to decide.

It appears inevitable that this large gap in our defence capabilities cannot be filled between now and close to the end of the decade. However, it is not too late to ensure the gap is closed after that, providing the right decisions – decisions made on military rather than political grounds are made in the very near future.